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PREFACE
This study attempts to bring out the economic phase of the
administration of Cardinal Richelieu. At present he is rightly
regarded as one of the great French statesmen. He is more
than that, for he may well be considered one of the first economic
leaders in French history. This is the central theme of the
treatise and although the study cannot claim to be regarded as a
final treatment of the subject, nevertheless, if it should aid in the
development of similar investigations in the future, the writer
would feel amply repaid.
The attempt has been made here to use as fully as possible the
letters, contemporary memoirs, the interesting Mercure Francois
and other sources available in a consideration of this fascinating
age.
This study was carried on mainly in graduate work at the Uni-
versity of Illinois. It is impossible therefore to thank all persons
to whom the writer is indebted for advice and criticism. Es-
pecial gratitude is due to Professor A. H. Lybyer of the Univer-
sity of Illinois, whose scholarly direction and inspiring criticism
have made this study possible. Acknowledgement should also be
made of the many valuable suggestions given by Professor L. M.
Larson of the University of Illinois, and Professors H. I. Priest-
ley and C. E. Chapman of the University of California. Fin-
ally, grateful notice should be taken of the kind and efficient way
in which the staff of the library of the University of Illinois
has assisted in the search for materials.
FRANKLIN CHARLES PALM
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
MAY 26, 1922

THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU
Car chacun sait que, quoique vous fassiez,
En guerre, en paix, en voyage, en affairs,
Vous vous trouvez toujours dessus vos pieds.
Works of Voiture, II, 426-7.
Edition Ubicini.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
If one were to ask the average well informed individual con-
cerning the career of the Cardinal de Richelieu, the reply would
be one which would convey little more than an intelligent appre-
ciation of the political acts of this great and interesting man, for
these have been regarded as constituting the dominant phase of
his life. His genius along this line was clearly brought out in his
conduct of the French participation in the Thirty Years' War,
his settlement of the religious question in France, and his relations
with foreign powers, the nobility, the Pope, the Queen Mother,
and other eager opponents of his ideas.
' ' One is accustomed by
habit to consider Richelieu in his struggle against Austria on
the outside, the nobles and Protestants on the inside, as only
a diplomat of keen and profound conceptions, a statesman ad-
vancing to his designs with an unflinching energy, tfee founder
of the absolute monarchy.
' ' *
There is another side to his career which had no inconsiderable
importance in directing and influencing his entire life and
achievements, namely, the economic phase. History has placed
such an emphasis on the other part of his life that it is difficult
even to ask if economic interests held any place in that spirit
which was agitated by such great designs. For example, did
Richelieu have an economic purpose in his capture of La Ro-
chelle ? Was his aim in entering the Thirty Years
' War purely
political? Did the Cardinal have an economic philosophy? It
is to be the purpose of this study to determine the economic
elements which entered into the life and deeds of Richelieu,
and thereby to establish the claim that this man was not only
a magnificent statesman, but also an able economist, with all the
crude but important economic conceptions of his time. To build
France up as a strong unit, both political and economic, was
i Pigeonneau, H., Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 vols., Paris, 1889,
II, 375.
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the goal of his ambition, which a premature death prevented him
from reaching.
The economic aspect of Richelieu's achievements has been
generally neglected, although it has been noticed by a few
writers. One says that "most historians have glided rapidly
over the economic side of Richelieu's career." 2 Others have
claimed that there is a gap in our general histories, and that, if
Richelieu had despised or neglected economic problems it would
have shown a weakness in his spirit. Yet, far from putting
them back to second place, he brought them to the front
and studied them with passion. He certainly did not im-
part second-rate ideas in his treatment of commerce, the
marine, and colonization. 3 Another writer who has treated
Richelieu's career from the administrative point of view, claims
that the Cardinal's work as an administrator was not inferior
to his political ability. He created in all directions a vigorous
impulsion to national energy, which if continued along those
lines would have produced wonderful results.* The same writer
in defending the case of Richelieu as far as concerns his entire
administrative career has succeeded in bringing to light the
economic aspect of the man. In fact, most of his administrative
reforms were of direct or indirect ecbnomic importance. When
he proceeds to point out the fact that Richelieu centralized the
monarchy and laid France open to administrative reforms, by
ruining the political positions of the Protestants and the nobles,
by giving the council of state a superior place, by diminishing
the power of local government and establishing fixed duties in
the generalites
5 he really indicates the first steps taken toward
an economic reform of the country which Richelieu fully in-
tended to carry through. Many difficulties, however, prevented
the great minister from accomplishing all he desired. Most
people have neglected to take these into consideration and thus
he has been denied a fair judgment of his career upon the eco-
nomic side.
His great internal and external achievements seem im-
zPigeonneau, II, 375-6.
8/Md., 376.
<Caillet, J., L'Administration en France sous \e Ministere du Cardinal
de Richelieu, Paris, 1857, Introduction, I-IV.
e
Caillet, Introduction, I-IV.
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possible when one considers his poor physical health.
6 Sick
throughout his life, one wonders how he was able to carry out
or even to conceive the things he did. Then there were the
many external and internal difficulties to be removed, some of
which were of a sort directly opposed to the material develop-
ment of any nation, as the Huguenot situation, for example.
Indeed, says one writer, the historian who studies the greatest
statesman France ever had without considering the gravity of
the internal situation at that time and the many difficulties
of the internal organization ; without appreciating the diversity
of provinces, and the multiplicity of their franchises; without
seeing the clash of religious beliefs, the variety of taxes,
customs, etc., in permanent conflict; without considering the
immense interests of the kingdom and the conditions of its
power and security, will never comprehend either the power
or the ability of this man, or the genius of his work.7 The
pressing need to attack these many difficulties is best illustrated
in the opening passages of Richelieu's Testament Politique,
where he. maintained that his first problems were to ruin the
political power of the Huguenots, lower the pride of the nobles,
reduce all rebellious subjects to their duties, and raise the king 's
name again in foreign affairs to the place where it ought to be.8
A good example of the difficulties encountered by Richelieu
is shown in the opposition of public opinion or sections of it.
In fact in 1626 he was accused of ruining the rights and interests
of France by remaining at peace. This accusation was voiced
by some so-called "libelles" in Germany, who saw no good in his
actions.9 However, it is interesting to notice that the "theolog-
ians" in reply maintain that the reasons which guided the king
and the Cardinal with regard to the so-called resolutions of peace
are unrecognized by his opponents. "Why not praise what has
been accomplished rather than condemn what has not been
carried out? Since you bear the names of Christians would
it not be better to judge those things which are beneath the
6/&id., VI-IX.
7 Montcretien, A., Traicte de I'Oeconomie Politique, Ed., Th. Funck-
Brentano, Paris, 1889, Introduction, XCI.
s Richelieu, A. J., Cardinal, due de, Testament Politique, Londres, 1770,
pt. I, 8-26.
*>Mercure Francois, le (1604-44), a Paris, XII, 516-18.
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surface rather than to condemn the surface indications?" In
other words criticised by some because he fostered wars, and
by others because he made peace, his problems were very modern
indeed, and it is no wonder that many sides of his career (the
economic for example) have been submerged because of a mis-
taken perspective of the difficulties involved.
It seems profitable, therefore, to dwell for a while upon the
economic activities of Eichelieu and to show that most phases of
his administration were more or less influenced by them. To
trace the economic thread is the problem of this study. This
involves an examination of its importance in the confusing
unsolved period of the first half of the seventeenth century, the
age of Richelieu.
CHAPTER II
THE AGE OF MERCANTILISM
The seventeenth century was distinctly the age when mercan-
tilism reached its height. Mercantilism was the natural out-
come of a series of historical events which caused men to grasp
and understand the economic theories of the doctrine without
realizing that they really were developing a distinct school of
economic thought. It did not take long, however, to discover
and to formulate, along definite lines, the philosophy behind it,
once it had become the cardinal feature of the nation's develop-
ment. It is desirable to distinguish some of the important
factors which led to the practical application of mercantilistic
ideas and the consequent theoretical formulation, because, as
will be shown, Richelieu based his entire administration on the
principles of the mercantilistic doctrine and in doing so was one
of the most enlightened exponents of that system.
The mercantilistic age seems to fall in the period of transition
from medieval to modern conditions, and really grew out of
those changes. "la fact," says one writer, "the decomposition
of medieval feudal life into modern existence is one of the two
chief aspects of modern life. ' ' * He goes on to say that the new
system based on individual activity and scientific conviction
has superseded the old military activity and supernatural be-
liefs of the middle age. Thus he maintains that industry has
been substituted for warfare. It often seems better to con-
sider industry as another cause for warfare. Moreover, the
beginnings of the separation of church and state, thd growth of
commerce and industries, and the discovery of the new world
with all its important consequences had a strong influence in
developing the modern era to the detriment of the medieval
age with its feudalistic basis of existence. They resulted in the
growth of the state as the vital force which was to expel all
1
Bridges, F. H., France under Bichelieu and Colbert, Edinburgh, 1866,
5-10.
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the needless and unhappy phases of the past ages, and a new
kind of feudalism came into existence in which the state, or
its king, was the actual feudal lord and his subjects were his
vassals. As a result when one reaches the stage in history where
the state takes the lead in controlling the destinies of man, then
appears the modern age and with it the so-called period of mer-
cantilism.
As to a definition of the mercantilistic age, it may best be
defined in terms of the state. "It is not," says Schmoller,
"so much a doctrine of money or tariff barriers, protective
duties, ior navigation laws as it is a doctrine which involves
something far greater, namely, the total transformation of soci-
ety, and its organization as well as that of the state and its in-
stitutions, in the replacing of a local and territorial policy by
that of the state. Now followed a struggle between state and
district against the great nobility, the towns, the corporations,
and provinces, the economical as well as the political blending
of the struggle of these isolated groups into large wholes, the
struggle for uniform measures and coinage and for a well
ordered currency and credit.
' ' 2 Thus the mercantilistic doc-
trine was that philosophy which centered everything economic
and political in the hands of the state.
When one assumes the general definition of Schmoller, that
mercantilism implies state-building, it is also necessary to realize
that this general idea includes a series of theories which prevailed
to various degrees in different minds: in the first place, a
tendency towards overestimating the importance of possessing
a large amount of precious metals; secondly, towards an undue
exaltation (a) of industry which works up material over indus-
try which provides it, and (b) of foreign trade over domestic;
thirdly, towards attaching too high a value to a dense population
as an element of national strength ; and fourthly, towards invok-
ing the action of the state in furthering artificially the attain-
ments of the several ends thus proposed as desirable.3 Thus
the three earmarks of the mercantile system are: (1) attention
to commerce (the importance of which was exaggerated), (2)
cultivation of a favorable balance of trade, (3) prohibition in
2 Schmoller, G., The Mercantile System, New York, 1902, 51.
s Ingram, J. K., History of Political Economy, London, 1904, 36-37.
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duties, bounties, and development of monopolies, etc.
4 All these
things led to the struggle of nations not only for political but for
economical predominance. States became, as it were, artificial
hothouses for the rearing of urban industries, etc. 5 Most of these
characteristics will be found existing during the administration
of the great Cardinal.
In following out the policies of his administration, Richelieu
conformed approximately to the common mercantilistic con-
ception as described above. In doing so he was especially for-
tunate in having certain predecessors to guide him in his actions.
Henry IV and his minister, Sully, laid the foundation or at
least made the excavations for the economic system of that
century. The economist Montchretien drew up in 1615 the
first French work on the subject of economics. Its crude but
timely ideas correspond to the theoretical basis for Richelieu's
administration. It represented the thought of the time and so
Richelieu, whether he read it or not, followed its precepts with
astonishing accuracy. This work together with the contributions
of Henry IV and Sully requires brief consideration.
The age of Henry IV and Sully marked the rise in France
of a consciousness of the economic side of life. People had not
been really aware of its presence in the fifteenth century. The
progress of public peace and well being, the influence of the
Italian custom, had given to the commerce of luxuries an impulse
hitherto unknown. The age of discoveries had awakened the
enterprise of the Norman mariners who began following in the
tracks of the Portuguese and Spanish navigators about the same
time as the English.6 Thus France began to assume a place of
economic as well as political importance in the affairs of the
world. As a consequence the men at the head of the government,
whether they were kings or prime ministers, began to consider
and solve matters which were primarily of economic importance,
on that basis alone, and were influenced in their political
policies by the economic results to be obtained thereby.
Louis XI, at the close of the fifteenth century, initiated the
economic growth of France especially by his centralization and
* Ibid., 50.
s Ibid., 39.
6 Pigeonneau, II, 54-55.
20 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [562
unification of the government. But it was left to Henry IV and
Sully, who came in after the religious wars, at the end of the
sixteenth century, to make the first direct efforts to solve the
commercial questions confronting the French nation.
The first problem encountered was the proposition of securing
internal peace. The edict of Nantes settled the matter so far
as the religious strife was concerned. The nobles were also
subdued by a combination of payments and force. Thus in a
short time both Henry and Sully were ready to strengthen
the economic position of France. Now at this time existed the
peculiar situation where a king and his helper both had their
own ideas on the subject and tried to carry them out regardless
of the opinion of the other party. For example, Henry IV en-
deavored to make France, and especially Paris, the artistic and
industrial center of the world, much to the disgust of Sully, who
favored the encouragement of agriculture. 7 As a consequence,
France at this time underwent a temporary expansion in agricul-
ture, industry, colonies, the marine, and internal and external
commerce.
By their accomplishments Henry IV and Sully laid, in a more
or less haphazard and incomplete way, the foundations which
Richelieu and Colbert were to complete or ruin. One writer
aptly sums up the work of Henry IV as follows :
' ' He did his
best to facilitate the downfall of the old system (feudal) and
to encourage the new. He tried to remove the shackles upon
industry and commerce; to improve the finances and found
trans-Atlantic colonies, etc. He looked forward to a common
European arbitration agreement, of a universal peace, and to
accomplish this which might be by others defined as a policy
of the balance of power, he set in motion the movement against
the forces of retardation, namely Austria and Spain.
" 8 In
other words, the policy of Henry IV was directed in one way
along the line of international relations, and thus, while atten-
tion was given to the building up of the state, it was not the
central theme of his administration. However, all of these
excellent and well planned policies were ended when Henry IV
was killed in 1610, and fourteen years of economic, as well as
political stagnation, were to follow.
7 Pigeonneau, II, 289-290.
s Bridges, 25-26.
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A certain writer says that "the death of Henry IV was de-
plorable in that the brilliant impulses which he had impressed
on the economic life of the country were stopped and existed
no more.
' ' 9 This is not wholly true, for one can find in the
treatise of Montchretien a clear presentation of the doctrine of
the time, and this work had a definite influence on the economic
future of France. Yet, in a practical sense, the tasks of Henry
IV were incomplete. "The peasants existed but that was all;
credit and commerce reestablished themselves with difficulty;
the systems of roads and canals were only outlined; colonial
experiences had only begun and habits of order, of economy,
and of honesty, which Sully had introduced into the financial
administration, had not yet become traditions, etc.
' ' 10
It would be interesting to speculate upon what might have
occurred if the rule of Richelieu had succeeded that of Henry
IV in 1610. But as it actually happened, the government de-
clined rapidly under Marie de Medicis. She was not able to
understand or follow the good policy of her husband. The
money saved by Sully was spent, taxes increased, colonies and
the marine were neglected, and the new colonial policy was saved
only through the energy and ability of Champlain.11
The death of Henry IV then meant an industrial crisis both of
a commercial and monetary nature. Troubles which he had set-
tled appeared again. Foreign states disregarded treaties with
France, excluded French commerce, sank French vessels, and
imposed unfair duties upon French vessels entering their ports,
in spite of the privileges they had in French harbors. Things
went from bad to worse until finally in 1614 a meeting of the
Estates general was called in a vain effort to remedy the
situation.
The result of this gathering was not insignificant. Riche-
lieu, in his Memoirs, says that the assembly ended as it began,
by doing nothing to advantage for either the king or the public.
"It was a financial burden in itself," he claims, "while the
corruption it opposed still continued." 12 He fails, however,
Gouraud, C. M., Histoire de la Politique Commercial de la France et son
Influence sur le Progres de la Bichesse Publique, Paris, 1854, 174-175.
! Pigeonneau, II, 350-352.
11 Ibid.
12 Richelieu, A. J., Cardinal, due de, Memoires, (Petitot Edition), vols.
X-XXX, Paris, 1821-1829, X, 383.
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to mention the fact that the king promised to carry out the
reforms asked by the assembly and neglected to do so. The in-
teresting features of the gathering are that it indicates a reaction
against the bad conditions of the time, that Richelieu was
present at the meeting and thus realized what was wrong, and
finally, that Montchretien was led to publish his Traicte de
I'oeconomie politique, in which he planned a solution for the
troubles of France. The Cardinal must have been strongly
affected by these two events, and his later actions indicate
that he was. 13 Thus, at the very beginning of his career eco-
nomic problems were placed before him alongside of the benefic-
ial, practical beginnings of Henry IV and Sully, so that he
could not help but be influenced by all these things. It is im-
portant, indeed, that the ideas were furnished by an assembly
of the people, and by the first French economist. Surely the
modern world in a commercial sense, both practically and theo-
retically, began for France at that period.
Montchretien was very careful in his work to develop his idea
of a paternalistic form of government. "The education of the
nation," he said,
"
is the same as in the family." 14 However,
there are some liberal conceptions in this treatment, as he
recognized the development of the third estate and a certain
amount of individualism.15 Furthermore, he maintained that
the social organization extends beyond the interest of individuals
and the family, of the locality and the province, or even the
particular interest of the nation.
16 This idea involves a multi-
plicity of relations between the different divisions of the govern-
ment and territories which only great men by their genius can
comprehend, and by their position and resources can justify
so as to increase the general prosperity, or, aided by science
and guided by the experience of individuals, can the practice
justify, according to the theories of political economy. In other
words, he said that the situation called for a great man, and
indeed a great leader in the person of Richelieu presently took
is Montchretien based his work upon the accomplishments of Henry
IV. Eichelieu and Colbert carried out the industrial and commercial con-
ceptions depicted in his treatise. See Montchretien, Introduction, LXXXIX.
i* Montchr4tien, Introduction, LV.
uJ., Introduction, LVI.
id., Introduction, XXV.
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advantage of the opportunity, and carried out the major part
of the program outlined by Montchretien. A brief summary of
the leading ideas of this early economist may be given, arranged
in relation to similar ideas or practices on the part of Richelieu.
He begins in his treatise by describing to the king the excellent
resources and situation of France. Richelieu in his Testament
Politique repeated Montchretien 's ideas almost verbatim.
17 He
then complains that France lacks men to invent and to do. Too
many of her men go to Spain, England, Germany, and Flanders.
Richelieu had this same idea, as will be shown later. He then
advocates the development of agriculture and manufactures,
so important to the strength of a nation. The whole tone of the
book is to "build up the power of the French nation with the
rich resources available," a true mercantilistic doctrine. He
advises the king to study the commercial systems of England
and Holland as accounting for their remarkable growth. Mont-
chretien continuously had the interests of France at heart and
does not consider outside interests as Henry IV did. The Cardi-
nal conforms with his view in this respect. Montchretien
recognizes both free trade and protection as combined and not
separate. "Send your surplus abroad," he says, "but keep
what you need and protect it." To carry out this idea both ex-
ternal and internal trade have important roles. However, it
is with foreign commerce that he is chiefly concerned, as was also
the case with Richelieu.
"All society, generally speaking," he says, "seems to be com-
posed of government and commerce.
' ' 18 Thus the merchants
are an important class of people. The stress laid upon com-
merce by Richelieu will be shown later. Both believe that gold
and silver are important, as they supply the necessities for all
men; and it is interesting to note that both men in their ideas
concerning commerce, industry, etc., constantly refer to the
public good, whose interests they claim to follow.
Montchretien devotes especial attention to commercial rela-
tions with England. That country he claims limits the use of
the products of French industries in England, for her own*
benefit, while obtaining fair treatment for her own goods in
IT Testament Politique II, 133-135.
is Montchr6tien, 137-146.
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France.19 Everything possible is done to ruin French com-
merce by extra taxes, etc. England desires to get control of
navigation. One thus can see that the commercial rivalry be-
tween France and England was coming to the front at this
time, and it actually* was to be one of the first problems con-
fronting the Cardinal.
Montchretien, on the other hand, admires Holland and desires
France to be on good terms with her.20 The fact that they are
so near and have mutual interests makes it best to be on friendly
terms. Kichelieu also had a great admiration for what the
Hollanders had accomplished. Both of them wished France
to study her and imitate what she had done rather than actually
to compete with her.
As to Spain, Montchretien complains about the failure to
treat French traders in Spain as Spanish traders are treated
in France. He says, "French subjects are not allowed or per-
mitted in Spain except if they wish to enrich the king of Spain.
She is jealous of her colonies and taxes French traders un-
fairly.
" 21 As a result, he claims that it is the duty of the
French to see that they are treated justly by the Spanish, as
the Dutch have done for their own citizens. "For if Holland
could do this, cannot we ?
" A policy of this nature will lead to
the augmentation, the welfare, and the repose of France, and the
employment and use of its most courageous subjects, who would
like nothing better than to undertake long and difficult duties.
By authorizing and protecting the trade of France, this policy
will increase commerce. Spanish ships have orders to destroy all
French vessels found on the ocean, whether they are Huguenot or
Catholic. Thus it is the task of the king to restore the use of
the sea, which is common and free to all the world, and on which
the French have a natural and legitimate right. How well this
part of his work was carried out by Richelieu, who believed in
these ideas, will be brought out later. It may be added that no
better proof of the early economic rivalry between England,
is Montchretien, 196-197. Montchretien believed that the severe treatment
of foreigners originated by England had resulted in a commercial and mone-
tary crisis. He opposed any concession to that nation except on the basis
of reciprocity. See Montchretien, 129-130, footnote; 134-135.
20
Ibid., 207-208.
21 Ibid., 208-209.
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Spain, and France can be obtained than in this treatise by
Montchretien, an enlightened contemporary.
Turning to the Levant, he urges the development of silk man-
ufactures at home, instead of obtaining these articles from the
Levant, a wasteful method because of the heavy duties imposed
by the Levantine countries and Italy. He refers to the at-
tempts of England to form a company in the Levant, and
after affirming the fact that Russia constitutes a new outlet for
trade, he turns to -a discussion of colonization. He was a strong
advocate of efforts along this line. Thus he advises the formation
of companies like the Dutch East Indian company (the one
formed in 1595). ''Such companies," he says, "would make
France strong and powerful.
' ' 22
His treatment of financial conditions in France was based
on the cardinal principle of preserving peace and quiet in the
land and being fair with the people. He says that there were
great riches in the land which would aid the true finances of the
country. They were wheat, salt, wine, cloth, and silk. "This
country is so flourishing and abundant in all that one can desire
that it is not necessary to borrow from one 's neighbors.
" 23 It is
not at all the abundance of gold and silver, or the quantity of
pearls and diamonds which makes the state wealthy, but it is the
resources of things necessary to maintain life, etc. Montchretien
had absolute faith that the resources of France were such as to
solve all financial troubles if used properly. Both Richelieu
and the economist had a sublime trust in the ability of the
French to overcome all commercial odds by this means. Both
desired to conserve the people and make them happy. Just
as the owner of a large plantation wants to build it up to its
greatest extent, both economically and physically, so these
two interesting men desired to build up France commercially and
also to increase the happiness of the people, not only by internal
means but by external additions of colonies to be obtained by the
development of navigation.24
Now in order to put down the colonial rivals of France not
only a strong army but a strong navy was needed. Like Riche-
22 Montchretien, 248-255.
23 Ibid., 237-244.
24 Hid., 283.
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lieu, Montchretien discusses the geographical position of France
with its two oceans, etc. He urges the development of the ad-
mirality. Again, like the Cardinal, he cites the success of Holland
on the sea, "If Henry IV had used his money to build up
harbors instead of the useless canal de Braire, our commerce
would be much greater than it is at present.
" 2t> To develop
commerce and a strong marine, and thereby make a strong state,
was constantly in his mind. At this point it may be added that
both Montchretien and Richelieu, advised the king to encourage
the building of boats by financial support or to sell some vessels
himself, to be used for trade outside of the kingdom. The very
fact that the Cardinal as soon as he came into office turned his
attention toward colonization, the building up of a marine, and
commerce in general, indicates that he was strongly influenced
by similar views, perhaps obtained from Montchretien 's treatise.26
Both men claimed that they were actuated by the purpose
of "the public welfare," as being the greatest aim of the king.
They appreciate the importance of each of the three estates.
Richelieu emphasized that of the nobles, and Montchretien the
third estate. They both desired to increase the riches of the
people by means of the development of the arts and manufac-
tures, the increase of navigation, and the reestablishment of
commerce, which was perishing day by day in the kingdom. 27
One cannot help but notice the similarity between the intro-
duction of Richelieu's Testament Politique and Montchretien's
work. Both bring out the disorders of the time and the reme-
dies to be undertaken in order to enrich the crown and the
asMontchre'tien, 306-308.
26 For further views of Montchretien concerning the duties of the King,
the people, the Estates General, the finances and the laws, all of which are
closely related to Richelieu's ideas, see Montchretien, 336-354.
2? Montchretien, 3, note. An interesting comparison might be made of
this quotation of Montchretien's with one of Richelieu's, regarding the gov-
ernment. "Si la nature des disordres ou vous vivons maintenant portait
que vous fissiez deux reformations differentes, 1'une a 1'appetit du commun,
et 1'autre par les vrayes maximes d'etat et de police que 1 'usage des affaires
vous apprend je ne doute point que le semblable n'arrivast."
Richelieu: "II semble, fait dire Richelieu a Louis XIII dans le pre-
amble de la declarations de 1641, que 1 'establissement des monarches estant
fonde par le government d'un seul, cet ordre est comme I'ame que anime et
que leur inspire autant de force et de vigeur qu 'a et de perfection.
' '
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state. There seems to be no doubt in the mind of Montchretien 's
editor that Richelieu did read the work. "Richelieu," he said,
"was the deputy of the clergy at the Estates General when
Montchretien published his treatise, so not only the industrial
and commercial measures of the Cardinal, but also the maxims
on commerce, the marine, and manufactures which one finds in
his Testament Politique, reflect the spirit of Montchretien.
' ' 28
Other writers have similar views on this issue. For example,
one maintains that Richelieu's theories concerning commerce
and navigation were not original.
' 'He borrowed or derived them
from documents of the reign of Henry IV, of which the cahiers
of the assembly of notables of 1617 and 1627, and the Estates
General of 1614 were one source and MontcLretien 's Traicte
d'Oeconomie Politique was another, from which the Cardinal
obtained many of his views.
' ' 29 Another writer brings out the
fact that Montchretien provided the colonial formula for Riche-
lieu to follow. ' 'As regards colonial companies,
' ' he says,
' ' Mont-
chretien recalls the methods followed by Holland and England,
forestalling Richelieu or rather giving him a formula." 80 (He
refers to the Cardinal's speech at the assembly of notables, to
be taken up later.) Montchretien claimed that there was no
better way to carry on colonies than by societies such as Hol-
land used, or a council of many individuals instead of one in-
dividual effort. So colonial exploitation by privileged companies
is the means advised by the economist. He is thus in that respect
the inspirer of the political economy of Richelieu. He has
formulated all the economic principles of the seventeenth cen-
tury and is the first and the most penetrating of the seventeenth
century economists. This study will attempt to show how Riche-
lieu took up many of his ideas and tried to put them into execu-
tion.
That the Cardinal ever read the book is not known because
he has never, so far as can be ascertained, mentioned the name
of Montchretien in his writings. The similarity, however, be-
tween the views of the two would indicate that the Cardinal
28 Montchretien, Introduction, XX-XXI.
2 Pigeonneau, II, 381-382.
so Desehamps, L., Histoire de la Question Coloniale en France, Paris,
1891, 61-62.
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did so. The letters and memoirs of Richelieu prove that
he was interested in these problems, and the fact that he favored
literary efforts of all kinds, and would be likely to read a
treatise dedicated to the Queen Mother and her son Louis
XIII, strengthens the probability of his having read it. The
important deduction to be made is the existence of a general
economic tendency both theoretical and practical in France
when Richelieu came to power. The mercantilistic doctrine with
the state as a center was the natural commercial philosophy
for a statesman to follow. And while this statement might seem
to detract from the originality of Richelieu's beliefs, this is
not so when one looks into the matter. For, although a man
may not conceive a view, it takes a certain amount of genius and
originality to make the practical application. The ideas of Mont-
chretien required economic statesmanship of a high grade. (An
inquiry may now be made whether the Cardinal possessed that
quality together with his political capacity.) Was Cardinal
Richelieu not only a political but also an economic statesman?
To what extent did he continue the practical accomplishments
of Henry IV and Sully, and carry out the theories of Mont-
chretien ?
CHAPTER III
THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN
RICHELIEU, THE KING, AND THE
THREE ESTATES
Richelieu from the first took the tasks confronting the King,
the people and himself with intense seriousness. Dominated
by his paternalistic conception of the King as the father of the
people, responsible only to God, he desired to do everything
he could to enable the King to build up a strong mercantilistic
state of which he was the sole owner. In his general scheme of
government all classes had their particular places and obliga-
tions. This idea was true even of the Cardinal himself. Loyal to
the individual who could alone represent the French nation,
whom he loved so well, the Cardinal at the beginning pledged
his fidelity, saying, "I will do all that will be possible, for, by
following the good inclinations of the king, one receives an
assured repose, the fruit of the service which I render his maj-
esty according to my duty.-' 1 In his Testament Politique he
recalls his first ambitions when called to office. "As soon as
your majesty was pleased to admit me into the management of
your affairs, I resolved to use my utmost efforts to facilitate
your great designs, so useful to the state and glorious to your
person.
' ' 2 One sees from the start the constant strife to obtain
all advantages possible for the king and the state, and no better
illustration can be given of the unselfish interest of the man apart
from personal gain than his constant fidelity to his ruler and the
latter 's welfare.
Richelieu did, to be sure, look after his own personal fortune.
His "Will and Testament" proves that he left great wealth, 3
most of which he bequeathed to his relatives. It also shows
1 Richelieu, A. J., Cardinal, due de, Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques,
etc., Ed., G. Comte d'Avenel. Paris, 1853-1877, III, 159.
2 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, 1, 8-9.
s Eichelieu, Memoires, X, 122.
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his own personal commercial ability. A good share of his money,
land, etc., was obtained by gifts from the king. He refused, how-
ever, many attempts of the rulers to bestow pensions on him, and
indeed maintained that at the court the minister must not
think of making a personal fortune but must plan only for the
development of the welfare of the state,4 which he must have
seen would in the end benefit him. Yet it is clear that the
Cardinal looked upon his office as meaning something other than
a mere money making proposition and a means of obtaining high
honor.6
In 1624 Eichelieu came into power as first councillor. At
once he began to carry out the duties of his office according
to his mercantilistic belief, by recognizing the two elements which
he must consider and whose welfare he must constantly promote
by advice and deeds, namely, the king and the people, or the
king and the state (including the people). "The greatest obli-
gation of a man is the saving of his soul," he says, "the most
important duty of the king is the repose of his subjects, the
conservation of the state in its entirety, and the welfare of his
government; for which reason, it is necessary to put down so
severely the injuries done to the state, that the severity of the
vengeance will prevent a recurrence. The repose of the state
is the dominant thing.
' ' 6 The welfare of the nation, politically
and economically, is the main theme of all his writings. Indeed,
he says that the king has the right to do anything, even though
it is against religion, to save his state.7 No better expression
can be given of the political and economic ideas of Riche-
lieu. One even finds a tinge of the conception of a larger field
than the mere state, when he says that the king must be liberal
but only at the right time. He must reward merit. For that
not only does the public but the entire world a service of which
the reward to the state is only a partial return of the huge
interest. 8
The works of Richelieu revealed a suppressed fear of the inabil-
ity of the king to look out for the country. The reason for
* Richelieu, Lettres, III, 204-205.
s
Eichelieu, Testament Politique, 1, Introduction, 4-5.
e Eichelieu, Memoires, XXII, 15. Lettres, II, 168 et seq., Ill, 159.
Ul>id., XI, 285.
s Eichelieu, Lettres, III, 196.
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this state of mind is clear when one remembers the political
weaknesses which existed through the youth and ineffectiveness
of the king, as well as the unfortunate economic condition of
France in 1624. The king's power was in a bad way. "Indeed
some people even brought up the idea of electing a ruler. But
the majority with Kichelieu believed that the absolute power
of the ruler was best for the welfare of the country. He made
the king the incarnation of public safety and interest." 9 The
Cardinal in his Testament Politique has clearly stated his posi-
tion as related to the king when he says that the ruler must
act according to. reason and public interest. In this respect he
would choose men to carry out those things he could not do. By
their working together, he had no doubt that the greatest good
for France would result.10 "For," he says, "nothing ought to
divert us from a good enterprise. We must do all we can to
carry through those things we undertake with reason.
' ' "
Thus one cannot fail to see the common, though unconscious,
economic conceptions of that time which dominated Richelieu in
his ideas concerning his duties as minister, and those of the
king his master. It is a mercantilistic state he pictures, with
the king as its earthly owner. Therefore it is the chief concern
of those who govern this piece of property to see that the people
who work on it, namely the subjects, are taken care of; that
their welfare is aided, and also that the state in a national
sense is to be developed to its fullest extent. By doing so a
strong state would be created, a credit to its king and its min-
isters, whose constant aim must be the welfare of France. What
was his attitude with regard to the Three Estates ?
Eichelieu, following the traditional French scheme, divided the
people of France into three classes and considered all individuals
as related to one of these orders. 12 They were the nobility, the
clergy, and the third estate, which included the rest of the peo-
ple. However it is an interesting fact that the Cardinal looked
Caillet, 26.
10 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 197-199.
11 Ibid., I, 265. Richelieu 's efficiency in governing is best illustrated
in that part of the Testament Politique in which he advises the King
to consider the important things and not to bother with the details. See
Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 195.
12 Ibid., I, 182.
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upon all these classes as constituting one people, and when he
attacked any class or sect of individuals, such as the Huguenots,
he did so for the public good, that is, the benefit of all. As a
consequence it was said that while the general public praised
him, individuals hated him and tried to bring about his fall.13
His efforts to reform the finances and to build up commerce
and colonies were, in general terms, the lines along which he tried
to aid the people, instead of particular groups. Centralization
of the government was the only efficient way by which they
could be benefited. His efforts to bring this about illustrate only
too well the economic and political purposes involved. Yet in
treating the people as a whole he had to consider their various
classes and the rights due to each.14 He recognized the system
as being for the best, but in doing so he constantly had in view
the welfare of the state. The class in which he placed the high-
est hopes were the nobles, who he believed were destined to play
the leading part in the destinies of France.
In his treatment of this section of the population of his native
land, the Cardinal had constantly in mind the welfare of the
nation. This is shown by the fact that he confronted and at-
tempted to solve two problems with respect to them. Namely,
first to prevent them from being politically independent of the
central government, and secondly, to make them useful members
of society and the state. What he did with respect to depriving
the nobility of political rights will be taken up in the next
chapter. But one might add, that when Richelieu ordered in
1626 the razing of the castles and chateaus of the nobles,15 a
measure which was the outcome of his opposition to the separate
political power of the nobility (which began as far back as
1617 ),16 he changed the entire economic policy of France, not
only in the increase of internal freedom of trade but in the
altered position of the noble class. 17 They were no longer inde-
pendent of the central government socially, politically, or eco-
is
Bichelieu, Memoires, XXIV, 191.
!*
Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 81.
15 Isambert, A. E., Eecueil General des Anciennes Lois Francoises, etc.,
29 vols., Paris, 1829, XVI, 192-193.
J Richelieu, Memoires, II, 6.
" Rambaud, A., Histoire de la Civilisation Fran$ais, 2 vols., Paris, 1898,
I, 574.
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nomically. They were subject to the will of the state. This con-
cept was just a part of the plan of Richelieu "to put down the
turbulent nobles and obtain by that means repose for the common
people, prosperity for the king, and increased grandeur for
the monarchy." 18
However, when Richelieu had deprived this class of people
of their independent powers, he did not oppress them and try
to push them down into the lower estate. On the contrary
he favored them. He looked at them not only from a political
but also from an economic point of view; and saw in them "one
of the principal sinews of the state, capable of contributing much
to its conservation and establishment. " 19 In fact he and the
king shared the same views, for the latter called them "the
right arms of the state.
' ' 20
Richelieu tried to make a definite use of the nobles. He saw
that they could fit into certain positions, especially those which
were rewarded with many honors. "His ability to converse
with the world, etc. ... all adapt him to certain func-
tions. ' ' 21 So that if Richelieu wanted to deprive them of their
political right to oppose the government, he also desired to
find a method by which they could live with dignity and serve
their country both in a political and economical sense.
Not only Richelieu but many of the nobles themselves de-
sired a part in the upbuilding of France. In a statement
of their condition presented to the king by the assembly of
notables in 1627, one obtains a fair idea of their ambitions. The
exposition begins with an account of the distressing condition
of the nobles, who are without any power or purpose. They
then ask for the reestablishment of the nobility "as the greatest
power to upbuild France, and to remedy its miserable condi-
tion.
' ' Mention
.is made of their former splendor and service.
They are now in poverty and without power and are oppressed.
Unwarranted abuses by some of their number (by many as a
matter of fact) has deprived them of the administration of jus-
tice, finance, and all the councils of the king. "Aid us, and
put us in our former place, and the kingdom will gain thereby
i*
Richelieu, Memoires, XI, 244-256.
J
Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 141.
zoMercure Francois, XVII, 65.
21
Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 141. et seq.
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and your reign will be more glorious and have a greater splen-
dor. ' ' 22 However they showed their selfishness when they asked
for control of governmental, church, and army offices and other
unreasonable favors. The fundamental thing was that they
desired a more active part in the government.
' ' Herein is where
Richelieu erred," says one writer, "in not giving them a more
important place in the administration of the government, as a
way of safe-guarding the right and well being of the nobility.
' ' 23
Yet, judging from their demand it is doubtful whether the
nobles ought to have been considered. Nevertheless the Cardinal
did make efforts to use them for the good of the nation.
He devotes a section of the Testament Politique to the differ-
ent means of aiding the nobility and making them subsist hon-
orably. "They must be respected," he says, "as one of the
principal sinews of the state, capable of contributing much
towards its preservation and settlement. Having been injured
by vast numbers of business men, who have been elevated at
their expense, it is my duty to protect them against any at-
tempts of such individuals. Yet the people under the nobility
must be protected from certain offices. It is a common fault in
those that are born in a certain order to exert violence against
the people to whom God seems to have given arms with which
to get their livelihood rather than to defend themselves." 2* In
this statement one sees the entire attitude of Richelieu. He did
not oppose the nobility because he had any prejudice against
them, but he did stand against them in so' far as they were a
detriment to the whole state in that they interfered with the
economic contribution of the third estate, one part of the country.
In order to aid them he carried out several of the demands
of the assembly of notables. For example, he established a mili-
tary school for young nobles, who were to be trained to adminis-
ter and develop the nation within and extend and protect it
abroad. 25 They were to have a part in the government, but
were to be trained for their work and could only keep their
positions by great services and superiority of ideas.26 The
^Mercure Francois, XII, 40-46.
23 Pigeonneau, II, 376-377.
2*Bichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 141-146.
zslsambert, XVI, 466-470.
26Caillet, 122.
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very fact that the nobility realized this made them ask for the
military school. This request was an effort to stay the decadence
of the class.
Efforts were made to aid the nobles in other ways. Many
were given good positions and favors to keep them in line with
the government. For example, "Chateauneuf was granted a better
governmental position in spite of his bad intentions toward the
government.
" 27 ' '
Indeed,
' ' Richelieu says,
' ' common people
were replaced by nobles in the king's household because it
would increase the number of those who are to help the people
bear the burden of taxation, which they are overwhelmed with
at present.
' ' 28 This is an economic way of looking at the prob-
lem. The Cardinal was willing to do all he could to help the
poor people, but he regarded the privileges of the nobles as
something necessary and a part of the natural order of events.
The fact that the Cardinal desired the nobles to enter all
phases of French life and thus, through their abilities, help in the
development of France, is best illustrated by his provision that
they were to be allowed to engage in commerce without loss of
honor.29 Moreover, individuals were ennobled because of their
successful colonial or commercial ventures. He thus strove to
bring the exclusive order down to the everyday phases of life, and
while he recognized their privilege, he wanted them to retain
these only in so far as earned by economic or political efforts.
The ultimate goal was to be of course the building up of the state.
He really intended to make this class the brains and administra-
tion of the country. The older men were to formulate the plans of
government and the younger men were to carry them out.30
He desired to use these men as official agents in the development
of France politically and economically as well. The inefficient
corrupt character of the members of the noble class prevented
the success of the plan, and in the long run brought on the
French Revolution and their ruin. They wanted a political
pension and not an economic position.
But after all, the great thing that Richelieu accomplished
with respect to the nobles was to ruin their individual
27 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 40-45.
as Ibid., I, 215-217.
^Mercure Frangois, XII, 3640.
so
Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 2425.
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political power and open to them opportunities to serve
the state politically or commercially, a course of action certainly
worthy of a statesman. That he weakened this class by adding
to them by means of the creation of titles because of activities
in the field of literature or in the field of commerce, is very
true. But what better proof is there of his economic tendencies ?
He realized that the sale of offices to the nobles was bad and
tried to stop it, but he could not bring about a reform in one
night, as he admitted.
31 In opening to the nobility the chance
to engage in political or commercial opportunities whereby the
state was to be strengthened, he acted in keeping with his eco-
nomic and political views, 32 and with the fundamental theory of
mercantilism.
The same viewpoint was true with regard to the clergy, "In
conformity with his doctrine of the state, Richelieu opposed
ultramontanism and proclaims," says one writer, "the absolute
independence of civil power and the necessity of a national
clergy.
" 33 To be plain the Cardinal desired the clergy to join
their interests with those of the nation. In fact the church
had something more than a religious influence in France at
that time. "It was an age of hospitals and schools which were
conducted by the clergy. They were the leaders of philanthropic
work. ' ' 3* Richelieu as Bishop of LuQon was well aware of the
importance of that class, and indeed tried to use his position to
diminish the oppression of the common people. Thus he wanted
them to use their powers for the interest of the state and its
economic and social betterment. Indeed, he said that he pre-
ferred the welfare of the king and the grandeur of the state
to the interest of Rome, even though he was of the clerical
order. That in brief explains his attitude. He desired a na-
tional clergy.
On the other hand some of the clergy recognized this position
taken by the Cardinal. They appreciated the fact that he de-
sired the unity of all the people in France for their common
conservation. "Your majesty," said one of their representa
31 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 165-167.
32
Ibid., I, 141-147.
83 Caillet, 55.
60-62.
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tives, "treats offensively and defensively, solely for the protec-
tion of the altar of France from the enemy." They outwardly,
at least, then joined the king and his administration "whether
it would be to keep up commerce or preserve the security of the
state in common defense, knowing that the sovereign law of
political government is the safety of the people.
' ' 35 Thus they
promised to do all they could to keep up the glory of the state.
This action indicates that at least a part of the clergy appreciated
the attitude Richelieu took towards them, and wanted to "do
their bit" towards developing the nation, even in keeping up
commerce.
Richelieu considered the clergy as being capable of serving
in other capacities besides the religious side of affairs. (Doubt-
less he was thinking of his own case.) For instance, he says
that the churchmen are best for public tasks because they have
less self-interest and other distracting influences such as fam-
ilies. 36 Economically speaking he desired to get out of them
the most possible for the aid of the central government. How-
ever he believed that their important function was on the
religious side. Herein he admits that many reforms are needed
such as an effort to get good bishops, to change the system
of appeals and courts, unjust exemptions, etc.37 "In fact," he
writes in a letter,
' ' the King must be obeyed, by great and small,
and he must fill the bishoprics with wisely chosen and capable
men.
' ' 38 While admitting the importance of learning and of its
propagation, he desires to see the monasteries limited in number,
as well as other religious houses, because of the fact that there
is a loss, probably economic, in having too many of them.39 So
he forbade the establishment of any more without the consent
of the king.
40
In conformity with his plan to get all he could out of the
ssMercure Frangois, XVI, 527-528.
Richelieu, Testament PoUtique, I, 304.
37 /bid., I, 62-63.
38 Biehelieu, Lettres, III, 181.
so Ranke, L. von, Samtliche WerTce, Leipzig, 1874, IX, 212. Ranke says
that Richelieu diminished the number of monasteries as they were a hind-
rance to trade or business.
loisambert, XVI, 347.
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clergy, especially the upper strata,
41 he tried to obtain as much
financial support from them as possible. For example, in 1628,
he requested money for the upkeep of the army and navy. By
giving some, the clergy would relieve the common people. So they
granted three millions of livres.*
2 He would have liked to
exclude them from exemptions of taxes. 43 On other occasions
he demanded certain amounts of money from the clergy and
they objected. Busy with his European wars he permitted them
to hold a council and decide what they would pay and
he accepted it, as he had other matters which kept him busy.44
As will be shown later, Richelieu opposed the Huguenots not
on religious but on political and economic grounds, except that
he encouraged their individual economic prosperity. This opposi-
tion was just a part of that central theory of state building which
he carried out so well, and of which not only the nobles and
clergy but the Third Estate was a part.
Richelieu regarded the Third Estate from the same point of
view as the nation, and for doing so he has been condemned. One
writer says that Richelieu always sacrificed the well being of
the population to the grandeur of the nation without thinking
that there was no more true and solid grandeur than in the
union of these two factors, public prosperity, and national
glory. In fact he accused the Cardinal of having no true love
of the people. And whereas the latter followed Henry IV in
his attempts to build up the state he did not imitate him with
respect to the improvement of the welfare of the people, which
was one of the aims of his predecessor.46
Now it is quite correct to say that the Cardinal built up
everything for the interest of the state. That was the central
part of his political and economic philosophy. He recognized
the people as constituting a part of the great nation and con-
sequently they must be aided as a class. He looked at them
4iBonnefon, P., La Societe Frangaise du XVII Siecle, Paris, 1903, 85.
Richelieu neglected the lower clergy, probably considering them a part of the
Third Estate so far as social standing was concerned. In this he made a
mistake.
**Mercure Francois, XIV, 179.
43 Caillet, 83 et seq.
44
Ibid., 87.
45
Richelieu, Lettres, I, Introduction, GUI, CIV.
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from the cold, calculating point of view of the statesman and
economist, who believes that you must build up all the parts in
order to increase the grandeur of the whole, but care must
be taken to have in view constantly the whole rather than to
weaken common advancement by an undue emphasis placed
upon some part. This was his theory with respect to the rela-
tions of the people to the state and even with regard to the
relation of individuals to the people as a whole. For example,
he says in his Testament toward the end of his life that the
public interest ought to be the goal of those who govern the
state, or at least the mass should be preferred instead of indi-
vidual people. He cites Spain as an example, as having been
made great through emphasis on the people as a whole. "By
means of reason and justice this should be the method of
councillors and kings of the future.
' ' 46 He asks the future
government to consider the welfare of its peoples but in doing
so he says, "all classes should stay in their proper boundaries,
and thus trouble would not arise. ' ' 47
In spite of the fact that Richelieu is considered to have had
no personal sympathy with the people, but instead appeared to
base all his ideas upon problems concerning the welfare of the
state; nevertheless, he did have human sympathy for them.
He realized their difficulties and would have liked to solve
them. He tried to do so but he knew that the strongest means
to obtain aid for the people was through a strong nation.
That is why he put the latter doctrine to the front, even though
the citizens had to suffer temporary oppressions. It was done
with the hope of better conditions for the common people in
the future.
Richelieu was a farsighted man. He admitted the sufferings of
the people due to the wars, but he saw the benefits to be derived
in the future because of them, not only by the king but by the
people as a body. "War," he says, "is for the best interests
of the people as a whole in that it keeps the state from ruin.
' ' 48
In another place he says that the interest of France is the interest
of its citizens, and the most important obligation of a king is the
46 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 267-270.
4i Ibid., 181-182.
*8 Eichelieu, Memoires, XXVI, 87.
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repose of his subjects and the conservation of the Kingdom.*9
He admitted that war made the people suffer, and he tried
to prevent it when possible. However, he also recognized the
fact that the average individual could not understand the
ultimate benefits to be derived by war and thus was apt to
oppose it at inopportune times.
' ' The miseries and afflictions of
the people of France," he says about 1630, "who have suffered
under very great and almost incredible poverty, made peace
a desirable thing, and the king as their king and father was
obliged to urge it. The frequent disorders taking place in many
towns brought up the fear of a continuation of the war, because
of the need of more money to wage it. The people in general,
especially merchants, blamed the government for heavy taxes,
etc." In conclusion it is interesting to note that he says the
king as their father was obliged to seek peace for them. 50
It is quite evident that there was a strong peace party in
France, led by the merchants, who did not like to pay the bills
of war. Yet the problem resulting seems to explain why Eichelieu
did not take active steps to aid the people at this time. In fact
he could not. The political and economic status of France
as related to other nations had to be settled first before he
could attend to the internal economic problems confronting
him. He had to develop his foreign commercial policy first and
then his internal commercial program. He could only accomplish
the latter when the general status of France in the world at large
was established. This task occupied the last ten years of his life.
Only a beginning could be made with respect to internal af-
fairs, although throughout his administration he was at least
sympathetic toward the common man.
One of the most important phases of Richelieu's career is
his bishopric of Lucon. The very fact that he was a church-
man, and a conscientious one at that, tends to indicate that he
must have known about the unhappy conditions of the people.
That he did was also shown by letters written during his ad-
ministration as bishop. In 1608, when he first became bishop,
he wrote to the people that "time will show the affection which
I bear toward you, more than words can do. It is for that
* Eichelieu, Memoires, XXII, 15.
BO Ibid., XXVI, 86-87.
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reason that I wait for deeds to let you know that all my attentions
are for your welfare."
51 He follows this up a few days later
with a letter to the local tax collector, protesting against the
unfair assessment of taxes, bringing out the misery and poverty
of the inhabitants from the excessive tattles, etc., and he closes
with a plea for moderation of the taxes and equalization among
the different sections of France. 52 This letter is followed by
another the next year (1609) to a high official (probably Sully)
asking him to aid the poor by a reduction of their taxes.
When he became secretary of war in 1617, he desired to aid
the poor people. Also in 1627, at the assembly of notables
he again advocated attention to the welfare of the common
people.
54 He said that the greatest thing that a king can do
is to protect public faith, as it is an inalienable friend which is
always to be found present. He made the assertion that the people
who now contribute more of their blood than their sweat to the
expenses of the state should be aided.
' ' In proportion as you help
the people and better their condition, the more you can obtain
from them. ' ' 55 This certainly is a sound economic doctrine and
shows that the Cardinal appreciated the fact that improved
labor conditions would bring better results.
In 1627 Richelieu was advocating the uplifting of the common
people to a surprising extent. One writer states "that he even
said, that he was to do it all in six years.
' ' 56 Unfortunately
he was not able to carry it out before his death. That
he believed in it in theory to the very last was shown in his
Testament. "This does not excuse him," says d'Avenel, "why
did he not aid them during the period 1627 to 1642 ?" 57 He
did to a certain extent, as will be shown in the chapter on
finances. But one must remember that during that time France
was involved in a great European war, to preserve her economic
and political status as a nation ; that she was trying to overcome
r
>i Richelieu, Lettres, I, 15.
52 Ibid., 1, 18.
53 /bid., I, 20.
s* Ibid., I, Introduction, CII-CIII.
ss Mercure Francois, XII, 790.
se Richelieu, Lettres, Introduction, XCII-XCIII.
57 Ibid., Introduction, CII-CIII.
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internal political troubles ; that a certain amount of territory and
centralization of government was necessary before the finances
could be improved; and lastly, that the great Cardinal was
hindered by numerous petty plots of individuals which disturbed
the nation during the entire period. What chance did he have
to fund a debt or attempt any important internal reform?
The center of difficulty in regard to the third estate was of
course the heavy taxes. Between 1627 and 1632 he intended to
discharge the people from the burden of three millions of livres
and asked them, in recognition of this desire on the part of the
government to aid them, to keep the peace.
58
The same idea is brought out in his Testament. He says that
the public welfare should be the only end of those who govern
the state. "If private interest is preferred to public good
then harm is done. But if the public interest is the first con-
cern, then the state will be happy and escape miseries. The
particular interest of the king and the people go hand in hand.
We must therefore aid the public and prepare for their pres-
ervation. ' ' 59 The means to do this was to be the reform
of the finances, for he says, "If the finances are properly ar-
ranged, the people will love him out of pure personal interest.
This affection is very important to a king. It is worth more than
gold or silver.
" 60 In other words a king cannot do much with
his money without the love of his people, a rather business-
like way of beginning the problem. And he not only states
it but tries to solve it by proposing to reduce the revenues de-
manded of the people by three-fourths. This will be taken up
in a later chapter.
61
Richelieu has been criticised for his economic conception of
the common people. He has brought out this idea in his treatment
of the question of the relation between the amount of labor
a man should do and his physical strength. "In regard to this
problem," he says, "all authorities agree that when the people
are too comfortable, or have too easy a time, it is impossible to
keep them within the bounds of duty, because they are more
ssMercure Francois, XII, 36-40.
5Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 267-271.
BO Ibid., II, 115-117.
ei See Chapter V, 73-81.
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ignorant than the other classes, and to keep them within the
limits of reason and within the law, they must be kept occupied.
If discharged from their duties or obligations, they would think
themselves released from obedience, like mules used to burdens.
But like these animals, their burdens must be moderate. The
common people need protection. Common sense must determine
the proportion between the burden and the strength of those who
bear it. The relation of the loads and the ability of the people
must be religiously observed. A prince cannot be esteemed good
if he exacts from his subjects more than is necessary. Yet those
people are not the best who never raise more than is absolutely
necessary.
' ' 62 This passage seems to indicate the economic turn
of the Cardinal's mind as no other part of his work does. He
desired efficiency in France. He wanted her to produce a sur-
plus. His idea was a strong nation built up of healthy, busy
people who would work and produce so that France could become
a great political and economic power. To bring this about
he even went so far as to advocate extra taxation of the
rich. For he says, "Sovereigns must, if possible, make use
of the abundance of the rich before they bleed the poor.
' ' 63
This remark has a socialistic tinge which is rather out of
place in the seventeenth century. No, it does not seem fair to
say that Richelieu was unsympathetic with the common people.
He really tried to aid them not only financially and politically,
but commercially as well. Richelieu was a business man and
the welfare of France was his business.
The development of the economic side of France was one of
the most important phases of his administration, and, indeed,
affected the common people by bringing on what might be called
a social revolution. "Richelieu," says a writer, "has been,
without wishing it, one of the most powerful agents of that
economic evolution and social change, which tends little by little
to level the ranks and which left to the nobles no other super-
iority except that of privilege. The commercial man no long-
er resembled the trader of the past with his simple and rude
manners, who busied himself with his cloth, etc. and passed his
life in going from town to town with goods on the backs of
*2 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 179-182.
es
Ibid., I, 181-182.
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his mules. Now, often raised in his calling to the side of some
magistrate's son, he was no longer a merchant but the head of
a firm of speculators, who had his departments and his corres-
pondents at Cadiz, London, Frankfort, etc." 64 "Big business"
was beginning at that time. Richelieu did all he could to en-
courage it by allowing the nobles to engage in it without losing
their rank and also by creating nobles from those of the third
estate who made a success of commerce and permitting them to
join the royal court.65 Efforts were made to reestablish com-
merce, to renew and amplify its privileges, and to bring it
about that the profession of trade should be honored by the
people.
66
As a result of the increase in commerce, class feeling was en-
gendered. It caused trouble between the nobility and the common
people, in that the nobles claimed that they were better than
the common man even though they engaged in trade. Also, the
third estate did not want the privileged class to engage in com-
merce and protested about it. Lastly, the rise of many middle
class people to the ranks of nobility can be noticed as a result
of this economic and social change.67 The middle class began
to assume a place of importance so that even Richelieu was
forced to try to influence them in his Mercure Franqois, the
first so-called French newspaper.68
In conclusion, Richelieu's attitude toward the King and the
Three Estates was that of a mercantilist. The latter were a
part of the state of which the King was the father or owner.
As his overseer the Cardinal's chief duty was to build up the
state, although he was keen enough to see that this really in-
volved the welfare of the people of France. As a result, he had
a sincere interest in their betterment,
69 and by his many accom-
plishments he helped to prepare the way for the social and eco-
nomic, as well as the political, changes which came later. No
better phrase can illustrate the Cardinal's deep and heartfelt
6* Pigeonneau, II, 456-458.
eslsambert, XVI, 527.
<*Meroure Francois, XII, 36-40.
" Levasseur, E., Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 vols., Paris, 1911,
I, 259.
Deschamps, 129.
6 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 180 et seq.
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interest in them, than the close of that section of his Testament
dealing with the third estate, in which he pleads with the king
to consider always their interest, and affirms that nothing would
give him greater pleasure than to have the king try to carry out,
after his death, what he has tried to do when he was on earth ;
namely, to build up a strong state and a happy people therein.70
70 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 180 et seq.
CHAPTER IV
THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF RICHELIEU'S POLICY
OF CENTRALIZATION
Richelieu, when he came into power in 1624, realized that if
he was to make the King supreme and build around him a great
state, he had to take steps that would lead to the centralization
of all internal political, social, or economic forces, under direct
or indirect control of the royal government. "The Huguenots
shared the Kingdom with us," he said, "and the nobles con-
ducted themselves as if they were not subjects of the King,
and the most powerful governors of the provinces as if they had
been sovereigns of the Kingdom.
' ' x All this, he claimed, dimin-
ished the authority of the King. 2 People looked after their own
interests rather than the state, and this neglect on the part of the
king's advisers caused great injury to the development of France.
To strengthen the power of the Royal House in internal affairs
was his first problem. It was the only way to develop the nation.
That Richelieu devoted his personal attention to this side of the
development, and left Father Joseph to carry on the major part
of the political questions of the Thirty Years' "War, indicates the
importance he placed upon this phase of his administration.
Now to bring about a thorough internal change, he had to
remove all troublesome obstacles, which involved naturally the
accumulation of power in the hands of the King and his Prime
Minister, the destruction of the political independence of the
nobles and Huguenots, and the centralization of all local forces
under the direct or indirect control of the King and his govern-
ment, especially the chief Councillor, who was to be a very im-
portant officer.
Richelieu has left ample evidence as to the qualifications of a
chief minister of the King. He must have in mind constantly
his duty to the King and to the state. There should be more
i Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 6.
id., I, 7.
46
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than one councillor to advise the ruler, but one should be
above the others. 3 "However," he says, "this man should have
public approbation, for if everybody likes him, he will be most
able to do good.
' ' 4 This minister should be able to advise the
King in all the phases of government. Louis XIII understood
the vast importance of the Cardinal. 5 Indeed, he even permit-
ted him to have a deliberative voice in the Parlement of Paris,
just as he had in the council of state. 6 As the king's chief ad-
viser he had access to all the parts of the French government.
He was supreme. All was centralized in his hands, subject of
course in theory to the final word of his master.
However, it is interesting, and important to notice, that the
office upon which Richelieu laid the most emphasis was that of
"grand master, chief, and general superintendent of the naviga-
tion and commerce of France. ' ' The fact that he obtained it dur-
ing the early part of his administration brings two important
points to light, namely, the economic interest of the Cardinal, and
the means by which independent nobles, governors, and other
powers were removed in the interest of centralization. It was
the first great step by which Richelieu could carry out personally
his political and economic program.
Bad internal conditions made this necessary. "There existed
in France," says one writer, "two institutions incompatible with
the unity of ministerial power, as with the order and finance
and administration. They were, first, the jurisdiction of the
high conn&table of France and secondly, the office of the admir-
alty.
' ' 7 Both were suppressed. Richelieu in his Memoirs,
mentions the abuses brought about by Montmorency, the last of
the connetables. The office and its mate the admiralty, which
had as much power on the sea as the former on the land, were
suppressed, "because," he said, "they weakened the control of the
King and were harmful to the finances, which were the ordinary
expense of war, together with that of the local officials of that
department.
' ' 8 The admiral had, likewise, large sums of money
3 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 232-240.
Ibid., I, 244.
5 Bonnefon, Introduction, II.
*Mercure Francois, XIII, 365.
i Martin, H., Histoire de France, 6 vols., Paris, 1861, II, 244.
s Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 212-213.
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to spend on the navy. The question raised was as to whether or
not they expended the money as it should be spent. It was quite
evident from the complaints of the soldiers and others that much
of it was wasted, and that, as a result, their finances were in bad
shape. Naturally, this led to the suppression of those offices
in the interest of the state. It happened that in 1627 they
were both made vacant by death, so that by abolishing them
the people were to be aided by decreased expenditures.9 This
was the view Kichelieu desired the people to take. It is inter-
esting to notice how, in carrying out all his great acts, he con-
stantly appealed to the effect upon their purses. He desired to
get control of the armies on land and sea, but wanted the people
to look upon it as an economical change for their benefit. His
aim was not only along financial lines, however. He desired
to build up the commerce of France, and this office enabled him
to do so without local hindrances.
But just what were its duties? The answer to this question
gives a clue to the economic policy of Richelieu. "In the first
place," says the edict, "he must treat with all kinds of persons.
He must look over propositions of our subjects relating to
commerce, decide concerning the merit, utility, etc., of all agree-
ments, articles, contracts, etc., concerning the sea and its enter-
prises. . . . He is to look after commerce, which is so useful
to France. Our navigation rights and sea enterprises are under
his charge. All those embarking on sea trips, can now go to him
for permission. Before this no one knew to whom to go. All
the evils of the marine are to be removed, etc.
' ' 10 The Cardinal
was to have full charge of navigation, the advancement of com-
merce, and the security of Frenchmen on the seas, in times of
peace. In times of war, other offices might be created.
11 The
importance of this office can only be appreciated when one real-
izes that it put the control of commerce fully in the hands of
Richelieu, and indicated that this part of his administration
was to be one of the dominating factors of his career. Trade
was to be fostered by it for the honor and grandeur of the
state and the profit and increase of public wealth.
12 It was
9 Mercure Francois, XIII, 354-358.
loj&uf., XIII, 361-362.
11 Ibid., XIII, 362-364.
XIII, 359-360; XIV, 4-46.
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clearly a part of his centralization policy. Indeed, says one
writer, "Richelieu took the control of the maritime provinces
away from local governors, and concentrated it in his hands, in
order that it should grow at an astonishing rate." 13 He realized
that centralization in time of need meant efficiency and quick
results. This is what he wanted on the economic side of his ad-
ministration. The office, really that of secretary of commerce,
marks the first great step taken in the economic development
of France, and it is an evidence of Eichelieu's unselfish motives
that the first abuses which he remedied were those by which) he
might have profited. He would take no pay for his duties in
this office, nor would he take a share in the salvage.14 Yet he
had enough economic shrewdness to know that he would benefit
financially by other means, of a more quiet nature.
However, this mercantilist^ policy of centralization, which the
Cardinal used as the dominant keynote of his administration,
is to be found also elsewhere than in the changes in the royal
government. The unity of the King and the common people
against the nobles is a feature which plays a part in this pro-
gram. The idea was not original with him, for one can see
its beginnings in the early Capetian days, and again in the
reign of Louis XI, "whose sole aim was to constitute the French
nation by removing the incubus, without whose removal its ex-
istence was impossible, namely, feudal aristocracy. Thoroughly
devoted to looking on the frivolous etiquette of the nobles with
undisguised scorn, assuming the dress and society of commoners,
Louis XI was the true precursor of Richelieu.
' ' 15
Nevertheless,
little was accomplished in the way of reducing the power of the
nobles until Richelieu's time.
When he undertook the administration of France, he saw
the nobles still at their attempts to strengthen feudalism by
means of various internal and external conspiracies. He feared
a combination of troubles. "What would happen if the nobles
or Huguenots united with Spain ?
" he asked. It is quite evident
that he saw the economic as well as the political and religious
consequences. For a Spanish victory might and probably would
isGouraud, C., 193-244.
i* Martin, II, 244.
is Bridges, 16-25.
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have meant not only the supremacy of the nobles, but it would
have permitted the Spanish Catholic nation to overrun France,
thus preventing the political and religious equilibrium which
the Cardinal hoped to establish in Europe as a necessory prere-
quisite for his future plans of making France a great economic
as well as a political state.
1*
Consequently Richelieu decided that he had to weaken or
destroy the political power of the nobles. The destruction of
most of their fortresses and castles unnecessary to the defense
of the kingdom was the most important step taken to attain
this desire.17 It was brought about with the express purpose
of eliminating needless expense, of preventing trouble, and of
delivering the people from the inconvenience, both economic
and political, which they had suffered from the existence of the
local quasi-independent powers.18 As a result, it made the
nobles, the courtiers, and the common people more independent
citizens. They .could trade with more freedom, and France re-
ceived a direct economic stimulus through this act. It cut down
the expenses of government and made for peace and tranquillity
in the land. Therefore, it was a very important economic meas-
ure. With the same purpose in mind the Cardinal prohibited
the carrying of weapons except by permission.19 Also, he brought
about the edict against duels, on the ground that it was best
for the conservation and growth of the state. He said that the
general welfare of the people was ahead of the interests of par-
ticular individuals.20 In other words, he did all that he could
to better social and economic conditions in France for all the
people, by depriving certain classes of rights unjustly claimed.
This was done with the express purpose of making France grow.
Richelieu did not succeed in his attempts to reform social con-
ditions. The blight of war prevented the fulfillment of this
phase of the development of France. Nevertheless, he had in-
itiated a social reform, and was, therefore, in so far, a forerunner
of the French Revolution. He left the nobles mere courtiers,
and the French Revolution deprived them of all their privileges.
is Richelieu, Lettres, II, 82-84.
17
Ibid., II, 320. Caillet, 124.
islsambert, XVI, 192-194.
19
Ibid., XVI, 175; Mercure Francois, XIII, 399-400.
20 Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 294-297.
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Richelieu desired the nobles to earn their exemptions. They
failed to respond, and this caused their fall.
The Cardinal was not radical in his changes. His was a con-
servative type of mind. In his reform of the government, in his
replacement of officials and removals of nobles in office, he was
very slow and exact in the steps he took. "The disorders," he
says, "which have been established by public necessities and
strengthened by reasons of state, cannot be reformed without
time. Changes must be accomplished by degrees without passing
from one extreme into another. ' ' He then admits that care must
be taken in the removal of officials. Efforts must be made to
keep them within the bounds of their duty, for the public wel-
fare. 21 Richelieu was willing to give in to some nobles or prov-
inces in various proportions, if he saw that it was for the in-
terest of the state to do so. Numerous examples can be given, as
where he refused to abolish certain taxes because all the prov-
inces would not agree to it,22 and where he exiled the ruler or
governor of Rouen and later allowed him to return.23 "Les
messieurs de Saint-Halo" refused to permit the King to con-
struct some vessels in their port. The Cardinal showed them
that it was for their interest in the protection of their commerce
to do so, and promised in return to increase their franchises. 24
Richelieu added to or took away the privileges of individuals,
with the sole purpose of public welfare as he saw it.25
No better indication that Richelieu wanted to be consid-
ered the benefactor of the people can be found than in the
dispute over the Cardinal's administration between Richelieu
and Gaston, brother of the King. The latter accused the Car-
dinal of working for his own ends and causing the great misery
of the people. In reply Richelieu said that the unfortunate state
of the people hurt him. However, he pointed out the fact, that
it was largely due to the uprisings caused by Gaston and others,
which had retarded him in his efforts to aid them. 26 Richelieu
21 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 159.
22 Montehre"tien, Introduction, XC.
23 nid., Introduction, XC.
24/&id., Introduction, XC.
as Richelieu, Memoires, II, 217-218; Lettres, IV, 200-201; Mereure
Francois, XII, 325-326; XIV, 70-139;. 156-160; Isambert, XVI, 339.
26 Mereure Francois, XVII, 264.
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constantly asserted that as soon as the political disturbance inside
France should be put down and Spain be defeated on the outside,
he would turn his attention toward the aid of the people, "which
I so much desire." 27 "The King," he says, "has no other aim
than the grandeur and welfare of the Kingdom.
' '
Another way by which Richelieu weakened the nobles and
aided the people was in the appointment of intendants. These
newly created government officials were charged with the man-
agement of financial and judicial affairs in the local provinces,
but were responsible to the central government. This power had
been in the hands of various nobles, who had used their authority
for their own personal financial benefit, so that the appointment
of these new officials had a distinct economic aspect.28
The reduction of the power of the Parlements, especially
that of Paris, has an economic interest besides its part in the
general centralization idea of Richelieu. He desired them to
attend to their judicial affairs, and leave the government alone.29
He did not ask either the Estates General or the Parlements to
aid him in getting control of the nobility, because both of these
bodies supported the party he struggled against, namely, the
great landowners.
30
Therefore, the destruction of the political
power of the Parlements as well as that of the nobles was neces-
sary for the centralization of the government, and the aid of the
people. According to Richelieu's scheme France was not
to have a government of the poor by the rich. It was to be a
government by a central hereditary monarchy over both classes.
"In other words," says one writer, "feudalism in the hands of
Richelieu was concentrated into a single institution, hereditary
monarchy." 31 By this he hoped to do away with most internal
and external evils and build up a strong state. No wonder he
put down all conspiracies so severely. Indeed, his effort to
end the disorders of the court of justice, by having the King
appoint men of merit and integrity,32 only serves to illustrate
27 Mercure Frangois, XVII, 130-133, 192-194; Richelieu, Testament
Politique, I, 8 ; Eichelieu, Memoires, XI, 349-350.
28 For further information concerning the Intendants, see Chapter V,
84 et seq.
29 Mole, Memoires, 4 voaols. Paris, 1855, I, 478-482; II, 3.
so Bridges, 30-31.
31/ftwZ., 31.
32 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 168.
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the fact that he tried, in theory at least, to reform all the parts
of the royal and local governments, in order to build up a strong-
ly centralized kingdom in which the people should enjoy a hap-
pier social and economic life. Practically, Richelieu was apt
to favor certain classes in his appointments, as when for example
he made the Archbishop of Bordeux admiral of one of his
fleets. The latter was not especially efficient in this new calling.
In 1641 the fleet was defeated by a Spanish squadron near Tarra-
gona, and Richelieu admitted that he had made a mistake by
removing the Archbishop from command.33
There was one political element in France which attracted
the attention of Richelieu more than any other single factor, on
account of its independence and opposition to the interests of
the state. It was the organization of the Huguenots. In his
Political Testament he says that at the beginning of his admin-
istration, he promised the King to employ all his industry and
all the authority given him, to rule the Huguenots, etc.
84 Their
control constituted one of his first problems in carrying out his
great scheme of centralization. ''It is certain," he said, "that
the downfall of La Rochelle, (politically speaking), is the end of
the miseries of France and the beginning of its repose and good
fortune." 35 It was the idea of attaining a future peace and the
development of France thereby, which caused Richelieu to take
a severe attitude toward these people from the start.
' ' As long
as the Huguenots have a foothold in France," he writes, "the
King will never rule within and can take no glorious action with-
in or without." 36 The destruction of their political power was
a necessary preliminary to the welfare of the ideal centralized
state.87
Nevertheless, in bringing about this change the Cardinal did
not desire to injure the Huguenots personally. "If they stay
quiet," he said, "they will be treated as citizens, with the due
protection of laws, etc."
38 They had a place and value as
33 Perkins, J. B., EicJielieu and the Growth of French Power, New York,
1904, 179.
s* Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 8-9.
ss Richelieu, Lettres, III, 161.
Richelieu, Memoires, XXII, 430.
37 Aa Bishop of Lucon, Richelieu lived near the Huguenots and thus waa
well aware of their religious, political, and economic power.
salsambert, XVI, 143.
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Frenchmen, and he recognized that fact. One writer sug-
gests that he rather favored those Huguenots who devoted them-
selves to agriculture, industry, and commerce. "He opened to
their enterprise all the French colonies except Canada.
' ' 39 The
Cardinal appreciated their economic importance as individuals,
but depreciated their political strength as a body. To preserve
the former and ruin the latter was necessary in order to develop
France along either political or economic lines. "There is no
King, Prince, sovereign, nor any state so well governed that it
approves a rebellion of its subjects; for an uprising would be
fatal to the existence of the state. ' ' 40 And Richelieu means not
only the political but the economic state as well. The Hugue-
nots could not remain either politically or economically inde-
pendent.
In 1615 Montchretien 's treatise on economics placed great em-
phasis on the value of the salt industry in France. "I would
remark to your majesty," he says, "that all the trade, not only of
Frenchmen but of foreigners, depends upon the salt of the
Kingdom." Salt can be a great source of revenue for France,
he points out, as it is a public necessity for all. In fact the
English, Dutch, Italians, etc., should pay the same revenues
as the French (which evidently had not been the case pre-
viously).41 In another place, he advocates the transfer of salt
to other parts of France by Frenchmen, instead of foreigners,
as had been the case.42 It would seem that Montchretien was
well aware of the economic importance of the French salt re-
sources. Also, one can see in the above citations another
indication of Richelieu's fostering care for the development of
French labor and transportation.
It is interesting to note that at the time when Montchretien
was advocating retaliation against foreign countries which in-
jured French commerce, England resented this attitude (as will
be shown later) , and thus was brought about an industrial mone-
tary crisis in France.43 Hard times helped to bring on the re-
volt of the Huguenots, who were becoming more and more ad-
dicted to the pursuits of trade and industry, and also led to the
39Rambaud, I, 572.
toMercure Francois, XIV, 104.
4i Montchretien, 235-236.
42/fctd., 185-186.
**
Ibid., 129-130, Editor's note.
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uprisings of the nobles who sought to profit by popular dis-
content, and recover their lost prestige.44 Thus a commercial
rivalry between England and France, and a political and econ-
omic struggle between France and the Huguenots developed into
a three-cornered fight, with the English in alliance with the
Huguenots, who in turn were aided by many ambitious nobles.
The struggle centered around the capture of the islands of
Oleron and Re, which of course would result in the fall of La
Rochelle. Richelieu said, that the island of Oleron was of great
importance in that it controlled the outlet of the Clarente and
the Sendre rivers, and could be of inconvenience to the traffic
of the Garonne river, and thus injure the King's taxes and
commerce.45 It thus becomes clear that Richelieu had a com-
mercial motive for the conquest of those islands. He desired
the advantages obtained from their wines, wheat, and salt.
Of course Richelieu's views were bitterly opposed by the peo-
ple of La Rochelle. The Huguenots claimed that the French
had constantly tried to hinder the commerce of that place,
by which it existed. In reply, the King and Richelieu
accused the people of La Rochelle of doing injury to the com-
merce of other towns, as Orleans for example. "They do not
keep their promises," the King said. 46 He told them on another
occasion that the commercial growth of La Rochelle made them
try to imitate the Parlememt of Paris and oppose the govern-
ment. "Now the word is given by their master and it is to
be enacted according to his pleasure. Otherwise, it is contrary
to the laws of his subjects, the divine law and other rights
of the people.
47 In other words, the commercial as well as the
political laws of the central government were to dominate over
any province or town. Any special commercial privileges of La
Rochelle were subject to the will of this central body.
It is certainly interesting to note that the Huguenots claimed
that they revolted to get commercial rights. They bemoaned the
unfairness of France in attacking La Rochelle, confiscating its
goods, and forcing it to seek English aid. In reply, the royal
government has the following to say: "O unfortunate fort so
4* Montchretien, 129-130.
43 Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 343-344.
46 Mercure Francois, XIV, 94.
47
Ibid., XIV, 90-94.
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fatal to France, infidelity, so dearly purchased. Since in your
substance is found the force of our misfortune, your ruin will
be the true remedy. Who will believe the fact, that they were
capable of hazarding the honor of France and the loss of the
islands and the fort of Re, and our liberty thereby.
" 48 It is
clear that the French feared above all the conquest of this
territory by the English.
At this point it may be observed that the economic basis
of Eichelieu's desire to put down internal rebellion was prob-
ably partly due to this loss of revenue, which must have been
largely responsible for the unfortunate financial condition of
France.49 Furthermore, "the activity of commerce, which rend-
ers the Kindom flourishing, would be interrupted, as a result
of the Huguenot trouble," says the Mercure Francois.50 It is
evident that commercial gain and financial loss were the factors
behind the oposition to the Huguenot and English control in
France.
On the other hand, the Huguenots pointed out the fact that a
treaty of peace had been made between England and France
with their aid. But they had found little to warrant their
carrying out the articles of that treaty. They had been prom-
ised free disposition of salt, which they possessed on the islands,
and of their other products, yet all the salt on the island of Re
had been taken away from them since the treaty. By the same
agreement liberty of commerce was promised, the retention of
privileges, and the reestablishment of the island of Re as a re-
treat for the naval forces, but none of these had been carried
out.51 In fact the Huguenots were emphatic in their claims that
economic injustice caused them to revolt. Later on, in 1627, they
asked why commerce was hindered. They hinted that something
must be behind it all. A plain exposition of the importance
of trade and the production and distribution of salt was given
and they declared that England wanted the islands. 52 The gov-
ernment in reply claimed that the Huguenots had fostered the
48 Mercure Francois, XIV, 102.
"d'Avenel, G. de, Richelieu, Monarchic Absolue, 4 vols., Paris, 1859,
II, 275; Mercure Frangois, XIV, 102.
so Mercure Francois, XIV, 102.
si Ibid., XIV, 89-90.
tU, XIV, 100-103.
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English alliance and that the commercial complaint was a mere
false mask, and accused the Huguenots of starting the whole
trouble. The central authorities failed to explain, however, why
the Huguenots should have so acted.
The personal element was brought into the controversy be-
cause there was at least one individual who believed that Riche-
lieu had personal motives in his capture of La Rochelle. "For,"
says Gaston d 'Orleans, the bitter royal opponent of the Car-
dinal,
' '
by his control of that place he could monopolise the salt
sent to England and France as a whole." 53 (Evidently the
importance of the salt trade as applied to La Rochelle justified
the ardent efforts of all parties to retain control of it.) Indeed,
Gaston claims that if Richelieu should fortify properly the is-
lands around La Rochelle, he could render France tributary for
the salt trade, and possess the principal revenue of the kingdom.
Viewed in retrospect the Huguenot affair was one of the steps
in Richelieu's efforts to centralize all the trade of France. His
assuming the office of superintendent and grand master of com-
merce and navigation was another. However, the important de-
duction from it all is that the British, the French, and the Hu-
guenots all desired the control of the salt supply, which, being
near La Rochelle, became the logical economic bone of contention
for all parties. As a matter of fact, one finds that in 1629,
Richelieu was appointed Lieutenant General of the islands of
Re and Oleron and several other places. 5 * He actually
controlled Oleron, and perhaps Gaston was not wholly in the
wrong. At least one can be assured that the Cardinal realized
the importance of that region, though to what extent he was
influenced by patriotic or personal reasons is a question which
is difficult to settle. It seems quite clear, however, that the Hug-
uenot affair was not simply a political, but also an economic
problem. In the second place, it is evident that Richelieu brought
about not only political, but economic centralization in his hand-
ling of the Huguenot situation. In keeping with his mercantil-
istic policy he did not desire either political or economic
decentralization within France.
In his efforts to create an efficient and centralized economic
ss Mereure Francois, XVII, 216-218.
5* Mote, II, 2.
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state Richelieu had certain ideas as to the kind of man he desired
for the King's household and other official positions. He
desired the positions to be filled from the nobility, yet every
individual appointed to office in the King's household should be
qualified for his place.
55 While he believed the class system was
best for France, yet even here he considered the interests of
the common people. For by limiting these positions to the nobility
he would leave more people liable to taxes and in that respect
would aid the people. He then openly advised the King to
appoint men on the merit system, and not sell the offices.
' ' Thus
virtue will be the reward for office, not money.
' ' 56 He even
outlined the requirements as to what constitutes a good council-
lor.57 Above all he must be faithful to God and the state. He
can attend to his own business and the state's also, but in a
conflict of interests, the welfare of the nation comes first.68 In-
deed, when Richelieu says that a minister must be chosen accord-
ing to his capacity, and his reward as a faithful public servant
is that of fame which is the greatest, he seems like some of
our modern idealists with socialistic impulses. In fact ''state
socialism" seems to be an underlying premise. A happy state,
a happy people would make a great King and a magnificent
France
;
this sums up his philosophy.
Fame should not be the only reward of a minister of the
King's household. "He should be given enough to live on in
comfort and be able to labor for the grandeur and benefit of
the kingdom.
" 59 If a man has the honesty, ability, and fore-
sight to merit a governmental position of this sort and to work
for the welfare of the state, the government should provide for
his economic existence. Richelieu has a practical way of exam-
ining political matters, which indicates that he saw their eco-
nomic importance as well as their political or social value.
SB Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 207.
sejfttd., I, 208-216.
37
Ibid., 1, 217-218.
58
Ibid., I, 225-226.
59 Ibid., 195-196. D 'Avenel has pointed out that the officers of the King 's
household, as chambellan, grand ecuyer, and grand maitre of the King, were
charged with various domestic duties of the royal house, but had no political
functions. Richelieu evidently wanted to make these officials of more po-
litical and economic value to the state. See d
'Avenel, Monarchic Absolut,
I, 55.
601] POLICY OP CENTRALIZATION 59
Good officials were necessary to build up a strong state not only
politically, but economically as well. "A person's interest is
not to be compared with that of the public welfare.
' ' 60
It seems that this idea of obtaining men for office by the merit
system is entirely in harmony with the mercantilistic conception
of the strong state. Richlieu admits this, when he claims that
one of the greatest advantages that can be procured for a
state, is to give everyone a position suitable to his genius and
capacity.
01 A man who is capable of serving the public in cer-
tain functions may ruin it in others. What would have been
the history of France, if Richelieu had been able to carry out
these views? They were conclusions reached as a result of his
years of work for the nation, and which he desired to be carried
out by those who followed him. Failure to do so, was one
of the contributing factors in the events which followed in
French history. What a difference it would have made if
this advice had been followed,
' ' Princes must be careful of
their given promises. A Prince does harm to appoint a friend
to a position for which he is incompetent. A personal friendship
should not come before the interests of the state. ' ' 62
However, when one examines his administration as a whole,
it will be seen that the Cardinal did not carry out his ideas
to the letter. He knew that to change a custom takes time. There-
fore, in such matters as the sale of offices versus the merit sys-
tem, he admits at the last that a man must submit to certain
weak conditions, and prefer a moderate regulation to a more
austere settlement, which would probably not be so successful.
"He who brings justice in by the lump, may sell it at retail,
but on the other hand, a man who buys an office may conduct
it aright, so as not to lose what he put into it.
" 63 He believed
in not rushing into radical changes. He admits that he would
be more popular with the common people if he advocated the
suppression of the sale of offices. However, he believed that the
welfare of the state is best maintained as it is now.64 The nation
was not strong enough as yet to bring about the required change,
eo Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 282.
si Ibid., I, 296.
62/&wZ., I, 299-301.
63/&id., I, 156-158.
e* Ibid., I, 163-165.
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which could better take place at a later time, while bad effects
might result if he abolished it at this time. Evidently he judged
all changes on the basis of the present and future welfare of the
state. Again he said repeatedly that merit should rule the
Prince and his appointments, but admitted that he had not fol-
lowed out this idea. "The reason for it," he says, "is due to
the fact that while disorders were in vogue, without any possi-
bility of a remedy, reason required that order should be extracted
out of the troubles. This was my intention in preserving or keep-
ing in offices in my care people whom I could oblige to follow
strictly my intentions and plans. If it had been possible during
the troubles of a reign agitated by different storms to settle the
regulation I propose, I would have been a very religious observer
of it. ' ' 65 Richelieu believed that an idea in theory and in
practice becomes two different things, which can both exist
only if the welfare of the state permits. In the case of the
merit system, however, he did hope to see it succeed in the end.
Before he could carry out many of his plans along these lines,
he had to restore peace in France. He hoped to do so by means
of a large army centralized in the hands of the royal govern-
ment. "For," he says, "a Prince must be powerful by the
strength of his frontiers and the strength of his army. The
welfare and the repose of the state depend on the fidelity and
repose of its defenders.
' ' 66 The army was another means by
which France was to be made ready for the great economic
change which would take place when peace arrived. Alas,
the great Cardinal had departed before that eventful day oc-
curred.
It is interesting to notice, however, that in spite of the many
distractions of war, Eichelieu tried to use the centralistic poli-
cies of the government to bring about great social improvements.
For example, "lettres patent" were granted a certain individual
who offered to aid in the foundation of an institution for the
incurable. "There are," said the edict, "many hospitals and
monasteries for curable troubles." Therefore, the government
considered such an institution needed for the welfare of its
people and allowed its establishment according to fixed rules.
es Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 188-191.
ee Ibid., II, 1-3 ; Isambert, XVI, 386.
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It was to be exempt from taxes, and to be favored in all ways
by Jthe government.67 The letter, published in 1637, shows
that the government was interested in and fostered all schemes
which could be of benefit to the general public welfare. It even
went so far as to investigate the hospitals and their bad admin-
istration, which prevented the poor from being received. This
evil was to be remedied; the Mayors and Bishops were to look
after their interests. The poor were to be aided by new laws;
public employment was to be provided. "By not working,"
Richelieu said,
' '
they deprive the public of the services which it
could receive by their labor. ' ' 68 This statement indicates solici-
tude for the interests of the poor and the state as well, rather
surprising but entirely in harmony with the general plan of
government. He seemed to be interested also in the physical wel-
fare of the people. The establishment of a Royal Garden at
Paris for the culture of medicinal plants, would indicate a gen-
eral governmental plan to preserve and conserve the health of
the people and thus make France strong. For the government
knew that the health of man is the most desired and precious of
things. "To aid the universities in their research along this
line and to help the people in their collection of medical plants,
we desire to establish this garden, etc.
' ' 69
All this formed part of the one political, economic, and social
conception of Richelieu, namely, to build up a great state along
these lines. To reduce the nobles, to put down the political
and economic power of the Huguenots, and to unify and make
efficient the governmental organization as a whole were elements
of one scheme which was essentially centralistic not only on the
political, but also on the economic side. He was successful in his
efforts to attain this program. Yet his financial policy is gener-
ally considered his one great failure. Thus it merits considera-
tion.
67 Isambert, XVI, 474-477.
es Richelieu, Lettres, II, 180.
69 Isambert, XVI, 161-162.
CHAPTER V
The financial phase of Richelieu 's administration is a very dif-
ficult subject to treat. It has been, in itself, fairly well devel-
oped in financial works dealing with the time. But as a part of
a general economic scheme, the weak phases of his activities
in this line take on a new meaning, and thus require considera-
tion from a new point of view.
In the light of a broader interpretation of the elements enter-
ing into the financial administration, it does not seem possible
to accept the common conception of this part of the great Car-
dinal's work. That the weakest phase of Richelieu's ministry
was his administration of the finances, is probably true; but
considering all conditions involved, one cannot say it was a fail-
ure. The accusation that he made no effort to relieve the burdens
of the people, or that he failed completely in his efforts to reform
the abuses of the financial administration is false. 1 It is an
unjust interpretation of the man's career, and necessitates
a vindication, although, in one sense, other writers have attended
to this more or less successfully.
2
Richelieu in developing the financial side of his administration
was guided by his one general purpose, namely, to build the
great state, of which the financial system was a necessary part.
But it could be improved only in times of peace and thus appears
the real explanation for what failures there were in the Car-
dinal's policy, namely, a long period of war which was like-
wise a necessity in the preliminary development of the great
state. Richelieu realized that he could carry out a general finan-
cial reform only in times of peace. He points out in his Testa-
ment Politique that he ruined the Huguenots, put down the
1 Lodge, R, Eichelieu, London, 1896, 174.
2
Caillet, 254, etc.
62
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nobles, and undertook a great war against powerful external
enemies, in order to assure a good peace and repose for the
future. 3 Why? He goes on to say that the tolerance of these
abuses has prevented any attempts to attain his aims, of
which the reform of the finances is one. The Cardinal's main
interest during his administration was in carrying out the
duties of ''superintendent of navigation and commerce, etc."
As a result he intrusted the principal care of the finances to the
superintendent of finances. Yet he gave attention to financial
matters throughout his life, and left, in his Testament Politique,
a clear and concise solution of the whole problem, to be applied
later.
This subject will be treated in two parts, first the achieve-
ments and problems of Richelieu and his financial superintend-
ents during his administration, and secondly, the general
theoretical solution of the problems as expounded by the Cardinal
in his last great work. In considering his achievements or
intentions, one must bear constantly in mind the main purpose
behind all his ideas, namely the grandeur of the state and the
elements entering into the attainment of that ideal.
It was in 1615 that Richelieu first took an active public in-
terest in the finances of the country. He spoke then as a repre-
sentative of the clergy against the sale of offices, which increased
the burden on the poor people, who were not able to bear much
more. "Finances," he said,
"
are the true nerves of the state
and should be administered with economy and with the reduction
of expenses, such as pensions, etc.
' ' * Also he maintained that
the number of people who were exempt from paying taxes should
be decreased,, all in the interest of justice and the welfare of
the poor. However, internal dissention prevented any actual
accomplishment except the temporary establishment of a cham-
ber of justice to study the question of finances.
5
Nevertheless, this meeting of the Estates General marks the
beginning of the reaction against the heavy taxes and the unfair
exemptions of certain classes. The assembly had heard the
demands of the third estate for the establishment of a real
3
Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 85.
* Richelieu, Mtmoires, X, 203, 321-322, 340, 358.
s ' ' This chamber was created in 1624 and revoked in 1625. So little was
done. " Isambert, XVI, 147.
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tattle borne by all owners of
' ' immovable property.
' ' 6 From
now on this tax was one of the goals of their ambition.
None appreciated better than Richelieu the immense waste
of funds which had been going on since the death of Henry IV.
Huge amounts had been spent on pensions for various nobles.
Indeed he said, that
' ' the economy of Henry IV and what he has
left alone has preserved France. But it will not last, and the
very fact that the nobles who have obtained most of the money
claim that it was given to foreign statesmen, makes an under-
standing necessary at once.
' ' 7
Richelieu took two steps in 1625 to remedy the situation.
He advocated publicity in the disposition of money obtained
in taxes, and a reduction of the expenses of the government. 8
To carry out the above purposes he brought about a temporary
establishment of the chamber of justice,9 and the replacement of
corrupt officials by honest ones. 10 "A change of officials," he
said, "is not a good thing, but there are times when a nation is
saved by means of such changes." " Richelieu carried out this
idea by replacing several financial officials who were connected
with various instances of corruption.12 However, nothing was
really accomplished except the stirring up of a little excitement
among the nobles, until 1626, when the two inefficient individuals
by the names of Champigny and Marillac were replaced by the
Marquis d'Effiat, in the office of superintendent of finances.
' ' His administration,
' '
said one writer,
' '
can be placed beside that
of Sully and Colbert in merit and importance.
' ' 13
The position of superintendent of the finances was, next to
that of chancellor, the* most important. He had charge not only
of the finances but also of all of the internal administration.
In fact, next to Richelieu, he took precedence. D'Effiat took
full advantage of his powers and showed his ability from the
very beginning. The first thing he did was to have the assembly
eEichelieu, Memoirs, XI, 240-243.
Tlbid., XI, 240-243.
s Richelieu, Lettres, II, 177-179.
9 See p. 93, note 2.
10
Mole", I, 337.
11 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 25-26.
12 Ibid., II, 26, 209-211, 330; Memoires, XXII, 354-356.
is Caillet, 268.
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of notables called. At this meeting, he presented to the depu-
ties a valuable statement of the financial condition of France.
He indicated the lack of funds for everyday expenses. Money
had been collected ahead of time 14 and bad management of the
finances had been endured ever since the age of Henry IV. 15
Just as Spain had suffered because of heavy war expenditures
and no peace, so France was on the verge of ruin because of
the state of her treasury. Efforts had been made to aid the
finances by selling the domain of the King; by the creation of
offices and increase of tattle, but to no avail. "However, when
peace is declared," he said, "the King wants to aid his people,
put down the internal disorders, and increase the rights and
wages of sovereign companies, etc. This meeting is to offer solu-
tions of the present problem. The King especially desires a
decrease of the tattles for the benefit of the people, because of
their terrible condition. Also, supremacy for France abroad
needs good home finances. Expenses and receipts must be made
at least to balance." 16 "One of the means," he said, "of bring-
ing this about is to supervise more strictly the amount of money
collected and spent.
' ' 17 That there was too much chance for
"graft" was the keynote of his discourse. He intended to put
the finances of France back where they had been in the times
of Sully, and the methods used were fundamentally those of the
latter.
His remarks indicate the unfortunate financial condition and
the problems confronting d'Effiat if he was to improve them.
However, the great expenditures brought about by unforeseen
external and internal troubles prevented him from accomplish-
ing much, except to keep down the public debt, which was a
great work in itself. For example, one way by which he dimin-
ished the expenses of the government was by reducing the inter-
est rate on money advanced to the government from 16 or 20
per cent to 10 per cent.
18 Strict economy and increased credit
would have worked wonders in spite of the ever-existing dis-
turbances.
i*Mercure Francois, XII, 804.
is
Ibid., XII, 790-794.
i6/&td., XII, 802-809.
" Ibid., XII, 794.
XIV, 589-590.
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Richelieu also delivered a speech to the assembly of notables,
in which he tried to justify the heavy expenditures made so far
in his administration.
' '
Everyone knows that in matters of state
real results are not often achieved at little expense. The
great numbers of soldiers necessary inside and outside of France
explain it clearly and so we cannot doubt the necessity. The in-
tegrity of the administration guarantees the honesty of the ex-
penditures ; and the oppression of the outside powers and internal
rebellions threatening the ruin of the Kingdom, explain their
need. 19 He tried to point out that the great expenditures were
for the welfare and future grandeur of France, and so far as
he went he was right. In advocating a state of preparedness
in the future for the preservation of France,
20 he strikes a chord
which is more or less modern. In fact Eichelieu here justified
his administration, and of course it was for the superintendent
of finance to obtain the money in the best way available, even
though the people had to suffer as a consequence.
The Cardinal became so infatuated with his external plans
of building up a great commerce, a large navy, and making
France strong by means of a great army, to be used against
her ever-present enemies, that he seemed to have forgotten all
his financial schemes for improvements. Of course the death of
d'Effiat in 1632, followed by the appointment of two weak
superintendents, both theoretically working at the same task,
accounts for the weakness of the financial policy to a certain
extent. Richelieu realized that in the death of his great financial
minister d'Effiat he had suffered an immense loss, and both he
and the King were greatly affected by his death.21 Yet he should
have done better in replacing him. The two men, Bouthilier and
Bullion, who divided the duties of this office, were not strong
men. This contributed largely to the unfortunate financial con-
dition of France in 1642, which will be taken up later. Further-
more, from 1632 to 1642 was the period in which Richelieu
was engaged in the important diplomatic, economic, and
military activities of the Thirty Years' War. Expenses, on this
account, together with part of the former costs of the large
Francois, XII, 756-760.
td., XII, 760-761.
21 Eichelieu, Lettres, IV, 337.
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marine, were contributing factors toward the unfortunate finan-
cial condition of France at his death.
Richelieu constantly harped on the need of great armies which
in turn explained why the expenditures were so heavy. At one
time he cited the success of the armies in France as an explana-
tion of the bad finances, and promised a future reform. Quoting
from the philosophers the saying, "that which is first in inten-
tion is the last in execution," he promised reforms in the name
of the King, for the people, (1) by the decrease of the tallies,
(2) by revoking undue exemption privileges, (3) by abolishing
luxury and waste, and (4) by the increase of commerce.22 This
promise is an excellent example of the clear economic viewpoint
of the man. He had a definite economic policy even if conditions
were such as to prevent him from carrying it to completion.
He even claimed that he had the interests of the people in
mind, while confronted with financial problems involved in
raising great armies and navies. From the first, he had tried
to raise troops in various provinces in order to protect their
commerce and ships, and to secure freedom of the sea for them.23
One must not be too hasty in condemning the man when one
considers the independent ideas of the various classes and indi-
viduals in France. How to raise money and also respect indi-
vidual privileges was certainly a problem. For he knew the
time was not ripe to do away with all special exemptions.
In 1630 Richelieu used his own personal funds to pay the army
in Italy, the government having failed to send him the required
amount. He even went so far as to borrow money for the
army from individuals.24 In 1634, he again admitted that war
had cost a great deal and was a burden upon the poor, but he
affirmed it was a necessity in order to save those men and to build
up the nation. 25 He tried to aid the people by decreasing the
wages of the troops, who were then the best paid in the world. 26
Towards the last he was so deeply affected by the financial
side of affairs that, in a letter to Bouthilier, he said that the
22 Beaurepaire, Ch. de, Cdhlers des Etats de Normandie, 3 vols., Eouen,
1877. Ill, 205.
zs Bichelieu, Mtmovres, XXIII, 125.
2* Eiehelieu, Lettres, III, 694.
^MSmoires, XXVIII, 4. Lettres, II, 297-298.
se Eiehelieu, Lettres, IV, 523-525.
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latter should decide financial matters, but if they were brought
before the King Richelieu would give his opinion. 27
By 1638, the finances were in a very bad shape, as is shown
by the fact that Richelieu, in a letter to M. de Bullion, com-
plained of the non-payment of the troops. Money was asked
for the marine, the army, fortifications, etc.28 In fact, Rich-
lieu had finally realized that he was involved in a death
struggle, and had concluded that victory was the only sal-
vation for France regardless of monetary consequences. As
late as 1641 he wrote in a letter that the King must provide
for a great navy even if he has to borrow the money, for power
on the sea is necessary.
29 If the Cardinal could have had per-
sonal charge of the financial end of things, it might have been
different. However, it was a physical impossibility to handle all
the affairs at the same time, as an intensive study of the prob-
lems involved will prove.
30 Yet he did from the very first try
to bring about some constructive financial legislation.
Richelieu displayed a certain amount of economic caution and
ability when at the beginning of his administration he urged
the need of making the best of conditions. "Since God is the
only being who will do something for nothing, in order to
arrive at his good ends, it is necessary either to diminish the
ordinary expenses or increase our receipts or do both. However,
it is impossible to retrench in the necessary costs of the
state.
31 To think of such a thing would be a crime. This is
why the King prefers the public to his own individual interest,
and retrenches on his own household expenses in preference.
You can judge the necessity of every other man doing the same
thing even when he cuts down on some things involving his own
person. Each should aid according to his means, and the
small efforts of the poor should have a place with the larger
aids of the rich. The most austere rules are and may seem mild,
when they have no other end than the public safety and well-
being.
' ' 3Z Could anything be more modern than this statement ?
27 Richelieu, Lettres, IV, 647.
28/ftid., VI, 245-247.
29 Ibid., VI, 806-807.
so Beaurepaire, III, 1-3.
si Mercure Francois, XII, 759-761.
32 The assembly of notables at the beginning of Richelieu's administra-
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Richelieu admits that war is necessary for the good of the state.
Therefore it is necessary for all to do their "bit" toward meet-
ing the inevitable heavy expenditures. But many for various
reasons failed to respond to similar exhortations ; and therein lies
the failure of his policy. The nobles and the clergy did not
fulfil their part of the bargain, though he had a sublime faith
in the patriotic feeling of the upper classes of the people. His
belief that educated individuals would all work for the public
welfare was a great mistake.
33
The Cardinal did all he could to carry out this idea by pun-
ishing corrupt officials. "No official who looks after only his
individual interests should retain office. ' ' 3* Yet he was lenient
because of the King, who desired his favorites kept in office.35
Again one sees that the faith of the Cardinal in every man's
interest in the state, and his conservative attitude toward vio-
lent changes in offices caused him to leave inefficient men in
various positions, and resulted unsatisfactorily for the nation.
The most interesting phase of Richelieu's efforts to meet the
financial situation in 1626, was his attitude toward the common
people. He admitted that in wartime the people contributed
not only labor but their blood. Therefore, he advocated making
the people contribute only enough to keep them from losing the
habit of paying taxes, and they were to be heavily taxed only
when foreign enterprises or internal rebellion necessitated extra-
ordinary means, for the welfare of the state.
36
Thus, Richelieu
was entirely consistent in obtaining the money of the people as
far as possible in times of emergency. He only carried out what
he had said in 1626. His great mistake is to be found of course
in his attitude toward the exemption of the privileged classes,
which he permitted.
tion had succeeded in bringing into the foreground the need of retrenchment
in government expenses, of decreasing the taille, and making other financial
reforms, and lastly of doing away with corrupt officials. People in France
realized that these problems had brought about the ruin of Spain,
and they wished to avoid similar disasters, in order to save the state. See
Mercure Francois, XII, 774-783.
33 Mercure Francois, XII, 760, et seq.
34 Eichelieu, Memoires, XXII, 256.
SB Ibid., XXII, 345-348, 357.
36 Eichelieu, Lettres, II, 302-303.
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In 1630, a special council for the consideration of the finances
was formed. The superintendent of course was the head of it,
and its reports were usually accepted by the council of state.
This change was accomplished through the Cardinal 's efforts and
indicates his interest in that department. The council, however,
not only had charge of the finances but also of matters dealing
with the roads, bridges, and other public works. It is interesting
to note that Richelieu tried to appoint nobles to positions in the
various councils and thus interest them in affairs of state.37
But the most interesting and important improvement in the
matter of finances, was the development between 1633 and 1637
of the system of Intendants of justice, police, and finances,
which was one of the most important accomplishments of Riche-
lieu, because it took away from Parlement, the nobles, local gov-
ernments, etc., all rights to a monopoly of the collection of
governmental taxes.38 The Intendants carried out the decrees
and reported to the central governmental councils, and had sup-
ervision of all affairs which concerned the taxes and adminis-
tration of public funds. The main purpose in appointing them
was to centralize the administration of finances, in accordance
with Richelieu's general plan of centralization. Their appoint-
ment aided the people, who in many cases suffered from corrupt
local governors and nobles charged with the collection of taxes. 39
It was the special duty of the Intendant to look after the inter-
ests of the common people. Generally speaking, they were
established in order to bring about local unity in all parts of the
administration, namely, the police, justice, and finances, and to
see that these were controlled by the central government. Yet
Richelieu permitted the Intendants in the performance of their
duties, to make certain allowances for the franchises and local
liberties of provinces or cities. He did this in order that they
should build up commercial industry. 40 The Cardinal desired
the supremacy in a political sense of France, but he was willing
to grant political or economic privileges to those who would use
them for the interest of France, by developing their commercial
sfCaillet, 23.
ss Isambert, XVI, 442-450; Caillet, 45-54.
so In 1626, careful instructions were laid on the
' ' tax commissioners to
avoid corruption." Isambert, XVI, 165-174.
*o Montchr6tien, XCI.
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or industrial resources. Exceptions were valid only when they
resulted in increased grandeur for the entire state. In many
cases the Intendant really usurped the despotic position of the
noble and thus the people did not gain by the change.
Richelieu was conservative in his plans for specific financial
reform in that he advocated no general retrenchments on the
ground that they would not pay for the reason that the expense
of bringing them about would make them failures. For example,
he did not put much faith in the selling of so-called "bonds,"
because the King never received more than a third of their
amount, while much time was consumed in examining the se-
curities upon which they were based.41
He did favor greater returns by means of increased commerce
and a strong marine. "By means of both," he said, "France
could make herself more powerful in money than any King of
the Christian world. ' ' One of the most important ways by which
the taxes were to be increased was by means of the gabelle on
salt, which both the French and foreigners obtained near La
Eochelle. No wonder he was so interested in obtaining
control of that city.
42 All the provinces of France were
to pay this gabelle, and any parts exempt before should have
their privileges transferred to the collection of the tailles. This
was not a good tax because it worked a hardship on the common
people.
Richelieu also showed a lack of insight in the collection of
revenue, namely, in the matter of commerce. Trade was to be
stimulated in order to obtain more money for France.43 The
French were to pay slight duties on the export of goods, but
a limited number of imports paid duties, light at first but heavy
later on. Thus,
' '
while Richelieu obtained more money for taxes,
he did not see as Colbert did, that by decreasing the duties
instead of increasing them, he would increase the receipts because
of the growth of commerce.
' ' 44
Kichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 264. Bonds were sold during the age of
Richelieu, with the tailles, the aides, gdbelles, and other taxes as security.
Very often it was difficult to find out whether a certain tax could be
accounted good security, since it might have been spent in advance.
/&{<?., XXIII, 262.
Isambert, XVI, 514-515.
Deschamps, 138.
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Many examples can be found wherein the Cardinal tried to
settle conflicts between local provinces and the central govern-
ment over questions of finance in the interest of both and for the
state as a whole.45 One can obtain a general idea of his
fundamental desire in his statement of the financial side of
the case to the Province of Brittany. In 1628, he admitted that
the wars against the Huguenots, etc., had been costly, but they
conserved the state and prevented the English from
invading Brittany. To protect them a strong army and nayy was
necessary and strong forts along the coasts. Thus for their
own interest as a part of the state, he asked them for money.*6
But the misery and poverty of the people even at that time
was a strong obstacle to extensive gifts of money to the govern-
ment. The fact that Richelieu had to go many times to the local
Parleme-nts of the various provinces for money indicates where-
fore the terrible financial condition of the poor was bound to
come, and it is surprising that it was not worse.
Of course Richelieu came in for his share of personal criti-
cism. Gaston, brother of the king, glad of a chance to injure
the Cardinal, accused him of causing this poverty through his
personal ambitions and lavish expenditures.47 In reply, Riche-
lieu frankly admitted that he desired to aggrandize France, but
as a good servant he regretted to see the Kingdom afflicted with
these passing misfortunes, which would continue if men like
Gaston were to have their way.48
There was one way in which the central government as a
whole took a definite stand. It was in suppressing the corrup-
tion of the tax collectors. In 1631, one year before d'Effiat
died, it was decided that
' '
no impositions should be raised except
in virtue of letters patent sent and sealed in regular form, which
should be registered by the controller-general of finances. Fur-
thermore, the royal judges were ordered to consult the people
on Sundays or Festival days to make clear the causes of the
impositions which were proposed, naming the amount of taxes,
and obtaining the consent of the majority of the people, etc. ' ' 49
**Mercure Francois, XIII, 533-534; XIV, 113-119.
**nid., XIV, 139-140.
<" Ibid., XVII, 255-256.
*&Ibid., XVII, 301.
XVII, 337-345.
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The finances were to be administered according to the amount
called for. Officials were to obey the laws, there was to be an
absence of "graft" in that they had to report the amount to
be collected to the people and get their consent, and also, send
in a report concerning the sums obtained to the central gov-
ernment. Local and external conditions prevented this plan
from being actually carried out, but it is significant in that it
aimed to place the collection of the finances on a more democratic
basis than ever before. The fact that the people were to be
consulted gives to them an economic and political importance
strangely out of place in a true conception of an absolute cen-
tralized monarchy, unless one considers the mercantilistic point
of view, that they were a part of the state, and thus their
interests would tend to influence the strength or weakness of the
nation.
In 1634, in an effort to aid the people, the tattle was cut down
by one fourth and they were exempted from the ordinary in-
crease of the burdens for the year 1634. Also, the increased
payment made by the people in the past was largely due to the
"graft" of the tax collectors. To avoid this, officials were to go
into parishes and districts, examine the rolls of the tattles of
those exempted, and see that each one should bear his just por-
tion, according to his ability or means, etc.50 This practice
would indicate a continued effort to improve the financial condi-
tion of France, even at that critical time.
The same edict went on not only to deprive the rich of their
"increasing rights" and exemptions, but also, only the heredi-
tary nobles were to retain their privileges. All those ennobled
in the last twenty years except twelve associates of the company
of New France (notice the indirect importance placed upon col-
onization by this act) were to lose their privileges. In the future
nobles were to be created only for important considerations, etc.
Also, no one could be exempt from the tattle by the simple con-
sent of the inhabitants of the parish, but all were to pay their
regular share.
51 None but exemptions of long standing were
to be recognized.
52 This would seem to be a very important
so Isambert, XVI, 389-391 ; Mercure Francois, XX, 661-662, 697.
5i/6td., XVI, 391-406; Beaurepaire, III, 207-212.
sz Omer Talon, Memoires, Petitot 2 Serie vols., LX-LXIII, Paris, 1819-
1829, LX, 60-63; 84, 123.
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edict, even though as one writer says, "It was not well ob-
served. " 53 It illustrates the efforts of the government to aid
France and its people in obtaining a more just and fair basis for
taxation. Even though the edict failed, it is evidence of the
efforts of Richelieu to reform the finances in a constructive way,
at that critical epoch of French history.
In 1635, another edict was issued to supplement that of 1634.
It appears that many rich people had fled to other towns to
avoid paying taxes, thus making the burden heavier for the
poor. Similar action was to be prevented in the future, by mak-
ing them liable to taxation in their old home, until they had been
three months in the new one.54 There was indeed a strong ten-
dency on the part of the government to aid the poor, in fact it
even went so far in an edict abolishing the sou for the registra-
tion of deaths, marriages, or births, as to say that "the strong
should bear the burdens of the weak. ' ' 55
By 1637, the financial condition of France had become critical.
Richelieu, in a letter to the King, warned him against overtaxing
the border cities, since their security was necessary for that
of the state.56 In 1639, Richelieu on account of the increasing
expenses had to cut down the financial aid given Holland.57
Finally the Cardinal in a letter of 1639 came out directly
against the increase of the gabelle, against unfair taxation in
general, and corruption, as having caused the financial troubles
of France. "I know," he says, "that the superintendents will
say that they can do nothing, and are obliged to undertake many
things which they would condemn another time. I will say that
all have given their hearts and lands to the enemy and are con-
demned at all times. ' ' 58 Richelieu, by this letter and others,
opposed the policy of the superintendent and the financial coun-
cil, which caused so much suffering.59 Yet he added insult to
injury by asking for additional money. In fact, the last letters
of Richelieu to the superintendent of finances not only requested
ssCaaiet, 265.
6*Isambert, XVI, 455-457.
BOjftMf., XVI, 460-461.
seBichelieu, Lettres, VI, 98; Memoires XXX, 317-318.
57 Ibid., VI, 613-614.
ss Hid., VI, 496-497; 500-501. Isambert, XVI, 497-499.
69 Ibid., VI, 858-859.
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more money, which was needed, but also recommended the pas-
sage of a general aid of a "sou per livre," which he said the
people were willing to endure.
60 He had come to the point where
he realized that the people had something to say. He admitted
that they were, after all, the deciding factor in the solution of
this problem. "The consent of the people in a time like this,"
he says, "is better than all the force which one can use in any
other way.
' ' 61 Finances must have been in a critical state.
It was not an entire lack of ability which caused Richelieu to
permit the state of the finances which existed at his death.
The whole truth of the matter is that he left the financial side of
his administration to his capable minister d'Effiat, who died
while in the midst of carrying France through very successfully.
Then two incapable men took charge of affairs, and Richelieu was
just beginning to take an active hand in financial matters, when
his own early death prevented the completion of his plan.
A few things may be noticed in his favor. The debt which
in 1595 was 300 millions of livres had been reduced to 250
millions by Sully, and was only 300 millions at Richelieu's
death. Thus, although the Cardinal increased the burdens for
his generation by his wars, the coming generation would have had
an excellent chance to develop France on the financial side ac-
cording to the ideas left in his last great work.62
Finally, when one considers the new and powerful impulse
he gave to maritime and commercial enterprises, and his efforts
to favor general prosperity and future welfare, it cannot be
said that his own personal financial policy was a failure. In
the larger sense of the term it was not. That it was in-
complete cannot be denied. Constant references by him-
self and others, leave no doubt as to his future plans.63 These
as appearing in his Testament Politique will be considered next,
and will be seen largely to justify his financial administration.
so Richelieu, Lettres, VI, 900-901.
fli Ibid., VI, 901-902.
62 Another evidence of the Cardinal 's interest in the finances is found in
the budget system which he attempted to introduce. This innovation re-
quired a yearly statement of the finances, and would have been very valuable
if it had been carried out.
os Beaurepaire, II, 175, 176, 177; 188-189, etc.; Ill, 1-3, 69. Goulas,
N., Memoires, 2 vols., Paris, 1879, I, 19-20.
76 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [618
Richelieu has left in his Testament Politique, a complete
statement of his final ideas with reference to the solution of the
financial problems confronting France.64 That he expected the
future generation to carry them out cannot be doubted. Indeed,
it is to his credit that in his financial schemes as well as his
entire policy, he looked into the future as well as the present.
Admitting that the expenses for war were great, he maintained
that the conflicts would benefit posterity forever and repay them
for the pain and labor undergone.
The graft and corruption connected with the collection of
taxes in the past, had filled him with disgust. He had been in
favor of sending officials to oversee these collectors and also
the nobility, and prevent any oppression of the weak and poor
by the strong and rich. However, he shows his caution and
farsightedness by indicating the necessity of "going slow" and
not overturning the entire system of collection. "The state
should see,
' ' he said,
' '
that those who serve the nation to the best
of their ability should be properly rewarded." To punish the
really bad, and reward the faithful, was the true method of his
reform. In fact his entire plan for the reform of the financial
officials was placed on the solid principles of allowing fewer
men to do the work and rewarding them adequately for their
efforts. Centralization in the hands of a few men of merit ex-
pressed the idea of one who was always looking for the greatest
economic, political, and social returns, for every measure along
these lines.
One must turn to the second part of Richelieu's Testament
Politique to appreciate his final ideas concerning the finances
of France, and his plans for the future solution of the diffi-
culties arising there. "It shows that he was not a stranger
to this important part of his administration," says one writer. 65
In the first place Richelieu makes clear the power of money
in developing the power of the state.
' '
Finances,
' ' he says,
' '
are
the nerves of the state. ' ' In order that a nation may be able to
compete with other countries, she must have the financial foun-
dation upon which to build her power. He points out that the
* The basis of this discussion is Richelieu's treatment of the finances
in his Testament Politique, French Edition, II, 80-105. English Edition,
II, 105-132. Both II, Ch. IX, Section VII.
ecCaillet, 260.
619] THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OP FRANCE 77
foundation must be solid. There is a danger of asking too
much of the people, and also of asking too little. A happy medi-
um must be struck. All necessary expenses must be met. How-
ever, the less one gets from the people the better. Now to obtain
the happy result of the best welfare of the people, strict economy
in the use of money must be the motto of the government, which,
of course, means a reform in the means of collection of the finan-
ces and also in the payment of expenses. He maintains that
the financial accounts of France, both receipts and expenses,
must be open and above board.
' '
Secrecy is conducive to corrup-
tion,
' ' he says.
He defends his policy of the suppression of the Huguenots and
his attitude toward wars in general on the ground of their neces-
sity in order to obtain a peace which would do away with all
other abuses. The finances could not be reformed very much un-
til an internal and external peace should be secured.
He then takes up the matter of internal revenue taxes, as a
means of raising revenue. He admits that they bring money, but
also realizes that they raise prices, which in turn makes the
expense of maintaining soldiers higher, as well as causes worse
conditions for workmen. They result in a great loss to indi-
viduals, with only a slight gain for the Prince. "The poor
landowner will not gain by the levy of such a tax. His land will
remain the same in value and its products likewise, and even
if they increase in price, the excess of price will cause the market
for the products to be limited." Richelieu seems to have a
faint conception of a law of supply and demand as affected by
price. He goes on to state that there will be not only an increase
of revenue tax for the producer, but he will also have to pay more
for other goods. Thus he will tend to become self-sufficing as
far as possible. Increasing internal revenue taxes raises the
price of commodities and decreases their sale. Certainly this is
a remarkable economic idea to come from a "Political States-
man" of the 17th century. He even goes so far as to say defi-
nitely, that if the taxes are increased, the loss in foreign trade
will more than offset the gain.. Also, if the internal revenue
taxes are increased it will reduce a number of subjects to idle-
ness, and the amount realized will decrease, due to diminished
production.
The discourse of the Cardinal is interesting in that it shows
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that he was judging his actions on an economic basis. He
admits that he deviates from the subject when he undertakes
to point out the bad features of the above tax. Yet this deviation is
sure evidence that he was of an economic turn of mind, and that
most of his activities, whether political, religious, or social, had
an element of the economic in them.
Going back to the matter of taxes, he makes the point that
there should be an arithmetical proportion between taxes and
the necessities of the state. He goes on to explain by saying
that no more must be imposed on the people in taxes than is
necessary for the subsistence of the Kingdom in its grandeur and
glory. Nevertheless, he points out that the King is responsible
only to God in his judgment as to the amount of taxes. Yet he
must consider the interests of his people in that their love and
fidelity are necessary for the subsistence of the state and the
preservation of his person. Even though the King was theo-
retically responsible only to God, yet practically, Richelieu
admits here and in many other places that the interests of the
people must be considered. "Taxes," he says, "must be in pro-
portion to the wealth of the country, for if this rule is not fol-
lowed, his subjects will have no funds with which to pay the
regular duties which they owe their ruler, or to build up com-
merce.
' ' A reasonable decrease of taxes, especially the taille, and
a careful use of the money obtained so as to attain the greatest
results is advice worthy of a first-class financier. He says also
that the interests which look to the future must be even more
considered than those of the present, in spite of the arguments
of numerous men to the contrary. These statesmanlike words
justify to a large extent the administration of Eichelieu.
The views of the Cardinal were not so wise with regard to
foreign commerce-, on the side of imports. He still believed that
the principal riches of the country depended upon the ability
to sell much and buy little. He forgot that a balance of trade
as a whole was the most sure way of stopping all the attempts
at home in the direction of production and industry.66 How-
ever, that he did see the value of buying commodities in return
to a certain extent, will be shown later.67
as Caillet, 261.
67 See Chapter IX, 134.
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The Cardinal emphasized the ecomomical use of the money
obtained by taxation. He compared the waste of French money
with the use of the taxes in Venice. As a promoter of state
economy, he advised the removal of the corrupt "campions," to
whom the taxes were farmed. This would mean a money saving
of a million livres. He concludes this particular topic by point-
ing out that it was an art to be able to know how to collect
only the necessary amount and also how to spend just the amount
needed. "The inability to do either, is a detriment and injury
to the state." It is clear that Eichelieu comprehended the im-
portance of these two sides of the financial problem, and that he
proceeded to treat it in a practical as well as theoretical way
is shown by what follows.
In taking up the method of reforming the finances, he con-
siders first the amount of revenue, then the expense of the gov-
ernment, and lastly, to what degree the people may be eased
by changes in the above two phases. No part of the work better
illustrates the clear, methodical, logical working of this great
statesman's mind.
In the first place, in his detailed analysis of the revenues
and expenses of the Kingdom, he points out that the amounts
and methods of taxation and expenses in times of war and
peace were different. Also he says that the revenues could
be 79 millions and the expenses 44 millions of livres. Thus
over 30 millions could be saved. In this 79 millions! the
tailles amounted to 44 millions, the aids 4 millions, the
gabelles 19 millions, and other taxes 12 millions. The ex-
penses are interest on bonds, wages, taxes and rights of
offices, etc. To increase the taxes, Richelieu wished to raise
the salt tax and make everyone pay it. He also wanted
the sou per livre tax on commodities in France. Likewise, he
desired to diminish the taille by one fourth. But he strongly
recommended the sou per livre tax as an aid to the support of the
war for the grandeur of the state, although at heart he did not
think much of the tax. He goes on to list the expenses that are
absolutely necessary, i. e., buildings and fortifications must be
built, and as for pensions, while they cannot be abolished, a
happy medium ought to be struck, in that they should be reduced
about one half. "Pensions," he claimed, "were for those who
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were doing something for the state, like serving in the war for
example.
' ' Now by cutting down the expenses, the taille could be
decreased, and thus the people would be aided.
' ' This reduction
should be the chief end. For the true way to enrich the state is
to aid the people and discharge them of their burdens. How-
ever, in doing so, we should constantly have in mind the future
as well as the present.
' '
Eichelieu had resolved also to put an end to the great amount
of interest which was paid on bonds, and at the same time to
diminish the taxes on the people.68 He planned to do this by a
reduction of the tallies to about 22 millions; by a considerable
increase of the revenue from salt. (This scheme is especially in-
teresting considering the value he put on this product in 1627
when attacking the Huguenots. ) Also, by a suppression of the 30
millions above 44 millions. He furthermore intended to make
the salt gabelle the important tax and one of the valuable
resources of the state, by making the trade in that commodity free
to everybody. Thus they would get rid of the numerous officials
whose wages absorbed a large share of the money received.
The 30 millions of interest charges, which he desired to elimi-
nate, he planned to reimburse within 7 years. He was well
aware of the decrease in the value of the capital which the
interest represented and saw the advantage to the government
of repurchasing the debt while its value was low. "Then," he
says, "the revenues ought to be 57 millions of which the tallies
furnish 22 millions, aids 4 millions, gabelles 19 millions, and all
the other forms 12 millions. Laying aside the 17 millions to be
put in the exchequer, the balance must be looked upon as consid-
erable. No nation lays up half so much after paying expenses.
' '
He notes that many more individuals are to be made liable to
the tallies, which will aid the people. The reduction of the
number of officials will ease them, in that they will become sol-
diers, merchants, or laborers. Decrease of the exemptions will
discharge the people of more than one half of their tallies, it be-
ing certain that the richest, who are liable to the greatest taxes.
are those who get exempted by means of money. In other words,
a general reform of the exemptions and the number of corrupt
officials would result in more paying the tallies and the burden
of the lower classes would be lightened.
esCaillet, 262.
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Upon what foundation was this entire financial scheme laid?
The benefit of the state, and of the people as the strongest factor
in the state. "I am sensible," he says, "that it will be urged
that it is easy to make such projects, like unto those of Plato's
Commonwealth, which though fine in its ideas, is a real chimera.
But I dare to affirm that the design is not only so reasonable,
but so easy to execute, that if God pleases to grant your majesty
a speedy peace and preserve you for the Kingdom, together with
your servants, of which I esteem myself one of the meanest,
instead of leaving this advice by my Testament, I hope to ac-
complish it myself."
He had indeed an excellent scheme for the financial reform
of France. It certainly was a misfortune for the French nation,
that he did not live long enough to carry the project to a suc-
cessful completion. Even though his actual financial administra-
tion was somewhat weak, nevertheless this final plan when viewed
in connection with his general economic and political policy,
justifies, in great measure, his financial policy. The same state-
ment might well be made of his internal administration as a
whole.
CHAPTER VI
THE ECONOMIC RELATION OF RICHELIEU TO AGRI-
CULTURE, INDUSTRY, AND INTERNAL COMMERCE
When Richelieu received the office of "grand master and
chief of commerce and navigation," it was natural that he
should be more interested in the external side of the national
development. He placed internal affairs in the hands of others.
For example, he left the guidance of industry to the secretary
of state, Sublet des Noyers, ordonnateur generate of the buildings
and manufactures of the King. 1 So we see that, although the
Cardinal entirely neglected no phase of the administration, yet
he did not emphasize this particular aspect of it.
From another point of view, it is clear that this part of the
French development would have to wait while Richelieu accom-
plished great things on the exterior. Only matters of direct
importance, in that for example they were concerned with
the wars, engaged his attention. To illustrate, the Cardinal
constantly tried to curb waste and extravagance in the kingdom.
He realized that industry and production in general should be
made to aid the nation in carrying its wars to a successful com-
pletion. Therefore he asked the Grand Marechal, de Bassom-
pierre, to form a committee to investigate and seek ways to do
away with the needless waste and luxuries of the people of
France. 2 Furthermore, abundance was to be produced in the
Kingdom by increased commerce, and the vagabonds, disbanded
soldiers, etc., were to be made to work. 3 Thus the Cardinal
seems to have attempted a rather efficient conservation scheme,
4
which he carried almost to economic extremes when he advo-
cated trade schools as being far more important to France
iPigeonneau, II, 389-390.
2 Richelieu, Lettres, I, LXXXV-LXXXVI.
3 Bassompierre, Marechal de, Memoires, 4 vols. Paris, 1875 ; III, 435.
'Mercure Francois, XX, 704-711; XXIV, 1-2.
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than the schools of Liberal Arts. 5 The economic efficiency of
the man would be of great benefit to France at the present time.
In the larger sense of the term Richelieu did not fail entirely
with regard to internal affairs. "He had too great a desire
for the welfare of the public to fail utterly in attempting to
continue the internal administration of Henry IV.
' ' 6 He fol-
lowed the same unconscious economic policy with reference to
the internal as to the external affairs; namely, the mercantil-
istic or the great state idea. He desired to centralize industry
and commerce, and take away the powers of local nobles over
agriculture. Whatever he did was done for the good of France.
However, the many local franchises, the heavy wars, etc., all
prevented him from accomplishing very much in such matters
as agriculture and industry. These phases of his administration
were postponed until the future peace, when they were to be
settled in the interest of the public welfare. Nevertheless, he
did manage to accomplish a little.
With regard to agriculture, the administration of the Cardinal
shows a weakness which was, however, but natural when one
considers the torn-up condition of the country at this time. Yet
efforts were made to drain marshes, and various companies were
granted the privilege of doing this work with suitable exemp-
tions. 7 Weakening the power of the nobles and centralizing con-
trol in the hands of the government was bound to aid the farmers
and give them a better chance to pursue their life's work.
"Also," says one writer, "the numerous ordinances which were
made relating to the problem of raising and alloting the taille,
and the matter of the discipline of the soldiers, not only resulted
in decreasing the bad finances and developing the army, but also
relieved many of the country estates by repressing the selfishness
of collectors and the ravages of men of war. ' ' 8 All this would
have had an important effect on France under different circum-
stances.
M. Henri Doniol in his Histoire des classes rurales en France,
has brought up the point that Richelieu's administration, con-
trary to general belief, did consider the interests of individ-
5 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 125-134.
Gouraud, I, 189.
i Isambert, XVI, 500-503, 537.
sCaillet, 281.
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uals and their freedom and rights. He has cited several extracts
from the famous code Michaud of 1629 in support of this point. 9
In the first place, the farmer was relieved from the entail' Also,
by the destruction of the fortresses of the lords, an additional
security was obtained which did much to relieve the hard life
of the population.
10 The prospect of peace produced an in-
centive to work, because of sure profits. Furthermore, laws
relating to exportation and importation, involving the decrease
of the taille, and efforts to make imports more nearly equal to
exports, together with the reduction of the rate of interest, all
tended to better the condition of the farmers. 11
There are several other measures in the "grand vrdonnance"
of January, 1629, which indicate the solicitude of the government
for the people. Article 206 forbids lords to subject their tenants
and inhabitants to corvees in their own interest, or to impose on
the villages in any way. Article 207 forbids lords to make their
tenants patronize their mills or presses on penalty of losing their
mills and all other rights. Article 209 forbids the lords to inter-
fere with the collection of taxes and the appointment of collect-
ors.
12 A direct effort was made to' deprive the lords of any
unlawful control over the peasants, and to permit the latter to
make the most of their own few privileges. Of course conditions
in France were such that this code was never actually carried
out.
But one can see that although very little was done to aid agri-
culture, yet in an indirect way a path was prepared whereby this
part of the economic development of France was to be controlled
and influenced by the central power. The farmers at the start
were given more individual rights, and what Richelieu would
have accomplished if he had lived is of course a matter of
conjecture.13
Turning to the subject of industry, one can find more evidence
Caillet, 281-282.
10 Code Michaud, see Isambert, XVI, 225.
11 Caillet, 282 ; Mercure Francois, XX, 697.
12 Isambert, XVI, 225 et seq. ; Caillet, 282.
is Richelieu diminished the power of the Huguenots and nobles as well
and after he had put them in their proper position of subordination to the
central authority, he did all he could to encourage commerce. See Rambautl,
A., Histoire de la Civilisation Frangaise, 2 vols., Paris, 1903, I, 572.
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of activity along that line of French development, so far as the
government was concerned. Starting with the Estates-General
of 1615, efforts were made to open industry to all. "At that
time, the cahiers of the third estate had demanded that the
free exercise of the trades be open to all the poor subjects of
the King.
' ' 14
Richelieu, however, did not respond to the desire
to deprive the so-called corporations of their monopolies. The
only exception he made was in the case of colonists who had been
in the colonies six years. They could become "masters" when
they returned to France. This part of his economic policy was
weak.
Many industries were at that time the object of regula-
tions. For instance, the beer industry was under governmental
control, and the wine; growers and distillers were recognized as
engaged in two separate industries. Certain regulations were
passed also with respect to the iron industry. The soft and hard
varieties of iron were designated to be used for different purposes,
and steps were to be taken to develop the mines of France.15
Such an industry as the manufacture of glass in Picardy received
its first impetus under Richelieu.16
The manufacture of rugs and tapestry attracted more of
the attention of the' government. During the administration of
Richelieu a man by the name of Pierre du Pont and a partner
were given the right to weave and manufacture rugs in gold,
silver, silk, etc., for 18 years. They were to accept apprentices,
train them, and as a reward for their services were to be en-
nobled.17 In other words, the government made special efforts
to develop this industry and thus cut down the imports from the
East.
The manufacture of silk, an eastern product, was also fostered
by Richelieu as well as Henry IV. It increased to a remarkable
extent under the former, who realized its importance. Indeed, he
believed in making France able to manufacture such things for
herself and advocated the development of the cloth industry
in pursuit of this policy.
18 The obtaining of luxuries from
" CaUlet, 275-276.
is Isambert, XVI, 183, 191.
lei&td., XVI, 198.
"Caillet, 278.
is Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 67-68.
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abroad was not to be encouraged ; they should be made at home. 19
This belief was a part of the mercantilistic doctrine. "If in-
dustry was developed and foreign importations hindered by
intelligent laws, France could live on its own manufactures as
well as agriculture," said Richelieu. 20
One means by which the Cardinal hoped to aid industry was
the development of technical schools along industrial lines. 21
This was a plan which he was not able to carry out before he
died.
It is clear that the interest taken by the government in the
development of industry was from the point of view of the
welfare of the state as a whole. The state fostered those indus-
tries which would compete with foreign manufactures, especially
in the East. What little attention industry did receive was on the
basis of making France a strong mercantilistic state. The de-
struction of internal political obstacles had an indirect influence
on industry in France. Doubtless this field of Richelieu 's admin-
istration would have received marked attention after the Cardi-
nal had finished the external part of his program and peace had
enabled him to turn his attention to other things. This state-
ment might be applied to the matter of internal commerce as
well as industry or agriculture. 22
"At the beginning of the 17th Century," says one writer,
two obstacles opposed the development of interior commerce: (1)
the lack of good roads and navigable rivers, (2) legislation which
laid heavy duties upon the products of the soil.
' ' 23 The first
problem was mentioned by the Cardinal in a letter to his super-
intendent of finances in 1638, in which he brought out the incon-
venience suffered by the public, because of the corruption and
waste of money on the part of those who were supposed to attend
to the paving of the streets of cities like Paris, which were
neglected as a consequence.
24 At another time he mentions the
plan of joining the ocean and the Mediterranean Sea by means
i Beaurepaire, III, 270-277. Indicates the rivalry between France and
England in the cloth trade in 1639.
20 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 64-80.
21 Hid., I, 126-127.
22 Gouraud, 1, 190.
23Caillet, 284.
2* Richelieu, Lettres, VI, 247.
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of the rivers d'Ouche and d'Armacon. "But," he says, "this
enterprise was too costly for the times. ,No person would fur-
nish the money, so it was neglected.
' ' 25 He admitted that such
schemes must rely on individual efforts as the government was
not financially able to carry them out. However, in 1632 a law
was passed with the purpose of making the rivers of Vettes,
Chartres, Dreux and d'Etampes, etc., navigable.26 So that evi-
dently Richelieu's interest in this part of his administration
obtained some results.
Richelieu tried to carry on the work of Henry IV in developing
navigation by means of canals. The famous canal of Braire,
begun in 1604, was finished in 1640. The government had tried
to pay all the expenses involved in its construction but finally had
had to call in the aid of certain individuals to complete the task
in return for certain concessions. They were to unite the ocean
and the sea by this canal in 4 years or lose the rights connected
with it. 27 The owners were to be ennobled and might induce
other persons of quality, such as churchmen, nobles, and judges,
to contribute toward the undertaking. In return, "considering
the services which said Guyon and partner render to the public,
if they succeed in an enterprise so useful to Paris and many
provinces of the Kingdom we will give to them the title of no-
bility, etc.
' ' 28 In this case the government wished to centralize
everything in its hands, but lacking money, permitted private
parties to undertake some portions of the work. However, this
concession was made with the welfare of the entire state con-
stantly in mind. The economic benefits of canals were evident
to all at that time.
Many other attempts were made to develop other canals, but
the unfortunate state of the treasury and general political con-
ditions prevented their execution. "However," says one writer,
"the system adopted by Richelieu had at least the advantage of
not engaging the financial responsibilities of the state, and
leaving to the companies who undertook the task, the costs as
25 Richelieu, Mcmoires, II, 321.
2Isambert, XVI, 369.
27 Richelieu took a personal interest in the plan for the uniting of the
two seas by a canal. See Caillet, 285; also Mercure Francois, XXIII, 338,
etc.
zsisambert, XVI, 488-496.
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well as the benefits. " Z9 In this one respect, Richelieu seems a
little in advance of the mercantilistic belief.
With regard to the condition of the roads and bridges during
the period of Richelieu's rule, one writer has taken great pains
to prove that the Cardinal centralized their control in the hands
of the Intendants. Richelieu made out the budget of bridges
and roads, looked over the changes ordered, regulated the
corvees instead of leaving their control to officials, and was
responsible only to the King and his council.30 This unity of
oversight was not long in bearing fruit. Although the roads
were far from being as well kept as they were in the 18th cen-
tury, they passed in the second part of the 17th century for the
best and the safest highways in Europe.31
The service of transportation tended more and more, like the
control of bridges and roads, to be monopolized in the hands of
the state. Before Richelieu's time, the convents, the universi-
ties, the Kings, etc., all had their separate postal and parcel post
systems. No royal relays or messengers took private business,
unless permitted to do so by the chiefs in charge. The transport
of goods in wagons was the exception, merchandise being car-
ried as far as possible on the backs of animals and by boat.
Richelieu wanted the government to take charge of this part
of French affairs, and to centralize the postal service in its own
hands. He continued this development (which had been started
by Charles IX) by creating in 1624, the office of director and
"Intendant Generate" of the posts, and gave it to one of his de-
voted servants.32 Also, at this time the royal relays were given
the monopoly over the roads they covered. The messengers of
the universities were limited to university letters, parcels, etc.
In 1625 an edict was issued which established relays on various
roads, that is, the government was to rent horses to individuals
who were to convoy goods to various places. An effort was
made to render the distribution of goods even and fair by pre-
venting the holding back of food, through storing it in boats
which were kept in secret places, etc. Warning was given that
merchants in the future could not hold up laden boats or keep
2 Pigeonneau, II, 391-392.
so Ibid., II, 392-393.
si/Znd., II, 394.
32 Levasseur, I, 249.
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merchandise in warehouses along the rivers for future use. Such
action was fraudulent and to the prejudice of the public.33 Thus
efforts were made to prevent speculation in food and merchandise,
in a manner very similar to the present. One sees that the
government of that time did not fail to regulate any indus-
try or organization if it saw fit, when the latter tried to
interfere with the public welfare. Finally, all goods except
grains, wines, etc., were to be transported by royal carriers, so
that the form of a monopoly was at last reached.34 However,
this privilege of government monopoly of the post and express
was never enforced, and the traders remained free to choose their
carriers for packages weighing more than 50 pounds. 35
Richelieu finally was able to establish regular routes from
various cities on certain days, and in 1630, France was divided
into 20 postal districts, and 7 foreign offices were added, in
Spain, Flanders, England, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and
Italy.
36 Carriers left the "central bureaus" of Paris, twice a
week, and traveled at the rate of 4 leagues per hour in summer
and 11/2 per hour in winter.37 The government did not make
any profit from the postal system. It was farmed out to indi-
viduals and they received the profits.38 Yet there was a gain
in that the letters went from one part of the country to another
with regularity, quickness, and security unknown in preceding
centuries. The creation of relays at this time was a great aid
to increasing the speed of the trips.
' '
Indeed,
' '
says one writer,
"travel by coaches became more regular, and transportation as
a whole became cheaper both on land and water.
' ' 39
Evidently
during the administration of Richelieu transportation received
an important impetus, with increased security, faster time, and
decreased costs. All this was accomplished by the state and
depended on it, in spite of the desires of individuals to the con-
trary. Created in the interest of the public, transportation, in
this instance, was successful in attaining its object.
as Isambert, XVI, 158-161.
34/&U?., XVI, 353-355.
ss Pigeonneau, II, 399.
36 Isambert, XVI, 351.
ST Pigeonneau, II, 399-402.
38 Isambert, XVI, 450-455.
so Pigeonneau, II, 402.
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Among the important means of aiding commerce was the news-
paper, which traces its origin to the days of Bichelieu. "It
was," said one writer, "together with the opening of the
canals, the creation of letter posts, of relays, messengers and
carriages, the crowning event which inaugurated modern
times. ' ' 40 Bichelieu not only used the newspaper for govern-
mental purposes but the so-called journal was a powerful aid
to commerce, by giving knowledge and publicity. When one
considers that through it the King notified the nobles) that they
would not lose their rank if they engaged in commerce and
announced that certain merchants or traders had become nobles,
one can see the effect it would have on trade. Richelieu's
constant concern for the welfare of commerce is displayed also
in the reduction of the interest rate from the usual rate of 24 per
cent plus to 18 per cent. There was a danger to commerce in
that men neglected it for speculation. Therefore this more
moderate rate was established to aid trade and industry
and also to assure a sufficient profit to investors.41
Everything possible at that time was done to develop commerce.
The government tried to make the frontier the only tariff bound-
ary, but the local provinces refused to consent on account of local
privileges, rivalries, etc.
42 No matter how heavy the taxes
were upon goods in France, similar goods imported from abroad
paid at least as much. For example, a tax was laid on iron in
1632, but foreign iron paid more than French iron. This privi-
lege accorded to national industry,43 was a part of the protective
aspect of the mercantilist^ theories.
The question of money was a problem confronting the govern-
ment in its efforts to aid commerce. The Mercure Francois
brought up, in 1631, the necessity of trade and the injury done to
it by counterfeit money. A chamber of moneys was established
to deal with the matter, on the ground that otherwise the ruin
of France would result.44
Also the increase of money as a result of the discovery of the
40 Pigeonneau, II, 461-463.
4ilsambert, XVI, 406. Memoires, XXIII, 259-260.
42 Caillet, 267.
43 Pigeonneau, II, 414.
"Mercure Frangois, XVII, 713-720; Isambert, XVI, 365; Mote, II, 62-
63, 195-196.
633] AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, AND INTERNAL COMMERCE 91
New World had caused trouble for French commerce. In 1636,
the relations of 38 different foreign coins were established in an
arbitrary way. Of course this plan did not work and in 1639
the relation of coins by weight was tried. Finally in 1640 all
the lighter French gold coins were retired and refunded into the
Louis d'or and smaller coins, with definite relative weights.
In addition to the simplification of the monetary system the
cost of mining was decreased, which was a gain for both the
government and commerce, even though not all the monetary
questions were solved.
45
In conclusion, it would seem that the efforts made by the gov-
ernment to improve the agricultural, industrial, and internal
commercial conditions, though rather meager in results, were
nevertheless important, when one considers the situation at that
period. The general purpose to build up the state and center
control in its hands was the common policy behind the govern-
ment in whatever it accomplished in these particular phases of
its administration.46 The coming peace would doubtless have
seen the attempt to complete this policy as applied to internal
affairs. It was not Richelieu's lack of ability or of knowledge
of conditions, but his lack of time, which accounts for his inac-
tivity in regard to these particular phases of his administration.
Furthermore, Richelieu, during his administration, was more
interested in his external than his internal problems. His
accomplishments with regard to marine, colonization, and foreign
commerce, really constitute the positive side of his administra-
tion.
45 Pigeonneau, II, 415-422; Levasseur, I, 255-258.
*6 ' ' Richelieu 's razing of the fortieses of the nobility was one of the
most important steps ever taken towards internal freedom of intercourse
within France." Schmoller, G., The Mercantile System, New York, 1902,
I, 54.
CHAPTER VII
THE IDEAS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF RICHELIEU
AS REGARDS A MARINE
The keynote of Richelieu 's position in regard to a war marine
for France is found in the following quotation taken from his
Testament Politique: "The sea is an object of dispute among
all sovereigns, for they all claim that they inherit a right to
control it. Therefore, the factor which does so is force and not
reason. It is necessary to be powerful in order to have a recog-
nized claim in the heritage.
' ' x The Cardinal then considers the
maritime organization of England, Spain, and the Barbary
states, compares the naval forces of these, and shows briefly how
he wishes to make the French strong and active* enough to be
able, in times of war, to contend with advantage against the
fleets of their enemies, and in times of peace, to defend their
commerce, ships, and shores, from the aggression of pirates.
Richelieu saw the need of a strong marine as a means of attain-
ing a powerful state, and so was anxious to exert his efforts to-
ward that phase of his administration.
In order to gain the opportunity to carry out his ideas along
this line, in 1626, he saw to it that he was offered the position
of "grand master, chief, and general superintendent of the
navigation and commerce of France." The duties of this office
had been carried on by several officials in the past, and were now
put under the control of the Cardinal, as a further move toward
the centralization of power which he was bringing about at that
time. "God be praised," says the Mercure Francois, "that lack-
ing in power because of the weakness of France on the sea, the
King has committed to the care and administration of the great-
est person of the century and most worthy pilot of the state,
who has appeased the storms of civil war and the foreign tem-
pests near and far . . . , the police and administration of
i Eichelieu, Testament Politique, II, 48-50.
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the sea, and as a result will build up commerce by means of
power upon the ocean and immunity from the attacks of other
nations thereby.
' ' 2
Up until Richelieu's time each of the former admirals and
connetables had unlimited personal power, and they were bound
to come into conflict with other officials. 3 But when Richelieu
took charge, all the duties were centralized in his hands. Some
of them were as follows : "to give and furnish all orders which
will be useful and necessary for navigation, in conservation of
the rights of France, the advancement and establishment of
the commerce and security of her subjects, at sea, in the ports,
harbors and nearby islands.
' ' 4 Thus one perceives that the
powers which Richelieu was to possess were very extended; in-
deed the appointment placed under his control the merchant as
well as the war marine. The duties of the Cardinal were defined
in more detail than were those of his predecessors, and further-
more, they were broader in so far as they concerned the necessary
field, so that he was able to decide as a sovereign ruler, all ques-
tions relating to the sea, even to disputes arising over the capture
and disposal of the contents of wrecked vessels. That he took
his office seriously, and tried to realize vast plans for the mari-
time and commercial development of France, is the final con-
clusion of most students of his life.
The way in which Richelieu carried on the duties of his
office will illustrate both his impartiality and his honesty.
Numerous passages in his letters show that he looked upon the
position as a sort of sacred trust. Indeed, the Cardinal consid-
ered the appointment as being one which was not conferred
upon him as a regular part of his official position, but was
given to him with the idea that its great importance to
the welfare of the nation and the King, required every
loyal Frenchman not only to obey its precepts, but aid in
carrying out its functions, if he was ordered to do so.5
This explains why the Cardinal refused to accept money
for his work in this particular office.6 One of his letters illus-
2 Mervure Francois, XIII, 257-258.
3 Isambert, XVI, 198.
*
Ibid., XVI, 194.
sEichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 257-258.
eBichelieu, Lettres, II, 346; Memoires, XXIV, 275-276.
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trates very well the spirit' in which he took up his duties and
some of the problems he had to face at the outset. He says,
"that the King, knowing for some time how his vessels were
preyed upon, was determined to put a stop to it. So he sent
out escorts with the various merchant vessels and fortified all
ports. Also, his majesty ordered me to take charge of commerce
and navigation, and has sent forward a general order that clear-
ance was to be taken from me rather than from Montmorency
(his predecessor) . . ." 7 He then goes on to cite cases in
which his authority was not recognized. There existed at that
time provinces, where local governments exerted almost unre-
stricted rights in maritime matters, and thus conflicted with the
central authority, which was at that time the "superintendent
of navigation and commerce." In regard to Brittany, one of
the more or less independent provinces, he says that he does
not seek to make innovations there, but only tries to give aid
and means to all those who wish to trade, and to do so in pleasing
and favorable ways. Many other letters indicate his great inter-
est in the office. 8 And so one finds that after this, he begins to
introduce important plans in regard to forming a naval force,
which was to be of great importance to France in the future.
But first of all a few words in respect to the past history of
this new war marine.
Francis I and Henry II had attempted to build up the navy
but since then it had dwindled to nothing. In 1603, Sully was
obliged to journey to England in an English vessel. On the
way over he was escorted by some small French ships, which
were forced to salute the English flag when they passed one of
the vessels of that country.
9 This was an insult which affected
Richelieu deeply, as it indicated the fact that England was
master over France, in so far as the sea was concerned.
Henry IV recognized the necessity of a strong marine, but
his sudden death prevented any efforts in that direction, so
that when the Cardinal went into office, France had practically
no power on the sea. "Trade," he says, "was almost totally
ruined and the King did not have one ship." 10
, Lettres, II, 350-352.
8 Ibid., II, 346, 349-350, 409-412, 416.
Caillet, 287-288.
10
Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 190.
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Richelieu as far back as 1616 realized the weakness of
the marine, and in his brief entrance into the "consett"
urged all villages to encourage the development of a marine as
far as they were able. 11 Now, as has been pointed out, Riche-
lieu's theories with regard to the marine have been borrowed
from the ideas of men like Henry IV, Issac de Laffemas, from the
cahiers of 1614, 1617, and 1626 as well as the writings of Mont-
chretien.12 But yet one must give him credit for having the
ability to weld all these ideas together in spite of almost super-
human difficuties, and to develop an exceedingly capable marine
policy, which was largely put into execution before his death.
One of the most interesting phases of this policy was the fact
that he consulted and informed the people of France concerning
it. He seems to have especially desired their approval. For
instance, the assembly of notables was made aware of his eco-
nomic and political reforms through the speech of one of his
representatives. They were unanimously approved by that
body.
13 The nobles felt that a strong marine was the sure
means whereby France could develop and regain her former
splendor.
14 Richelieu also used the Mercure Francois, in reality
a government controlled newspaper, to inform the public
concerning the state of the marine. In it the former
glory of France is brought out, especially under Charlemagne,
Charles VI, and Francis I, particularly with regard to relations
in the Levant. Then it shows how the religious wars had led
to the fall of the fleet, which Henry IV had not been able to
renew.
' ' He who is master of the sea is master of the land. ' ' 15
France had existed without sea control, while England, Spain,
Denmark, and Sweden had increased in power by that means.
Control of the sea meant power for the nations, and was neces-
sary for France.
However, the Cardinal did not have to use many arguments
to convince the people as to the need of a marine. France had
many direct and indirect enemies at this time, and the critical
state in which the nation was placed because of lack of sea con-
11 Gouraud, I, 176.
12 Pigeonneau, II, 381-382.
Ibid., II, 384.
i* Bichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 256-257.
is Mercure Frangois, XIII, 214-229.
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trol caused him to take immediate efforts to reform the marine,
with the full consent of the people. Of course, there was a
certain amount of opposition from local governors and other
officials affected by a centralization of its control.
16 Further-
more, the Huguenots were not enthusiastic for a national) navy.
But it was just this local opposition which caused the Cardinal
to go ahead. Eichelieu knew that the marine exerted a direct
influence on foreign relations, and this was the primary cause
for his determined and farsighted stand with regard to this
problem.
In the first place, one discovers that relations between France
and the Barbary pirates were not very pleasant. The inhabitants
of northern Africa had for many generations followed piracy
as a profession, and at that time dominated the Mediterranean
Sea. They had been so strong that it was impossible for a French
vessel to venture out of a Mediterranean port without running
the risk of being captured and having its crew taken to Africa
as slaves.17 Indeed, no part of the French coast was immune
from attacks of pirates of various nationalities. The "Barbar-
esques" penetrated from ten to twenty leagues into the interior
of Provence and were a source of constant terror to the people
there, who constantly petitioned for aid, calling Richelieu's
attention to the fine harbors upon which to base his sea control,
where he could also build up an immense trade.18 Furthermore,
the Spaniards and English committed piracies near French
soil.19 Add to all this the fact that the nobles in France had
no scruples about taking part in these depredations, and one can
readily understand why the people of France demanded as a
unit the creation of a strong marine.
On account of these raids and the unanimous demand of the
people, Richelieu, in the second year of his ministry, made a
is Richelieu was hindered in his work by many opponents, even with
regard to the marine, which had more national support perhaps than any
other measure. Some even said that he hid behind the claims of benefiting
commerce, to obtain control of the sea and thus to make himself supreme.
This helps to indicate the problems before him. See Richelieu, Memoires,
XXIII, 224-225.
nMercure Francois, XII, 56-65; 75-79.
is Ibid., XII, 65-73.
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"Reglement pour la mer," in which he brought out the necessity
of a strong war marine for France. "In order to guarantee to
our subjects who trade in the East, safety from the losses
which they have received from the pirates, and to maintain
the regulation and dignity of our crown among foreigners, we
wish that in the future there will always be in our ports forty
galleys prepared to go out and quietly scour our coasts.
' ' 20
A.S a result, Richelieu did all he could by means of treaties with
the pirates, as well as the force of a great navy, to make the
pirates respect the flag of France on the high seas.
21 He succeed-
ed in accomplishing these aims to a remarkable extent, but his
successor Mazarin, through neglect, permitted the pirates to
become strong again and continue their depredations. However,
there were other influences besides that arising from the acts of
the pirates, which caused Richelieu to take such an active stand
with regard to the navy.
Diplomatic relations with such countries as England and
Spain, which affected both the political and economic growth
of his country, caused the Cardinal to consider a strong marine
as the most important weapon with which to meet these nations.
"On the power of the sea," he says, "depends the lowering of
the pride of England, Holland, Spain, . . . against us, and
the ruin of the Huguenots.
' ' 22
The best source of his ideas on this particular subject is found
in his Testament Politique, where, after discussing the advantage
of certain types of ships on the ocean and the Mediterranean
Sea, he goes on to say that a great state would never be in such
a position that it had to receive an injury without taking a just
revenge. He points out the supremacy of the English over the
French. "This," he says, "works as an injury to the commerce
of France, especially to her fisheries." He then comments on
the fact that England and not France can fix the duties on com-
modities because of her strength at sea. The latter in her state
of weakness could do nothing. He goes on to relate an incident
zoEiehelieu, Lettres, II, 163-166.
21 Masson, P. Histoire du commerce Franc.ais dans le Levant, XVII"
Si6cle, Paris, 1896, 28.
22 Sourdis, H. de, Correspondence, Ed., E. Sue Collection des Docum.,
ined. de I 'hist, de France), 3 vols., Paris, 1839, I, Introduction, II-III.
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in which the British flag had to be saluted in preference to the
French standard, because of the naval inferiority of the latter.
In conclusion, he says that only force will make England recog-
nize France.
He then takes up the naval strength of France, pointing out
the fact that the utility of the Indies to Spain compels her to
have a large sea force. "We should be able," he says, "to op-
pose and put a stop to any of these enterprises against us. If
your majesty is powerful at sea, you will be able to attack Spain
on her lengthy coast, and they will conserve most of their rev-
enues in an effort to guard their territory. This danger will keep
them from troubling their neighbors, as they have done up to the
present. For they will need all the power they have to protect
themselves . . ." 2S He closes this section by describing the
excellent location of France in respect to harbors, emphasizing
the fact that she has ports on the ocean and the Mediterranean
Sea as well. This is an immense advantage. Then he comments
in more detail on her excellent ports. "Brittany alone," he says,
"contains the best harbors on the ocean, and Provence has better
ones than England and Italy together. Spain has to have a large
navy in order to keep her many seaports under control. Just
as the sea divides Spain from Italy, so France separates her
from the rest of her territories. ' ' 24 Richelieu realized very
clearly the importance of a war marine to France, because of her
weakness on the political and commercial side in her relations
with foreign nations. One must admit that his desire for a
fleet almost implies aggression against Spain for commercial
and territorial rights. These quotations taken from his last
work, written as a result of twenty odd years of service in the
employ of his country, certainly indicate his final ideas on
this subject, and throw very valuable light on his aims at that
time.
There was yet another cause which influenced Richelieu to
build up a war marine. This was the rising colonial trade of
France and her growing commerce as a consequence of it. Riche-
lieu realized that in order to develop and protect colonies and
23 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 49-52 ; Memoires, XXIII, 257-258 ;
Mercure Francois, XIII, 208-213.
2* The Spanish Netherlands, Luxemberg, and the Franche Comte were
the important territories separated from Spain by the French nation.
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commerce, a strong navy was a necessity. Now, as he wanted
France to be a powerful colonizing nation, it is natural that he
should turn toward the development of a navy as one of the
first steps in the promotion of this idea. "A force on the sea
is necessary to keep it clear of pirates, to protect commerce and
increase the grandeur of the state. The King takes to heart all
the affairs of commerce and trade inasmuch as he cannot sep-
arate individual interests and his own. All are involved in the
question of power on the sea and against those who would ex-
clude them, thus to the detriment of their trade . . . etc.
' '25
The question of commerce was a national affair, and affected all.
And the very fact that Gaston, the hated enemy of Richelieu,
supported him in his efforts to secure a marine, indicates the
importance placed on this part of his administration.26
"Power in trade and commerce depends on sea power," says
the Mercure Francois. "For example, the naval force of
England and also of Holland all have increased trade by that
means, as well as the Portuguese and Venetians. The Hanseatic
cities of Germany also having failed to protect themselves have
sought the protection of some powerful Princes on the sea.
French commerce shows a decrease and thus the absolute necessity
of a fleet. France needs to be protected in war on the sea, and
to be strong in commerce in times of peace through protection.
Thus not only for political, but for commercial reasons, it is
desirable that the French nation be a strong sea power.
'
'-
2T This
quotation from Eichelieu's paper sums up his entire attitude
toward that problem. He appreciated the natural advantages
which France had in regard to commerce, and the development
of a strong marine, and was farsighted enough to desire to build
up for the future. At no other place is his economic states-
manship better illustrated than in his efforts to create a war and
commercial marine, in spite of the numerous obstacles in the
way. "There is no Kingdom so well situated as France and
so rich in all that is needed for it to become a power on the sea.
To do this we must see how our neighbors govern themselves in
that work, we must make great companies, and oblige the mer-
chants to enter them. Small merchants cannot meet the diffi-
25 Mercure Francois, XIII, 229-233. Eichelieu, Lettres, II, 331-332.
26 Eichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 261-262.
27 Mercure Francois, XIII, 233-237.
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culties of the sea . . . etc.
" 28 A combination between the
merchants and the government to furnish mutual aid on the
seas, was the plan of Richelieu, which would have doubtless pro-
duced great results if he had lived long enough to carry it
to its logical conclusion, namely, a great merchant and war
marine.
Turning to the actual accomplishments of Richelieu with re-
gard to the marine, one finds that it was during the years 1629
to 1635 that he began seriously to consider this phase of his
administration,
29
although there is evidence that he contemplated
action along this line from the very start.30 Financial troubles, 31
and disturbances, such as those with the Huguenots, prevented
his doing much until later. But he admitted the weakness of the
French on the sea, and the injury done to their commerce by
other powers. "Our neighbors," he said, "buy our goods and
sell theirs at their price. Now this state of affairs should cease.
Therefore, his majesty is resolved to have 30 good vessels of
war to protect our coasts and inspire respect for us on the part
of our neighbors.
' ' 32 From the very start the Cardinal had
a definite policy outlined and stood ready to carry it out even
to the smallest detail.
The first thing he did with reference to the marine was to place
the situation before the assembly of notables in 1626. As a re-
sult of this meeting the grand edict of reformation of 1629, or
the Code Michaud, was passed. This edict, written by officials
of the Cardinal, but expressing his views,33 advocated the free
exportation of wheat and wine except in times of famine, author-
ization for gentlemen to exercise the duties of merchants and
colonists
;
forbade French sailors to serve under foreign banners ;
and established the convoy of merchant ships by war vessels;
action against the pirates was contemplated; exportation of
merchandise in foreign boats was forbidden if French vessels
were available; there was prohibition of the importation of
foreign cloth; jurisdiction in maritime matters was reserved to
28 Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 258-259.
29Caillet, 292.
so Richelieu, Lettres, II, 163-166; 290-292; 295-296.
si Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 126.
32 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 386, see note.
33 Isambert, XVI, 329, etc. ; Levasseur, 243.
643] IDEAS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS REGAEDS A MARINE 101
tribunals of the admiralty, etc. If these provisions had been
carried out France would have developed a great commercial
and war marine based on rather remarkable modern protective
ideas, part of which endure at the present time. This code is
a striking example of the emphasis that was being placed on the
economic side of foreign relations at that time. It is a pity that
internal opposition and external problems prevented its entire
execution.
Finally, in 1629, the Cardinal was free enough from other
administrative troubles to take up the question. He decided
that conditions in the land in so far as they affected the creation
of a war marine, should be investigated. Accordingly in 1629
and 1633, he ordered two of the best trained men in the King-
dom, Messrs. Leroux D 'Infreviile, commissioner of the marine,
and Henri De Seguioran, Seigneur de Bone, Knight and Council-
lor of the King, to carry out this project. The former was to
inspect, the coast bordering on the Mediterranean Sea. They
were to report on everything which concerned the marine and
were also to reestablish the right of anchorage, which Henry IV
had yielded to foreign vessels."'4 "These duties, executed with
rare intelligence, cast a rather depressing light upon the de-
plorable situation in which they found all forms of sea. activities,
a situation rendered still worse by the conflicts of jurisdiction
which were being constantly brought up by the governors of
provinces or the admirals or the nobles whose feudal estates
bordered on the oceans and rivers. ' '35 These men reported that
the ports were without garrisons, that the coast of the ocean
was harried by the pirates of Africa and Spain, and that the
harbors and the castles built around them, both on the Atlantic
Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, were in a very unfortunate
state of neglect. In addition to all this, there were "river rul-
ers,
' '
who exacted tolls from travelers who went up and down the
rivers which passed through their territories. They reported in
detailed fashion as to the condition of the coasts of France, the
duties collected, armaments, boats, the means of defense in the
ports, the spirit of the inhabitants of the coast towns, the number
3* Richelieu reestablished the old anchorage charge of "3 sous per ton-
neau," on foreign vessels unloading their freight in France. See Sourdis,
III, 173-175.
35 Sourdis, III, 173-225, etc.
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of ships engaged in navigation, and the number of their sailors,
carpenters, pilots and, captains. Finally they gave an exact
analysis of the different claims of the dukedoms, syndicates,
and corporations in France, and recommended as a result, that
his majesty provide war vessels to protect the commercial ships
as well as the ports.
36
Thus Eichelieu became aware of the fact that trade was at a
low ebb ; that other nations because of the weak marine of France
could do what they wanted so far as concerned their relations
with France; and that the position of France both in the East
and the West was becoming worse. He came to the conclusion
that something must be done to build up her weak and almost
rotten fortifications, and her small and almost useless navy, if
France was to command the respect of foreign nations and even
of the pirates.
The program of Kichelieu in regard to a war marine might
be broadly classified in the following manner: (1) laws relating
to maritime authority and accountability (the bureau of ac-
counts) ; (2) the formation of a "personal marine;" (3) the
restoration of dilapidated coast fortifications and the creation of
new ones
; (4) the creation of a war marine and of naval equip-
ment.37 A brief consideration of the above seems justifiable.
The Cardinal in taking up that part of his work which was
concerned with the passing of laws governing affairs on the
sea, displayed not only his fairness to all other sea powers, but
his knowledge of matters pertaining to the marine. He soon
placed the control and conduct of all acts relating to it in the
hands of definitely assigned officials. The latter formed what
is called his "personal marine," and they conducted and
managed affairs relating to the sea according to fixed rules and
regulations imposed by him. He tried to put an end to the
conflict of authority existing in France, in respect to the control
of military affairs. Seven Bureaus of Admiralty were establish-
ed, to be composed of officials already appointed by certain
individuals, and in the future to be nominated by the Cardinal
himself and his successors, who were "grand masters of France."
They were to have under their control all criminal and civil
seSourdis, I, Introduction, XXXI-XXXII.
t, 301-302.
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affairs, and all acts connected with the state government and
navigation on the high seas. Also, they were to have charge
of the proper disposal of wreckage.
38
In carrying out his scheme relating to the formation of a mar-
ine, Richelieu even went so far into details, as to change the
method of getting sailors, which had hitherto been one of the great
causes of the weakness of the French on the sea. He had a
census taken of the number and addresses of sailors and carpen-
ters in every harbor in France. He ascertained the number of
vessels and their equipment, and the number and size of the
harbors, and from that information as a basis, he determined
the quota of sailors to be furnished by each province, and
the amount of money that might be levied for ships and their
equipment. 39 In addition to all this, he established schools for
pilots, put the coast in a state of defense, created new ports,
enlarged others, and finally established three arsenals. He
spent over 359,000 livres in 1635 for the fortifications of Brouage
d 'Orleans and the island of Re. He wanted to make the former
the center of maritime power upon the ocean. He strengthened
the ports on the Mediterranean in a similar fashion, especially
Toulon, which he desired to make the war center of the nation
on the southern coast.40 However, the crux of his efforts in
building up the power of France lay in the increase of the num-
ber of war vessels and the enlarged equipment.
Henry IV had realized the necessity of a fleet, but it was
left to Richelieu to carry this idea into execution. "He resolv-
ed," says Caillet, "to endow France with a military marine,
that is to say, a military force truly belonging to the state, and
not furnished by cities, as had previously been the case.
' ' 41
Up to this time, there had existed the custom of allowing par-
ticular individuals and certain interests to build vessels and
rent them to merchants for their protection. But Richelieu
saw that this was not a good thing, and, after he had triumph-
ed over the Huguenots, he was very careful to hold all ports
ss Mercwe Francois, XX, 924-925.
39 Richelieu also issued orders in 1635, that all vagabonds, beggars, etc.,
should be inducted into marine service to fill up the huge gap in the number
of men available for service. See Meroure Francois, XX, 923.
40 Sourdis, III, 359, et seq.
Caillet, 310.
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accountable to himself, to make himself master of all the
magazines, all the cannons, and other war materials. Lastly, he
forbade all vessels to bear arms, unless they had royal permis-
sion.
Under the orders of the council of notables in 1626, which
had really been called and conducted under the direction of
Richelieu, the fleets of war vessels were greatly increased. But
it took time before the maritime service was really well organ-
ized.42 As late as 1626, when France wished to put an end to
the ravages which were being made by the Barbary pirates on
the ocean, they could not find enough vessels to carry out the
task and had to get twenty from Holland. It was particularly
during the siege of La Rochelle, as has been said before, that
Eichelieu felt the inferiority of the French war marine. After
that he set aside a certain sum each year for the creation of a
navy.
From 1630 to 1634, the naval power of France gradually
increased, and finally consisted of three large squadrons. As
a result, the pirates were suppressed for the time being, and
Spain was thrust aside, so far as her claims on the sea were
concerned. ' ' It was to be for France and for the great minister,
who had increased his country's reputation so much, a just
subject of pride when their fleet of eighty-five vessels passed
triumphantly across the sea, where some years before she had
possessed a fleet less powerful than that of the smallest city of
Italy."
43 He must have realized that he had now in his pos-
session the implement by which he could carry out many of his
political and economic plans to the glorious ends which his
fertile brain had assigned to them. Up to the very last, he
was occupied with this problem, although hindered by financial
difficulties.44
Thus the Cardinal saw his plans reach what seemed to be a
successful conclusion. But death took him away just at the
time when he was most needed. The splendid fleet, like a
flower nipped by an unexpected frost, dwindled away almost
to nothing after his departure. The good fruits of his work
along this line were mostly temporary. No one continued this
"Caillet, 314.
/bid., 311.
**
Richelieu, Lettres, VII, 292, 303.
647] IDEAS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS REGARDS A MARINE 105
task, which he had so well begun, until the age of Colbert, and
then it was too late to prevent irreparable injury.
But before reaching a conclusion, it seems best to consider
briefly the importance of his work so far as it concerns the
navy of France. L. P. Fournier in the preface of his valuable
work entitled Richelieu, writes with much enthusiam con-
cerning the progress of sea power under Louis XIII. "Fav-
ored with the admiration of the world," he says to Louis
XIII, to whom he dedicated the book, "France now finds her-
self famous through your victories. She now sees the great
navy and the harbors open to receive and fortified to protect
them. Well supplied magazines are established on both coasts.
All of which is equally useful in the promotion of commerce, as
well as warfare. Your majesty's fleets have controlled things on
the Mediterranean. Indeed, Spain has been forced to acknow-
ledge the power of the French fleet, and thus future glory must
be approaching.
' ' 45
M. Masson in his Histoire du Commerce Franqais dans le
Levant, continually emphasizes the point that it was the
development of a navy under the Cardinal that prolonged the
Eastern trade of France with the Levant, which was on the
decrease at that time, because of the lack of protection.
46 M.
Sue also sums up the work of Richelieu very appropriately
when he points out the fact, that when the Cardinal built up
the navy, he laid the foundations of a great and splendid
system of military marine, which would serve as an offensive
arm to combat the enemies of France, and as a shield or protect-
ion to aid her commerce, and thus by making transportation
of goods safer he made them cheaper, which in turn aided in
the support of the war marine.*
7 The Cardinal's econ-
omic turn of mind is very well illustrated by the above
passage. He evidently intended to pay for the marine by an
increase of taxes on the subjects whose prices were lowered
because of cheaper transportation. These taxes were, as a rule,
borne by the merchants themselves. "His system," says Sue,
"was a marvelous exposition of thought, force, and solidarity." 48
5CaiIlet, 314-315.
46 Masson, 117.
*7 Sourdis, I, Introduction, VII-VIII. M. Sue is considered an authority
upon the activities of Richelieu with regard to the marine.
43 Richelieu 's ability with regard to the marine is nowhere better illus-
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It was carried to extremes by those who came after him, so
that, not being sufficiently supported by maritime commerce,
the sea power of France died from lack of sailors, finances,
defenses, and good harbors. Indeed, France just before the
world war adopted an active policy developing her war
marine, and in doing so was influenced by the same motive
which compelled Richelieu centuries ago to do likewise.49
After all, this phase of his administration is fundamentally
economic. "He," as Sue says, "wished to give also a large
development to commerce, merchant navigation, and colonial
enterprises, interests upon which he intended to base the de-
velopment of a military marine, preparing himself thus for
the eventualities of a war during the intervals of peace.50 The
Cardinal knew that if he was to obtain the great state he
desired, France must be strong in trade, colonies, and in
political influence. A war and merchant marine was the means
by which this was to be obtained. It is certainly a pity that
Colbert was not able to carry to a successful completion the
plans for the marine as set down in Richelieu's marine
code.51 If the Cardinal's naval ideas had been carried out, the
chances are that the subsequent colonial and commercial history
of France would have been entirly different. Richelieu was
constantly favoring those engaged in commerce.52 He realized
that trade would benefit every individual in France. "France,"
he says, "will add in a short time to her natural abundance what
trated than in the complete statement which he has left of all receipts and
expenses connected with that phase of his administration, during the years
1631 to 1639. It is a striking commentary upon the efficient financial ad-
ministrative abilities of the man. See Sourdis, III, 359, etc.
See Braeq, C., France under the Republic, N. Y., 1910, 34. M.
Bracq points out the efforts of France to strengthen her fleet before the war,
so as to be able to meet her rivals on equal terms, and also be strong
economically, and thus protect her commerce and colonies from the possible
insults of rival powers.
so Sourdis, I, Introduction, XXIX.
si Pigeonneau, II, 411-412. In 1642, de la Porte, Intendant of com-
merce and navigation, was ordered to write a general statistical account of
the marine. Richelieu was fond of statistics. He gave therein the laws and
ordinances concerning the marine. It was really the sketch of a maritime
code of which Eiehelieu 's death prevented the completion. See Sourdis,
III, 321, etc.
52Gouraud, II, 195.
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commerce brings to the most sterile nation.
' ' 53 He even went
so far as to point out the fact that cheapness of food for work-
men would be brought about through increased transportation
facilities on rivers, etc.
5 * There can be no doubt that he was
preparing the marine, not only to oppose his great political
rivals on the sea and protect for the time being French traffic
on the water, but also that he was looking forward to the time
of peace, when he would be able to found the great mercantile
nation of which the marine would be the strong arm for defense,
and possibly, for economic if not political aggression.
"Eichelieu, Testament Politique, II, 78-79.
s* Ibid., II, 78.
CHAPTER VIII
THE IDEAS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF RICHELIEU
AS REGARDS COLONIZATION
Before the age of Richelieu, France had accomplished very
little along the lines of colonial development. Indeed the
period in which he came into power was really the time when
the settlement of North America, for example, was in its in-
fancy, so that France had really not considered very seriously,
up to that time, the opportunity of carrying on colonial projects
in the new continents, although a beginning had been made by
Champlain in 1608. Furthermore, internal troubles, religious
wars, and unfriendly foreign relations all tended to prevent
the predecessors of Henry IV from sending any expeditions
of importance outside of the vicinity of France and Italy. On
the other hand, other nations grew stronger on the seas and
in colonial enterprises. Spain and Portugal rose for nearly a
century, but declined about the time of the Armada in 1588.
And then came the age when England and Holland gained rap-
idly on the sea.
1
England took from France the cloth industry in
the Hundred Years' War, and built up her state on a strong
protective basis. The Hanseatic league decayed and in its
place rose Holland. Colonies in America, Africa, and Asia
resulted from the growth in sea power of these nations, and
the latter acquired wealth in consequence.
In the seventeenth century came for France the age of
Henry IV, Richelieu, and Colbert, and as a result colonial
commerce underwent unprecedented growth. What little col-
onial activity had occurred before the age of Henry IV was
based on the motive of discovery and exploration, rather than
of industry and settlement. But when Henry IV came to
power, mercantilistic ideas were just beginning to take a definite
form, and the value of colonies as a means of monetary gain
i Levasseur, E., Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 vols., Paris, 1911, I,
275-277.
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began to be recognized by French statesmen. In other words,
Henry IV and Richelieu simply applied in France the system
inaugurated by England and Holland, namely, a plan of col-
onization founded upon the general interests and permanent
needs of the country, and not upon such dreams as a search
for the northwest passage, or some other particular interest,
such as the religious basis of the colonization of Coligny.
2
Inspired by the colonial activities of England and Holland,
both Henry IV and Richelieu tried to foster ideas in regard to
the foundation of great colonization companies, which were
more or less new to the French people. This was done "in
order to make ourselves masters of the sea, and to form great
companies, to encourage merchants to enter, and give great
privileges to these companies as they came into existence, just
or foreigners have done.
' ' 3
However, lacking money, as was the
case with the governments of England and Holland, the French
government could not back the companies, but simply encourag-
ed, guided and protected them, leaving in the hands of individ-
uals the financial risks and the details of administration.
Not much in a colonial way was accomplished by Henry IV.
' ' Colonial enterprises lacked experience and national character,
' '
says one writer;" "they were too local, weak in capital, and
narrow in viewpoint to use their privileges to the utmost.4 In
fact Henry IV did not live long enough to form any definite
colonial policy, so that it fell to Richelieu to initiate the colonial
expeditions of France.
When the Cardinal came into power, he began immediately
to build up the strength of the French nation as a colonizing
state. Aided by the accomplishments of Henry IV, and such
ideas as are found in the work of Montchretien,6 he made
colonization a political and economic question, involving the
growth of France. 6 This problem was treated with diplomatic
reserve, and as a consequence little was written concerning it
by contemporary writers. However, it is known that Champlain
and other well known advocates of colonization projects recog-
nized in the Cardinal the true leader of this movement.
2 Pigeonneau, II, 329.
aD'Avenel, Monarchic Absolve, III, 209-210.
* Pigeonneau, II, 346.
sibid., II, 360-363.
oDeschamps, 82-83.
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Richelieu saw the advantages and difficulties in the way of
colonial expansion on the part of France. He knew that he
would have to face the opposition of England, Spain, and
Holland on the sea. But that did not stop him, for as soon as he
assumed the office of the head of navigation and commerce, he
began to plan a war and merchant marine and commercial
companies, which were to settle and build up economically and
politically new territorial possessions for France in America,
Africa, and Asia.
His principal aims in forming colonies were: (1) to establish
and multiply colonies, to people them with French colonists,
and maintain there the Catholic religion to the exclusion of
all others; (2) to enliven commerce and promote a war marine
for protection. It is interesting to note that Colbert borrowed
this policy from him and completed it. " Indeed," says one
writer,
"
people have not realized the important part played
by Eichelieu in colonial development, or have mixed his achieve-
ments and initiative with, those of Colbert. In the thoughts of
Eichelieu, the maritime and colonial supremacy of France holds
a place equal to the idea that the Hapsburgs must be ruined.
' ' T
These were the two threads, which were really connected and
were to unite to form the grandeur of France. In 1625 the
Cardinal addressed to Louis XIII a proposed law for the sea,
and a memoir which contained his new ideas, namely, to build up
the marine as a preparatory measure of which colonization was
to be the end.8 "In 1626," says one writer, "Richelieu re-
ceived five memoirs or letters on the state of commerce and
the marine. He was himself the author or the source of inspir-
ation of a great number of contracts, letters, reports, and
statistics having the same object.
' ' 9 Among the memoirs, two
are of special interest, one by the Chevalier Isaac de Razilly,
and an anonymous memoir of November 26, 1626. De Razilly
pointed out the need of navigation in spite of opinions to the
contrary. He advocated clearly the advantages of the exchange
7 Deschamps, 74-76 ; Bonassieux, L. E., Les Grandes Compagnies de
Commerce, Paris, 1892, 5.
s Richelieu, Lettres, II, 163-167.
Deschamps, 87-88. The many memoirs, projects and plans addressed to
Eichelieu concerning the marine, indicate the interest shown by the people
in this phase of his administration, and the recognition of his leadership in
the undertakings to be carried out.
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of goods, and the adaptability of the French for carrying on
long voyages. (Evidently there was opposition to any commer-
cial policy France might engage in at this time.) Then he
outlined a plan of reform concerning navigation and colonies,
exactly similar to that which Richelieu and Colbert followed.
In the first place, France was to regain her sea power and
make conquests and establish trade all over the world. Also,
men were
'
to be encouraged to undertake navigation, nobles
who participated were to retain their rank, and merchants
were to be ennobled because of their accomplishments in this
particular field. Companies were to be founded in which the
King, the ministers, the princes of the blood, and great seign-
eurs should be interested, as well as individual cities and the
clergy as a class. Colonies were to be established in the Amer-
icas, and according to the anonymous memoir, in the East Indies
as well.10 These two memoirs, which were in harmony with the
policy of Richelieu and Colbert, looked forward to the fall
of Spain and Portugal, and the rise of France in commerce
and navigation in the Orient, the Mediterranean, and Asia.
The downfall of the Hapsburgs was to be a necessary prelude
to the rise of France as a commercial and colonial power. This
likely was one of the guiding forces behind the rivalry of the
Bourbon and Hapsburg houses at this time. Colonization was
an important part of governmental administration, and the
fact that the King in 1626 gave a great masquerade ball to
which the fur-trading companies sent representatives dressed
in the native costumes of the people of the various colonies and
and trading stations of France, indicates the interest displayed by
French society in the economic affairs of their country. 11 There
was a little opposition to Richelieu's commercial policy, but it
was spoken, not written.
12
The Cardinal outlined his program from the very start.
"Indeed," says Mathieu Mole, a contemporary, in one of his
memoirs, "the Cardinal wished to present to the assembly of
notables in 1627 some new edicts concerning the state of the
marine, trade, and navigation, in order to justify his position
as head of the kingdom. He established by means of an edict,
lODeschamps, 90-03.
11 Mercure Francois, XII, 187-190.
isDeschamps, 131.
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a perpetual navy of forty-five vessels, which he said would re-
turn the French war marine to its former state of splendor.
He also wished to create some important companies to which he
would grant privileges. He then appointed me to examine the
first proposition which was made by Nicholas Witte, Jean du
Meurier, esquire, and other French and Flemish merchants, who
have formed a company called, 'La Nacelle de Saint Pierre
Fleurdelisee,' with the purpose of establishing in France an
immense trade in all merchandise which enters into commerce,
of introducing fisheries, of building vessels, and other uncommon
duties, and finally of increasing in value lands and colonies
which have not returned much profit hitherto. " 13 This company
was to build up not only French colonies, but France itself.
The text of the agreement adopted by the Cardinal with re-
spect to this company is to be found in the notes or memoirs of
Mathieu Mole. Since it gives a correct idea of all that relates
to external commerce and to the great industries, it seems
best to give the principal articles of the contract, especially
in as much as all the companies formed by Richelieu conformed
more or less rigidly to this type.
41
I. The heads of the company were to take over 400 families
within a month of the day of negotiating the agreement. These
families were to be composed of persons suitable for commerce,
fishing, manufacturing, and agriculture. Besides these, there
were to be sent no less than twelve vessels completely equipped
for the expedition. By so doing, the aforesaid company would
be allowed to trade both by seas, rivers, and land, to establish
fisheries upon the sea, and manufacturing concerns of all sorts,
to plant sugar cane and refine sugar, to work mines, to make
porcelain vessels and crockery by the methods of the Indies
and of Italy, and finally, to use all other resources and manu-
factures which they recognize.
II. All Flemings, Hollanders, and others who should go over
to the colonies were to be regarded as Frenchmen and enjoy
all their rights.
III. Rewards were offered to those who invested money in
the company or worked on behalf of it. The crown intended
is Mol6, Mathieu, MSmoires, 4 vols., Paris, 1855, I, 422-448.
., I, 422-448.
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to honor those who took up the work more than ever before,
in order to attract persons who were capable of aiding the
proposition in any way. People of every condition, clergy,
nobles, and officials could enter and put their money into the
company without injuring their position or endangering their
privileges. Indeed, in order to aid industry and colonization,
His Majesty was to ennoble thirty-two persons, whether they
were Frenchmen or foreigners, who would enter the company
during the first year of its establishment, and put at least 5000
pounds into its funds without having the power to withdraw
the money for six years, and also some who did not invest any
capital in the enterprise, but who devoted all their ability and
energy to the advancement of the aforesaid company.
IV. His Majesty was to give the company two sites not
occupied as yet, one on the ocean, the other on the Mediterranean.
They were to have the power to build houses of business in those
places. In each of these a market place was to be established
with fairs (two yearly fairs of eight days each), etc. All inhabi-
tants should be exempt from the payment of the aides, tailles,
etc., which fell upon other ports.
Articles V and VI provided for the government and the
working of the mines in those territories, in which the colonies
were to have supreme rights, subject only to the final decision
of the "grand master of commerce," who was Richelieu.
VII. All vagabonds, beggars, petty criminals, etc., were to
be taken by His Majesty's orders into the employ of the
company.
VIII. His Majesty was to allow the company to undertake
voyages abroad, to establish colonies at advisable places, even
in Canada and New France, to conquer lands beyond those
which were under the control of His Majesty, to use them for
profits of the aforesaid company, to which full and entire
possession was given, on condition that they should be faithful
and swear homage to His Majesty. The latter permitted them
to trade with all companies which were not declared enemies
of the Kingdom, and even countries like Russia, Norway,
Sweden, and Hamburg. . . The articles of agreement which were
made with the latter nations, were to be communicated to
Richelieu as superintendent of commerce and navigation. Fin-
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ally, "if the directors of the company should discover new
lands, they could enjoy the fruits of them, separate from the
other colonies."
The principal articles of this agreement have been given,
because they indicate the main ideas of the Cardinal's policy
toward colonization. It shows first that he desired to develop the
colonies. It illustrates the fact that he wanted to found posses-
sions, which were to be almost self-governing, with this one
exception, they were to be responsible to the chief of commerce
and navigation in France. In fact, Richelieu put himself at
the head of almost all commercial companies founded at that
time. Masson criticizes Richelieu because he made the colonial
companies too centralized, and forced them all to depend on
the government of France as a final authority. Yet the agree-
ment cited above seems to give the colonies plenty of leeway
in which to develop without interference of the home power. 15
But, before generalizing concerning Richelieu's colonial pol-
icies, it is well to look further into the actual accomplishments
of the Cardinal in that particular field.
The company whose charter has just been quoted failed
because of the lack of credit and funds to maintain it. Further-
more, the directors did not carry out their promises and sought
only to profit by the monopoly which they possessed and from
which they derived temporary gains. They kept up the project
with one purpose in view, namely, to sell to the colonists who
had been sent over, goods at a high price, and to buy furs from
them as cheaply as possible. Champlain never ceased to protest
against the attitude of the directors toward the colonists.16 He
himself desired to found a colony which would take up the
threefold purpose of colonization, namely, agriculture, conver-
sion of the natives, and commerce. The only result of his plan
was the establishment of new fur-trading stations in North
America. But there is another explanation for the failure of
the company. It was too far-reaching in its scope and plans in
that it proposed a thousand things to do and a thousand ends to
achieve. It wished to establish fisheries, exploit mines, drain
marshes, develop both foreign and domestic commerce, colonize
the "West Indies, etc. It was a universal company, but fell
before it got really started. It was a society which wished to
15 Masson, Histoire du Commerce Franc.ais dans le Levant, 174.
leCaillet, 337; Zeller, B., Eiclielieu, London, 1884, 184.
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embrace all, but it could not organize itself.17 In the last place
it was, perhaps, too modern in its purpose.
The company of Morbihan. was the next to be formed, in
1626. It obtained its name from a port in Brittany, where
its counting offices were established. A group of men called
"the Hundred Associates" signed the agreement, so that it was
often called "The Hundred Associates" company. Its articles
provided for a fort at Morbihan, 100 vessels, a capital of
1,600,000 livres and the monopoly of the commerce of the
East and the Levant by land and by sea.18 Indeed, such was
the magnitude of its designs that Richelieu says the English
and Dutch were alarmed, fearing that the King by that means
would soon make himself master of the sea.19 Spain had no
less fear for her Indies and well might have, when one reads
in Richelieu's Testament Politique the statement, that the only
way to obtain footing in the West Indies, is by driving the
Spanish out by means of a war. 20 However, this company
came to naught, because of the failure of the local Parlement
to register the edict creating it, arising from a conflict between
it and the local estates general of the province in which Morbihan
was located. 21 Yet the formation of this company had impor-
tant results in that herein one finds de Razilly's idea realized;
namely, that colonial enterprises should be participated in by
all.
22 In it is apparent the disinterested stand taken by the
Cardinal with respect to colonization. In return for all the
advantages given the company, Richelieu demanded only one
thing, namely, that it would make the greatest and most rapid
fortune that was possible, and in whatever manner it wished,
either by fisheries, by boat building, or by cultivating the soil
of the colonies or by establishing some manufactures, etc. "It
was an admirable example of broad and decisive views which
indicate the correct judgment of the great man in all affairs
of state," says one writer.
23 This company likewise did not
IT Bonassieux, 363.
isLevasseur, 281-282.
is Eichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 127.
2oEichelieu, Testament Politique, II, 71.
21 Eichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 128.
22Desehamps, 88-91.
23 Gouraud, I, 197. Concerning this Company see Eiehelieu, Lettres, II,
346-349; Mercure Francois, XII, 44, etc.; Eichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 127.
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succeed apparently because of the fact that the people of France
were not capable of so great commercial enterprises at that time.
However, Eichelieu went on and formed other colonies, not at
all discouraged by past failures. In this connection it is
important to remember that his company was the prototype of
the East India company of a later date.
Richelieu now turned his attention to America. Various at-
tempts had been made to settle that country before his time,
and there was no little interest to be found in France concerning
this far-away land of promise. The first voyage by Frenchmen
were those of Jacques Cartier, Robeval, and others from 1524
to 1599. In 1541 the first attempt at a permanent establishment
was made by Robeval. It was abandoned the next year. Various
companies began to be formed to settle in Canada. Finally
one was established in 1602 by the leading traders of Dieppe,
Rouen, and La Rochelle, with fur trade privileges, etc. Explor-
ations were made under the leadership of one especially notable
man, Champlain. In 1603 Sieur De Monts became chief of
the colony of Canada, undertaking to give the King one
sixteenth of the product of the mines. In 1606, in addition to
the fur trade, the farming and exploration of the new territory
began to be considered seriously. Some new explorations had
made known the fertility of the soil. In 1608, Champlain
was again sent out by a company with three vessels, which
repeopled Port Royal and founded Quebec. But failure to take
up agriculture in the colonies and constant opposition on the
part of Holland prevented any of the French colonial plans
from achieving a substantial measure of success before 1627.
At this time a new company was formed called the company
of the "Hundred Associates" of New France or Canada. This
organization, which lasted longer than any other of Richelieu's
creation, was granted its charter in an edict issued by him
when before La Rochelle.24 Many merchant traders and other
rich persons had proposed to form companies to support the
colonies already there, and to establish new ones in the vast
and little known country. It was to these first associates that
the King by his edict conceded the following privileges and con-
ditions : the company must send two or three hundred men of all
24 Bonassieux, 350-351.
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trades, and during the following fifteen years four thousand per-
sons of both sexes. The company should support the inhabitants
for three years. No foreigners or Protestants should be among
them. Furthermore, three churchmen should be in each habi-
tation, etc. Homage was to be paid to the King, and a crown
of gold to the weight of eight marks, should be given him
on his accession to the throne.
In return for these requirements, the company was to have
the following privileges: full proprietorship of Quebec with
all the land reaching from Florida to the Arctic region, including
the land of the Saint Lawrence river; the cession of all mines
and minerals discovered; the right to build fortresses; mon-
opoly of the fur trade and other commerce, etc. Fishing rights
were to be open to all the King's subjects. The King was to
give two war vessels, and grant exemption from customs.
Finally, the principal personages were to receive letters of
nobility.
25
However, in spite of the encouragement given the colonists
by the government, they failed in the end because of the fact
that they tried to buy from their colonists goods at a low price,
and sell to them at a high price. This was also the case with
the natives, who preferred to trade with the English and Dutch
who gave them better prices. Then there was a lack of support
in the mother country easily to be explained by the difficulties
confronting France during this period. As a result, the Dutch
soon obtained most of the commerce with the natives, and in
1629 the English captured Quebec and the surrounding terri-
tory.
26
In 1632, Champlain pointed out to Richelieu the necessity
for the restitution of New France to the mother country. 27 As
a result the Cardinal sent six armed vessels across the Atlantic
and compelled the English to cede it back. Thus in 1633, the
company of New France reentered upon all its former rights.
Champlain as head of the French colony built up the settle-
25 Isambert, XVI, 221-222.
26 Mercure Francois, XIV, 61, 232-240. Gives a complete account of the
colony including a discussion of its control by means of a board of directors,
etc.
27 Caillet, 342-345, Dumont J. Corps Universel Diplomatique <?ui Droit
des Gens, 8 vols., Supplement, 5 vols. Amst., et La Haye, (1726-1739), VI,
pt. I, 31-32
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ment and companies to a degree never before attained. In
1640, Montreal was founded and a fort called Fort Richelieu
was established just above where Quebec is at present, so that,
by the time of Richelieu's death, the French possessions hi
North America had a good start, and it was not due to any
direct fault of his that they failed in the end.
One writer, in accounting for the decline of the colonies,
places the blame on the cupidity of the merchants, who neglected
agriculture for a selfishly conducted fur trade. Furthermore,
religious influences had a tendency to injure the economic de-
velopment of the colonies. Too much emphasis was placed on
religion to the neglect of agriculture.
28 The competition of
the English and Dutch for the Indian trade, and of the govern-
ors and the colonists, coupled with increasing neglect of the
colonies by the home government, after Richelieu's time, all
tended to ruin the bright future of the French possessions in
America. Indeed, one cannot explain the failure of French
colonial policy at this time as being due to Richelieu's central-
ized system of settlements. There are too many other incidents
which go to make up a logical account of its non-success.
No better example of the difficulties confronting the Cardinal
with relation to foreign opposition is to be found than in his
efforts to secure a foothold in the West Indies and South
America. A company of the Antilles was formed in spite of
the opposition of Spain and Portugal, who claimed sole command
of the seas surrounding that particular part of the world.
The question of the freedom of the sea then came up for the first
time in French history when France in company with Holland
(the famous work of Grotius, Mare Liberum, appeared in 1608)
affirmed with energy that doctrine. Thus began the conflict
between interests and doctrines which continues up to the
present time. In this particular case, the conflict prevented
France from doing anything in a colonial way, either in South
America or the West Indies. In 1625, the French and English
established a colony on the island of
" Saint-Kitts " which was
destroyed by the Spanish, and revived by the French later on.29
28
Pigeonneau, II, 430-431 He defends Kichelieu's policy in excluding
the Protestants from colonies because of their constant efforts to form
alliances with the enemies of France.
29 Pigeonneau, II, 434-435; Isambert, XVI, 421, 540-551.
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Other islands as Guadeloupe, Martinique, Dominique, etc., were
occupied by the French. A settlement was made even in Guiana.
"Indeed," says one writer, "the French in their settlements
in the West Indies, gave proof of brilliant qualities, persever-
ance, and initiative never exhibited before.
' ' 30 But the im-
portant thing to notice is the fact that French and Spanish
colonial interests were conflicting very sharply during the
Thirty Years' War, and this economic rivalry must certainly
have had more or less influence on the diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries. France was striving for a world
colonial empire during Richelieu's administration.
About the time the French were colonizing America, they
were also undertaking the task of assuming close relations with
the Orient. Missionaries were the means by which their efforts
were to be made successful. The famous Father Joseph was
named by the Pope in 1625, director of missions in the Levant ;
and that nomination, together with the office of "grand master
of navigation, etc.," acquired by Richelieu about the same time,
is direct evidence as to their aims in regard to colonial and
commercial expansion. Of course religion was the prime motive
of this movement in Asia, but it is interesting to note that the
French Jesuits sent into China, Japan, Persia, etc., were also
diplomatic agents of the government.
31
The first society to trade in the East Indies was formed by
Henry IV in 1604, with exclusive rights for fifteen years. It
had the port of Brest and was otherwise favored by the govern-
ment. The jealousy of other nations prevented this company
from buying the necessary equipment from them. Thus it did
not really start at all. Letters patent, however, in 1615, gave
the company a new lease of life, and brave adventurers from
Dieppe visited the East Indies and Madagascar.32 Finally in
1642, Richelieu granted several individuals exclusive privileges
in the East Indies for ten years. So it is quite evident that
France definitely began her East India policy at this time.
Settlements were established even in Africa. Senegal espe-
cially attracted the attention of the French. In 1621-1626 a col-
ony was formed, which was under the protection of the Cardinal
so Pigeonneau, II, 439-440.
siDeschamps, 102-105.
32 Isambert, XVI, 78-82.
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and which had as its purpose the colonization of the land in
that territory.
33 To carry this out, Richelieu even sent Admiral
de Razilly with a squadron to aid in the work, but it was of
no avail, for the company had to be replaced in 1633 by a new
one composed of the merchants of Rouen and Dieppe, who
obtained permission to trade for ten years at Cape Verde and
upon the rivers in Senegal. Various other similar organiza-
tions were formed, but nothing of especial importance can be
obtained from a study of French colonization in Africa at
this time, except that a foundation for French influence in
that continent was laid, which might have amounted to more
than it did, and only recently has been utilized.
One colony, established on the island of Madagascar, seems to
have been more or less permanent. Many attempts had been
made during the reign of Henry IV and during the first year
of the rule of Louis XIII, to found settlements on this and neigh-
boring islands. There was another purpose in the establishment
of a colony here besides mere colonization, namely, that the
French intended to use this possession as a base or half-
way house, for their trade with the East Indies. On March
2, 1611, Louis XIII granted permits to several men which
gave to them the exclusive right to settle these lands and
begin trade. They had besides a monopoly in all commerce
carried on with the East Indies for the next twelve years. But
as they made no use of that privilege, the merchants of Rouen
resolved to take it away from them. They offered to carry on
that trade and develop it to the fullest extent, as they had the
facilities to do if they had the chance. 34 The first company,
however, opposed any interference with their rights, and claim-
ed that they were doing the best they could, considering the
obstacles which were erected by the foreign neighbors of France.
As a result of all this, the various companies and claimants of
their rights were united by the government into one concern.
The grant establishing this united organization stated that
its members should undertake the navigation of the West Indies,
maintain its protection and enjoy its privileges. The fleet of
Montmorency was to defend all the subjects of the King, as
well as the interests of the company, and to undertake any
saCaillet, 352-358.
3* Ibid., 353-355.
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necessary trips from the coast to the Cape of Good Hope during
this space of twelve years, in order to aid commerce. In spite
of this liberal charter and the various attempts made to settle
the East Indies, the plan failed in 1620, because of the pressure
of the Dutch in that part of the world.
Finally, the company decided to place a colony on the island
of Madagascar, in the hope that if they could found a powerful
settlement there, it would serve to aid in further expeditions
to the Indies. So they went back to the original plan which
had been changed when the different colonizing organizations
had been united. However, internal disturbances in France,
which took place in 1631, prevented them from carrying out
this plan.
In 1638, another attempt was made by a man from Rouen to
found a colony in Madagascar, and he left a very interesting
account of a voyage to that island.
35
Finally, a new company
was formed January 24, 1642, which obtained from the Cardinal
the exclusive privilege of sending into the island of Madagascar
and other adjacent islands the members of the organization, to
establish colonies and take possession in the name of the King.36
As a result, in the month of May a ship was sent to the islands,
and they took formal possession. Thus Madagascar was at last
a real possession of France and a way was prepared for further
settlement. This was the final colonizing project started by
Richelieu.
What were the general results of all the efforts of the Cardinal
and his co-workers along this line?
' '
Geographical knowledge
was extended if nothing else," says one writer in relating the
results of the colonial efforts of France during this period.
"Richelieu himself," he says "aided a man named Sanson to
found a geographical school at that time.
' ' 37 But there were
other gains more important than these, especially on the eco-
nomic side, for which the Cardinal merits considerable praise.
When one looks over the field of the colonial activities under-
taken during Richelieu's time, he must conclude that very little
had been accomplished on the material side. It seems that
all the efforts of the Cardinal were in vain, and while Holland,
ssCaillet, 355-357.
36
Ibid., 357-358.
3T Ibid., 358.
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England, and Spain were forging ahead in their colonial de-
velopment and commercial activities, France was doing scarcely
anything along these lines. But the Cardinal deserves great
credit for the part he played in the colonial development of
France. In spite of many internal troubles, such as the relations
of the government and nobles, and his complicated foreign poli-
cies, he was always interested in planting new French settlements
on great unoccupied continents, and he aided in the different
colonization enterprises not only during the first part of his
rule, but up to the very last. He at least laid the foundation of
the French colonial policy.
Finally, one must not forget that this great man died before
he could carry out his ideas as regards this part of his adminis-
tration. His Testament Politique clearly indicates that he real-
ized the advantage of colonial development as keenly as French
statesmen did just before the recent great war. 38 Furthermore,
he looked ahead and foresaw the future rivalry with England
upon the sea. It is indeed unfortunate for France that he
could not have lived to see the dawn of peace in Europe, so
that he could have carried out his entire economic program,
of which the formation of colonies was one important part.
A number of writers criticize Richelieu's colonial policy, not
without justice. But they do not look at it with reference to
the other difficulties confronting the Cardinal at that time. Mas-
son thought that it was entirely too centralized, and d'Avenel,
referring to one of his edicts concerning the formation of a
colonial company, says,
' ' that it is a source of profound astonish-
ment to me to see a mind as clear and practical as Richelieu's
in diplomatic and military organization, attempt to carry out
his dreams of that most peculiar economic despotism which mod-
ern people call state socialism." But to Richelieu, colonization
was a state affair. "The edict of Morbihan is one which all
France seeks," says the Cardinal, "whose execution is alone cap-
able of putting the Kingdom in a state of splendor. The pro-
clamation," he continues, "alarms already the English and the
Dutch, who fear that he will make himself master of the sea.
Spain is afraid of us also, for she fears the loss of her Indian
possessions."
39 This would indicate that Richelieu saw the
ss Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 64-80.
39 D'Avenel, Monarchic Absolue, III, 208-217.
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colonial struggles that lay ahead; and wished to prepare for
them in the best possible way. Since individual capital to
found colonies was lacking, support by the government seemed
to him to be the only logical way, in spite of the fact that
colonization is essentially due to individual effort rather than
royal plans.
It was not the general economic policy of the Cardinal re-
lating to this branch of his administration which was at fault,
"but", says one writer, "it was marred by the practice, com-
mon to all statesmen of the day, of intrusting colonial enter-
prises entirely to exclusive companies. These corporations,
by which privileged individuals were protected at the general
expense of the body of consumers, were extremely unsuccessful
in French hands, partly through their excessive dependence
upon the state parentage and control, and partly through their
total neglect of agriculture, and the consequent failure to
form permanent and prosperous French settlements.
" 40 In
short, the failure of the French colonies can be laid to, (1)
artificial imitation, (2) religious narrowness, (3) too much
aid from the state, and not enough emphasis upon commerce
and colonization. Furthermore, the companies themselves are
to blame to a certain extent for the weak colonial policy of
France, because of (1) bad administrative direction, (2) pre-
mature distribution of dividends, (3) lack of capital and credit,
(4) bad economic organizations.
In view of the numerous difficulties confronting Richelieu
in this phase of his administration one wonders that he ac-
complished what he did. 41 The very fact that the French
people were unprepared for colonial efforts, the numer-
ous internal troubles, financial and industrial for instance, as
well as Richelieu's involved foreign policies, indicate the mag-
nitude of the task which the Cardinal confronted. Yet
Richelieu's thoughts were constantly turned toward this field
of activity. Whenever there was a lull in political and internal
affairs, or when he was offered any favorable opportunity, he
did his best to found successful colonies in the new lands.
40 Lodge, R., Eichelieu, London. 1896, 173
41 Seeley explains the loss of French colonies as due to (1) strict reg-
ulations, (2) loss of population in war, (3) expulsion of Huguenots, (4)
too many wars. See Seeley, J. E., The Expansion of England, London,
1891, 79, 110.
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He even tried to work up an interest in colonies by 'means
of inspiring accounts concerning them, published in his Mercure
Francois.
42 Public opinion was aroused, as is illustrated by the
numerous publications made at this time concerning the col-
onies.43 A few years of peace might have brought about a
great change in the colonial position of France. But it is only
within the last century that France has been able to do any-
thing in regard to colonization. And thus the general policies
of Richelieu have been revived at the present day, and so are
doubly important as constituting a force which is now continu-
ing. That Richelieu deserves more credit than he has obtained
for his work in behalf of French colonization, that whatever
weaknesses existed in his charters granted to colonists were of
minor importance, and finally, that the foundation laid by this
man which would have resulted in the erection of a strong
and powerful imperial edifice was ruined by the ineptitude
of the French people and the faults of those who came after
him, are the main conclusions to be drawn from a study of this
phase of his career.
Deschamps, 129-130.
id., 103-115.
CHAPTER IX
RICHELIEU AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN
COMMERCE
Richelieu came to power at a time when foreign commerce
was in its infancy and the world was just beginning to awake
to it8 importance. "To Richelieu as well as Cromwell and
other great people of his time," says Bridges, "war and foreign
conquest were no longer the primary occupations of rulers.
When they engaged in it they saw, dimly indeed, and in-
consequently, but still they saw, the two grand tendencies of
the modern world; peaceful industry in the temporal sphere
and morality based upon unfettered thoughts in the spiritual." 1
The Cardinal's appointment as "grand master and general
superintendent of navigation and commerce," in 1626, placed
him at the head of not only the marine but also of internal
and external commerce. 2 He, at this time, made the assembly
of notables understand not only that he was in control of
commerce but that he was going to develop it and enrich his
people and state thereby. 3 Thus, at the beginning of his ad-
ministration, he decided to do all he could in his official capacity
to develop a great trade for France. This intention is remarkable
when one considers the other problems which then confronted him.
In 1626, as mentioned before,4 the Code Michaud was
introduced. Richelieu, although an enemy of Michaud, accepted
most of these ordinances, one fifth of which dealt with commerce.
In this code the manufacturers of silk were to be encouraged
by forbidding the importation of foreign goods. Exportations
should be aided and companies of commerce should be established
i France under Richelieu and Colbert, 63.
zlsambert, XVI, 194-197.
zMercure Francois, XII, 759-761.
* See Chapter VII, 100.
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and encouraged. Nobles were to retain their rank if they engaged
in commerce, and, as mentioned before, the privilege of nobility
could be conferred on traders under certain conditions.5 Indeed,
Richelieu in trying to carry out these ordinances, really pre-
pared the way for a great expansion of French commerce,
which would no doubt have taken place except for internal
and external wars.
He encountered many difficulties in his attempts to develop
commerce. In the first place, such nations as England, Holland,
and Spain were far ahead of France in this phase of a nation's
strength.
6 The English even required all French goods to be
sent to England in English vessels. On the other hand the
Dutch seemed to carry all the French trade with the northern
countries. 7 In the Levant alone the French flag dominated
the carriage of commerce. But this supremacy also was en-
dangered by England and Holland.
Therefore in order to aid French development of foreign
commerce certain laws such as that which laid a duty on foreign
vessels, or such as that which prohibited the exportation of wool
and the importation of cloths, were passed.8 These mercantilis-
tic changes had a tendency to aid not only in the development
of manufactures in France but also in the growth of French
commerce.9 The creation of a large marine of course was an-
other important factor in the solution of the problem of commer-
cial growth.
In his efforts to build up commerce, however, the Cardinal
had internal as well as external troubles. For example, numer-
ous towns and provinces with ancient privileges objected to
his efforts to build vessels in their ports. "Les Messieurs de
Saint-Malo" refused to allow the King to construct some vessels
in their harbors, as it was contrary to the franchises, they said.
10
The Cardinal showed them that it was to the interest of their
trade to do so and promised, further to enlarge their
franchises. He concluded by saying that he was working for
the interests of French commerce, which was necessary to make
See chapters VII and VIII; Isambert, XVI, 273-278.
Gouraud, I, 157-188.
TPigeonneau, II, 406-407.
sSourdis, III, 171-174.
Beaurepaire, III, 270-277.
10 Montchr4tien, Introduction, XC-XCVL
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France strong and flourishing. 11 Richelieu was perfectly wil-
ling to aid local cities by subjecting foreign traders and goods
to high import duties, etc., but he would not permit them to
establish independent marines.12 Thus developed an inter-
esting economic struggle between local privileges and the grow-
ing spirit of centralization.
The problems of Richelieu were indeed intricate. Contrary
to the demands of Rouen, the city of Marseilles complained to
Richelieu not only of heavy impositions laid upon them, and
slight protection afforded them, but also of the lack of protection
and aid to foreigners whose trade they desired. In other words,
while both Rouen and Marseilles wanted instant efforts to be
made to repress piracy, the former desired the foreigners in
France to be repressed while the latter wanted encouragement
to be offered to foreign commerce. 13 The only thing he could
do was to consider the interest of the nation as a whole and
adjust his policy toward individual cities accordingly.
Now the Cardinal did not neglect the commercial problems
in France. He sent, for example, M. de Lauson, who was
employed by him in a high position in affairs of commerce
and of the colonies, to investigate commercial conditions, and
had him return to consult concerning remedies which would
aid both the King and his subjects.14 As a result he attempted
to bring about better conditions with respect to both consuls and
other officials connected with commerce, and to foreign relations.15
He even went so far as to send instructions with regard to the
destinations of cargoes, etc., of French convoys. 18 At another
time, in 1627, he wrote a letter asking M. A. M. de Baugy
for a report on the condition of commerce. He assures him that
merchants shall be given all reasonable privileges and aid.17 In
compliance with these promises he tried in 1627 to establish a
company of merchants in the capital city of each province, for
the purpose of promoting navigation, and to give them special
privileges. This was done with the main purpose of building up
11 Richelieu, Letters, II, 381.
12 Deschamps, 135.
is Ibid., 136-137.
i* Richelieu, Lettres, II, 345.
^Mercure Francois, XII, 782-784.
"Richelieu, Lettres, II, 504-506.
" Ibid., II, 380.
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trade. One can find many other letters which illustrate his
solicitude for the state of commerce.18
Dominated by this view, Richelieu had a more or less definite
commercial foreign policy which affected all the important na-
tions of the world. This was especially true with respect to
Spain. Richelieu hoped that he might be able to develop the
army, make France strong upon the sea, and thus be able
to dominate Spain in commercial relations. 19 During the first
part of his administration, Spain imposed various restrictions
upon French trade, but would not permit France to act
similarly towards Spanish commerce. It is significant that
Spain not only dominated commercial relations between the
two countries, but also between her colonies, and between
Portugal and France.20 Richelieu then decided in retaliation, to
prevent all trade with Spain, and in 1625 issued a declaration
to that effect. 21 However, the fact that Holland and England
were competing for French trade in Spain accounts for the
Cardinal's never absolutely cutting off commerce between the
two nations. He knew that if Spain could be defeated in the
Thirty Years' War, commercial relations with her could be
easily settled to the advantage of France. Therefore, rather than
lose out during the period of war, he permitted trade between
the nations, which of course was of mutual benefit. He was
sure that Spain, "whose sole wealth depended on the gold from
her colonies," was on the decline, and that time would make
France her superior and dictator in commercial as well as in
colonial relations.22
Turning to England, one finds that Richelieu appreciated
the importance of that country as a commercial nation. 23 Her
resources, manufactures, and trade were all elements contribut-
ting to her grandeur and made her a direct competitor of France.
Just like Spain, England restricted French commerce in her
direction and opposed similar treatment in France. As will
isEiehelieu, Lettres, III, 171-173; 178-179.
is
Eichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 261-262.
2<>Levasseur, I, 265.
21 Isambert, XVI, 148.
22
Richelieu, Memoires, XXII, 39; XXIII, 257-258; Sourdis, I, Introduc-
tion, III-VII.
23
Eichelieu, Testament Politique, II, 49-52.
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be shown later, Richelieu's diplomacy, to a large extent, was
centered around his attempt to obtain a just recognition of the
commercial rights of France by England, and also a claim for
equality on the seas.
2* Of course he had to temper these demands,
because of his desire to retain the British as an ally against the
Hapsburgs. Nevertheless, he recognized the fact that French
commerce needed protection on the seas and should have it.
During the Huguenot affair, commerce with England was
prohibited.
25 Richelieu at that time was really afraid of an
alliance of England, Spain, Holland, and Savoy against France.28
It was not long, however, before efforts were made to bring about
an alliance between the two countries, which resulted
in the treaties of 1629 and 1632, whereby friendly commercial
relations with England were restored, much to the credit of
Richelieu, who even wanted to establish certain rules of the
seas which would govern commercial relations in the future.27
After 1632 Richelieu relaxed his efforts to settle critical com-
mercial questions, as he knew that the Thirty Years' "War pre-
vented any such action on his part. On the whole, therefore,
commerce between the two nations went on as usual. Most of
the trade was in English boats, and the English continued to
annoy the French merchant who came to trade at London, by
taxes, formalities, etc.
28 France had to become stronger on the
seas before she could settle commercial relations with her rival.
Richelieu was well aware of the power of Holland, and was
a strong admirer of her commercial success. It was between
the years 1610 and 1625, that Holland assumed a strong position
on the seas, in the colonies, etc. She became at that time the
great economic rival of England. In a commercial way, trade
with Holland was kept up and fostered during the administration
of Richelieu. That country was the diplomatic ally of France
against the Hapsburgs, so that he was unable to undertake any
economic action against her except to injure her trade with
Spain through France, by means of ordinances. Political and
24 See Chapter XIII; Beaurepaire, II, 84-85, 166-7; Richelieu, Lettres,
II, 490.
as Richelieu, Lettres, II, 774 ; Dumont, V, pt. 2, 506-507.
26 Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 335.
27 See Chapter XIII, Lettres, VII, 676; Dumont, V, pt. 2, 581.
28 Levasseur, I, 264.
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economic necessity elsewhere prevented a direct economic con-
nection between these two lands, although two treaties in 1624
and 1627, arranged a more or less clear basis of friendly economic
relationship with regard to the seas and colonies.
29
It is in a study of French commerce in the Levant that one
can obtain the best illustration of the real economic rivalries of
Holland, England, and Spain with France. Since the death of
Henry IV, the former important commercial relations between
France and Turkey had diminished, while the influence of
Holland and England in Turkey had increased. Centralization
of the government of France took away th<e extensive
commercial powers of individual cities. But even this change,
up to Richelieu's time, had not aided commerce with the Levant.
When he came into office he encountered a chaotic condition in
this trade. The conflicting efforts of the central government
and the cities seemed to be making matters worse. "It needed
a man," says one writer, "with a definite policy, as Richelieu
had to make an effort to create a positive reform.
' ' 30 Trade
with the East had been neglected, and it was his task to restore
it.
In the first place, he had to overcome the influence of the
English, Dutch, and others in Turkey. They were paying 3%
import duty while France paid 5%. The Porte favored the
former powers. Inferior business methods and goods had lost for
France the cloth trade with the East in return for spices, and was
ruining the general commercial chances of the French in that
quarter of the globe.
31
Nevertheless, in spite of this competition,
France until 1635 had an important trade with the Levant. Ac-
tive entrance into the Thirty Years' War at that time injured this
commerce in that the Spanish ships and the pirates hindered
navigation, while cessation of trade with Spain cut off the supply
of gold, which France had been accustomed to send into the
East. The lack of money in turn accounts for the resumption of
commercial relations with Spain in 1639.32 One step towards a
revival of eastern commerce would be attained, however, if Spain
could be defeated, and Richelieu realized that fact. 33 Spain's de-
2 See Chapter X, Levasseur, I, 266. Dumont, V, pt. 2, 461-462, 523.
so Masson, Histoire du Commerce Frangaise dans le Levant, 105-109.
si Hid., 118-119.
32 Ibid., 119-135.
ss Eichelieu, Testament Politiquc, II, 55-56; 71.
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feat would have removed the greatest naval and colonial rival of
France in the Mediterranean.
"Richelieu has been accused of neglecting the Levant in the
interest of more distant colonies," says one writer. "This is
not true. The Cardinal understood better than his councillors
the value of commerce in the East, and was not the man to let
himself be carried away with the dreams of another crusade
there, which seduced the imagination of Father Joseph."34 He
goes on to indicate that the elements which caused the deplorable
weakness of France in the East, were the presence of pirates,
poor conduct of diplomatic relations, inferior quality of mer-
chandise, and bad organization of the consulates and their un-
fortunate conduct. All of these defects Eichelieu tried to
remedy. He furthermore encountered the war between Persia
and Turkey which made matters even more difficult. But he at-
tempted to trade with the former country by arranging a treaty
with the northern countries whereby goods could be sent through
Russia and the Baltic.35 This plan did not succeed because
Russia would not permit French caravans to go through her
lands.96
Father Joseph, at last rid of his crusading dream, was sent
to the East. He founded religious establishments in Jerusalem,
Alexandria, Bagdad, etc. As a result, commerce was permitted
to grow up under the wing of the church. Richelieu had other
men study the routes and conditions of commerce in central
Asia and the Orient, and they succeeded in writing and bring-
ing back vivid accounts.37
The Cardinal knew that the influence of France depended on
the capitulations made with the Sultan. In 1631 he sent an
ambassador to Constantinople to renew the capitulations, "with
the very high, very excellent, very powerful, very invincible
Prince, the grand Emperor of the Musselmans, in order to con-
serve and extend the friendship and union of the crown of
France and the Ottoman Empire for trade, traffic, and com-
8* Pigeonneau, II, 443-444.
as See 166.
3 Pigeonneau, II, 445-446.
87 Ibid., 448-449. The best known of these men sent by Richelieu was
Jean Baptiste Tavernier, who was not only a traveler but a merchant as
well, who founded French commerce in Persia, in India, etc. Besides visit-
ing Turkey in Asia, Persia, and India, he went as far as Sumatra and Java.
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merce with our subjects.38 But he was at no time very successful
in his commercial efforts in the East.
In 1633, a committee of dignitaries, nominated by the coun-
cil of Marseilles (a city very much interested in eastern com-
merce) on the basis of their commercial knowledge, reported
and complained concerning the decay of eastern trade, which they
said was due to many causes. They cited the long and important
European wars, piracy, the oppression of ministers of the
"Grand Seigneur," corruption of officials in the Levant, and
of traders, etc. In fact, they complained that the entire com-
mercial system of France in the East was debased.
39 To re-
build the trade of the Levant was a difficult proposition, but
Richelieu did the best he could under the circumstances.
In 1639 he sent a new ambassador to Constantinople with
instructions not only to protect Christians there, but to aid
the French in developing commerce by seeing that the capit-
ulations were obeyed. He was to see that all nations which
had no ambassadors in the East should sail their ships under
the French flag and recognize the French consuls. He was
also to investigate the heavy impositions levied on the French
merchants at Aleppo and Alexandria by the natives. If there
was no remedy the trade would be ruined, or henceforth be
carried by the Venetians and English.40 The Cardinal thus
made direct efforts to strengthen and rectify matters in the
East. He even went so far as to give advice with regard to
the injury caused by debts contracted by past ambassadors.
They should be settled at once in the interest of French trade
as a whole.
In spite of his difficulties, the Cardinal up to the very last
recognized the value of eastern commerce. 41
' '
I will not enter,
' '
he says, "into detail at all as to the commerce which can be
carried on with the East and Persia, because the humor or
caprice of the Frenchman is so quick, that he wishes the end
of his desires almost as soon as he has conceived of them, and
3* Richelieu, Lettres, II, 23-24; IV, 106; Mercure Francois, XVII,
815-817.
saDeschamps, 135-136.
40 Richelieu, Lettres, VI, 320-322.
Richelieu in his efforts to develop commerce gladly accepted helpful
advice from others. See Pigeonneau, II, 383.
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the voyages that are distant are not agreeable to their na-
tures.
" 42 It is interesting to notice that Richelieu was keen
enough to see and admit the colonial weakness of the French.
History was to bear out the truth of his remarks. "However,
as there comes," he says, "a great quanity of silk and tapestry
from Persia, many curiosities from China, as well as spices from
there and other parts of that section of the world, which are
useful to us, therefore this trade must not be neglected. In
order to make a good establishment there, it is necessary to
send two or three vessels commanded by some persons of qual-
ity, prudence, and wisdom, with patents and necessary powers,
to treat with the Princes and make alliances with the people
on all the coasts, just as the Portuguese, English, and Flemish
have done. This policy works better than forcing one 's way into
a country, and holding it down by force, and thus stirring
up hate by deceiving them, as others have done." It is quite
evident that Richelieu desired close commercial relations with
the East, and the fact that he did not aim to accomplish that
by military force seems to indicate his keen power of observa-
tion. He knew that he could attain the best results by peace-
ful treaties in the East and acted on the basis of that knowledge.
He even went so far as to list the merchandise involved in
trade with Naples, Rome, Smyrna, Constantinople, etc. Money
and merchandise were exported from France in return for the
silks, wax, leather, spices, drugs, etc., of the East. "Before
the English and Dutch settled in the Indies," he says, "all
silks, drugs, and other merchandises of Persia came to Aleppo,
from whence they were sent throughout France, Holland, Eng-
land, and Germany.
" 43 It is the loss of the monopoly of eastern
trade which Richelieu bemoaned and desired to regain.
"Now the very same English and Dutch," he says, "have
taken away our commerce, and deprived France not only of the
merchandise of Persia, but also are encroaching on the land of
the 'Grand Seigneur,' which they have to go through. The
merchandise is then sold in Sicily, Naples, Genoa, Germany,
etc.
' ' ** Furthermore, he points out the fact, that the English
and Dutch were getting spices and drugs directly from the
42 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 70-71.
"Ibid., II, 72-73.
44 Ibid., II, 73-74.
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Indies, and thus were gradually obtaining control of the sale
of these goods.
Richelieu regretted this state of affairs. He feared that for-
eigners would even control the trade of the East with France,
and thus his nation would lose the profit to be obtained thereby.
He points out in his Testament, that the French took more
hemp, cloth, wood, etc., to the East than they did money. Fur-
thermore, what money they did send was obtained from Spain
in exchange for merchandise sold to them. That France would
profit by a renewed trade he had no doubt, and pointed out
Marseilles as a city which had made considerable money in the
past by means of the eastern commerce.
One would think the attention given the advisibility of the
retention of money in France, would classify him as an ex-
treme mercantilist. Such was not the case. "I admit," he
says, "that I have for a long time been deceived as to the
commerce which the people of Provence founded in the East.
I believed with many others that it was prejudicial to the state,
founded upon the common opinion that it exhausted the money
of the Kingdom, in order to bring back merchandise, not nec-
cessary at all, but only useful for the ease of our nation. But
after having taken an exact view of this trade, condemned by the
public voice, I have changed my mind, and if any one will ex-
amine the question, he will see certainly, that I have done so
with thought and reasoning. It is certain that we could not
do without most of the merchandise which is obtained from the
East, as silks, cottons, wax, rhubarb, and many other drugs
which are necessary to us.
' ' *5
This is one of the wisest economic utterances of the Cardinal.
It might well mark a gradual change from the strict mercantil-
istic view, to a very liberal, if not modern one. Believing in
the great value of a retention of money in France, he changed
about, and toward the last recognized the fact that after all it
was the export of goods which other countries desired and the
import of goods needed by France, which counted. He could
see that by this means France could develop better than under
the narrow policy of the past. It is unfortunate that he did
not live long enough to carry into execution these new economic
ideas which he conceived toward the end of his administration.
45 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 75; Mercure Francois, XXIII,
390-393.
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Richelieu was not concerned with the commerce alone be-
tween France and the East. He desired France to be a dis-
tributing point and a manufacturing center for the products
of the East, by which it could make 100% profit. In this
way France could be assured of a great number of artisans
and sailors, both useful in peace and war, and of revenues from
export and import duties. In order that the French merchant
could appreciate and be stimulated to develop commerce in the
East, the Cardinal even advocated the sale of government ves-
sels to be used by the French in commerce.46
Furthermore, he desired to make the Mediterranean a French
lake. This is best illustrated by his efforts to settle not only
the question of piracy but also his attempts to arrange com-
mercial relations with Algiers, Tunis, Morocco, etc., in North
Africa. A representative named Sanson Napolon was sent
to Algiers and obtained in 1628 a treaty which stipulated ob-
servation of all the articles of the capitulation between them.
Trade and fishing rights were adjusted and things looked bright
again in that part of the world.
47
In 1630, Isaac de Razilly was sent to settle the difficulties,
and he succeeded in obtaining the right of the French to trade
freely, and have consuls in that country.48 Furthermore, the
English were forbidden by this treaty to send arms to Morocco.49
By these agreements the privileges of the French in North Africa
and on the sea, and the rights of the natives of these countries
to trade with France were confirmed. On the whole the re-
lations with the Barbary States were improved. There was,
however, a little trouble in 1633, and another treaty was neces-
sary in 1639. In fact one might say, that in Africa as well
as in France and America, Richelieu's work was incomplete.
He had ambitious plans for the development of the entire
Mediterranean, but did not live long enough for any part of them
to materialize.*
Richelieu did not confine his attentions only to the East in
his effort to develop foreign commerce. One finds for in-
stance, that he desired to sell to the Swiss, French salt, which
46 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, II, 76-77.
47 Lavasseur, I, 266-267; Dumont, V, pt. 2, 559-560.
48 Isambert, XVI, 357-359.
**Mercure Francois, XVII, pt., II, 181; Dumont, V, pt. 2, 613-614.
so Pigeonneau, II, 453-455; Dumont, VI, pt. I, 18.
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was better than German salt, and at a more reasonable price.
He hoped by this means to pay the pensions due the Swiss
soldiers. 51 Indeed it would seem as if the Cardinal was plan-
ning on using the salt resources of France as one of its financial
foundations. No wonder he did not want to lose La Eochelle.
With regard to Poland, Eichelieu made an interesting remark.
He said in 1629, that France had little trade with Poland
because the former had no need of wheat or wood, which
could be obtained in nearer markets, in Norway and Denmark.
Furthermore, she could get tar from Norway and leather from
Sweden, so that trade with that country was not really im-
portant.
52
However, Kichelieu admitted that the Austrians
dominated Poland at that time, which may account to a certain
degree for his attitude toward the latter. He declared that
France furnished Poland some salt and wine, which the Dutch
really controlled. "Our more important trade is in Spain, Italy,
and the Levant. England might better desire peace in Poland
because of her great trade with that nation."53 Here one sees
a clever effort on Richelieu's part to push England into the
conflict in 1630 because of commercial interests in the north.
The Cardinal evidently recognized the powerful influence of
trade in diplomatic relations.54
Richelieu did not get all that he wanted in Russia. Full
commercial rights were obtained, but the French were not to
be allowed to go through there on their way to Persia. Russia
was to furnish such a good market for France that they could
get the goods from the East as cheaply as if they went after
the merchandise themselves. It certainly is interesting to notice
that the orginal plan of founding a commercial company in
France, which was to trade with Russia, and which included
a plan to bring Persian goods by means of the Caspian Sea, the
Volga river, and the Baltic Sea to France, culminated in the
first real commercial treaty made by the French nation with
Russia. 55 Richelieu was looking out for French commerce and
in 1630 he believed that the Baltic Sea was to be the way by
si Eichelieu, MSmoires, XXIII, 289-290.
52 Ibid., XXV, 129.
53 Ibid., XXV, 129.
5* For further information, see Chapter X.
65 Eichelieu, Memoires, XXV, 131 ; Dumont, V, pt. 2, 594-598.
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which he could trade not only with the north but with the East.56
One can see why he was so anxious to arrange treaties with
the Scandinavian countries. Also, the effect upon France if
Austria had controlled the Baltic must have been obvious to
Richelieu. It is no wonder that he founded the alliance against
the Hapsburgs and fought his fellow Catholics at a time when
the religious controversy still had its place in affairs of the
world.57
Richelieu desired not only to open up trade with the East
through the Baltic, but he also wished to increase the commerce
of France with such countries as Denmark, Norway and Swed-
en. In the treaty of 1629 arranged with Denmark, the latter
was promised pure salt from France instead of the impure
product the Dutch sold to them. France would have also a
better market for the purchase of such things as hemp, masts
for boats, etc., which she needed.58 A treaty also was arranged
which permitted French merchandise to go through the Straits
(the Sund) with a tax of 1 per cent instead of the 5 per cent
hitherto levied. This arrangement was limited to eight years. 59
A commercial treaty was also negotiated with Sweden; In
it an alliance was agreed upon which was to last six years, and
in compliance with it they agreed to defend oppressed friends,
to assure freedom of commerce from the north to the
.Baltic,
etc.60
France during this period was interested in the Baltic not
only for diplomatic reasons or on account of the fear of the
growing Hapsburg dynasty, but she also desired to assume
more friendly and important commercial relations with the
northern countries. It is possible that the alliances were fostered
partly to bind the nations more closely together against a com-
mon foe. They were likewise probably brought about in order to
5 This is especially interesting when one remembers that the Spanish
Hapsburgs by means of their control of the Portuguese were developing the
route around Africa.
57 See Chapter X.
58 Caillet, 328-332. (Les Voyages de Monsieur des Hayes, baron de
Courmesmin en Denmark, 1669, p. 99 et seq.)
69 With reference to the Danich treaty, Richelieu has this to say, ' ' It was
a great advantage to the commerce and navigation of France." See his
Memoires, XXV, 342-343.
eo Martin, II, 316.
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obtain an advantage over the competition of at least Holland in
this particular part of the world, and to establish a new commer-
cial route to the East. Whatever were the motives, Richelieu was
the instigator of this policy and thus deserves the credit for
what he accomplished along the.se lines. It will be shown later
that his accomplishments here had important consequences in
the progress and outcome of the Thirty Years' War.
61
But it is in Richelieu 's Testament Politique, that one finds his
final ideas with regard to commerce in general. He repeats
(and seems fond of doing so) the story of the commercial rise
of Holland. "It is proof," he says, "of the utility of trade.
Though that nation produces nothing but butter and cheese,
yet they furnish all the nations of Europe with the greatest
part of what is necessary to them." 62 He then proceeded to
tell how they had ousted the Portuguese from the East Indies
and were preparing to do the same in the West Indies. One
can not fail to see the yearning in the heart of the great states-
man for a similar growth on the part of France. He realized
that if this could only take place, France with its geographical
and economic advantages could become the leader of Europe.
After all the economic side of a nation constituted the
foundation of its strength and all his attempts at political
centralization were for the purpose of bringing about a success-
ful culmination of his "ideal state." France is so fertile in
corn, so abounding in wine, flax, hemp to make cloth and rig-
gings, so necessary for navigation, that Spain, England, and all
the neighboring states must have recourse thither," he says,
"and provided we know how to improve the advantages which
nature has given us we will get the money of those who have
occasions for our goods, without troubling ourselves much with
their commodities which are of little use to us. " 63 He knew
that his country was being exploited by the commercial pro-
gress of other nations, and that if she found herself, she could
not only develop her commerce and fisheries, necessary at that
time, but she also would be able to keep her sailors at home,
who up until then had sought employment ^n Spain.
The development of French industries, French commerce,
ei See Chapter X.
2
Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 65.
es Hid., II, 66-67.
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and French wealth was the underlying foundation of his
philosophy. "Instead of importing cloth from Spain, England
and Holland, let us make it ourselves," was his earnest demand.64
"France is industrious enough, if she desires, to dispense with
some of the best manufactures of her neighbors.
' ' 65 He then
goes on to praise the plush made at Tours, as ahead of that made
in Italy and Spain. France could make as good silk as any
nation, was his boast. It would seem as if he indulged a typical
"made in France" argument, such as is not out of fashion at
the present time. Efficiency was his motto. He could see in the
revival of commerce and industry, a chance whereby everybody
could have an opportunity to work, so that sloth, laziness, and
an extreme desire for luxuries would be overcome. A man who
advocated the use of the entire material and human resources
of the country in order to create a wealthy and strong state is
certainly not to be classed as mediocre either in the political or
the economic sense of the term.
No one can doubt that he possessed keen business ability.
"There are many advantages in navigation," he says: "The
fur trade of Canada is very useful, as you can carry on an ex-
change of goods for goods.
' ' M He points out the advantages
of commerce in the East Indies and in North Africa. "The
merchants of Rouen," he says, "at one time established a silk
and cloth trade in Morocco by means of which they obtain
a great quantity of gold." He bemoans the lack of a great
merchant marine which could carry all the traffic of the north
which the Flemish and the Dutch had taken over because the
north had an absolute need of wine, vinegar, spirits, etc.,
all commodities in which France abounds and which she can-
not consume herself. (The idea of a surplus of products is
clearly brought out here.) "It is easy/' he says, "to carry
on a commerce with them, and better in that the French
vessels can bring back woods, copper, etc., things not only
useful to us but necessary for our neighbors, who must get
them direct from us, if they do not wish to lose the freight of
their vessels going for the commodities.
" 6T It would seem as if
Richelieu intended not only to carry on French trade with the
64 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, II, 67.
65/fcuJ., II, 68-69.
ee /&*., II, 68-69.
6T Ibid., II, 69-70.
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north in French vessels, but desired to have the French merchant
marine have a monopoly of the trade of all nations with the north.
It was a large scheme, but it fits in exactly with his general eco-
nomic and political idea of the great state, and the destruction of
all forces which would hinder that conception. A great state
would certainly mean a nation which was the predominant com-
mercial center of the world. The first step in order to bring this
about and assume control of commerce in the West Indies, etc.,
was to overpower Spain by means of military strength.68 This was
the underlying economic element in their relations in the Thirty
Years' War, as will be shown.
Thus, commerce and the methods to obtain a development of
it in France, dominated his thoughts towards the end of his
administration, and no better indication of its importance, and
of the keen intellect which solved its difficulties is found than
in his change from a supporter of a high export and internal
tax on goods to the support of a lower tax, in order to increase
trade thereby.
69
es
Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 71.
6 Ibid., II, 88, et seq.
CHAPTER X
THE ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN THE DIPLOMACY OF
RICHELIEU
Richelieu's entire administration was taken up with the ful-
filment of two objects: in the first place, to develop the ex-
ternal commerce, marine, and colonization of France, and make
her one of the strongest nations from an economic point of
view
;
in the second place, to create in France one of the strong-
est political states in Europe, and, as a consequence, place her in
the center of the nations united or opposed to each other, in
order to preserve the balance of power. He wanted to create,
as one writer says, a combined continental and colonial nation. 1
His accomplishments with regard to the marine, colonies, and
internal and external commerce, would indicate that during his
administration he at least tried to lay the foundations of his
first great object. But it has been shown that he could go only
so far in his effort along those lines because of the fact that
his second object, the continental supremacy of France, was a
necessary preliminary to the first. Thus it was his purpose to
bring about the pacification of Europe as the essential basis of
all future progress.
2 The method of attaining that end was
a war against the Hapsburgs. It now remains to consider the
economic motive involved in his efforts to carry to a successful
completion the second phase of his administration.
Few people at that time comprehended this ultimate pur-
pose, as is shown by the fact, which Richelieu admitted, that
few people could see the necessity of war, which he believed
was really needed in order to preserve the dignity and credit
of the King and state, over against other European powers.
"Merchants and people in general, do not see this point," he
says, "they complain about the burdens of war but do not see
1 Vignon, L., L 'Expansion de la France, Paris, 1891, 28-34.
2 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 285-286.
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the value of it for the state as a whole." 3 The Cardinal had
the security of the nation in view, as a prerequisite for future
prosperity. But the people could not look so far ahead. They
could see the benefits of the suppression of the nobles, but the
Thirty Years' War was above their political or economic com-
prehension. The need of a strong frontier, the maintenance
of the balance of power, and the question of the control of the
sea as a part of a strong economic and political nationalism
were beyond them. Richelieu realized this and was compelled
to hold back many of his advanced policies until the coming
peace would enable him to undertake them with a better hope
of success.
In his diplomacy the theoretical rule guiding his relations was
of course to assure the welfare of France by means of favor-
able negotiations with other countries. He was in particular
guided by a spirit of political and economic reciprocity.4 The
diplomatic relations between France and Spain during the
period may first serve as a good illustration of this policy.
Spain, when Richelieu came into power, was beginning to
decline, but nevertheless could be a very powerful and active
foe. The Cardinal feared her and sincerely believed from the
first, that the welfare of the world would be aided by the de-
struction of her power as well as that of the Empire.5
This nation was not only a danger to the existence of France
on the seas and along her boundaries, but also threatened her
internal status. The French Court, which was led by Anne of
Austria and others suspected of treason, was half Spanish ; 6
and furthermore, according to Richelieu, the Spaniards were
more or less interested in the attempts of the Huguenots to
obtain independence. 7 "Why? Of course, in part for political
reasons. Spain desired to weaken France, in order to be per-
mitted to unite with Austria across Italy, and on other accounts.
But it should not be forgotten that La Rochelle was important
as a center for the distribution of salt. England realized this
a Richelieu, Memoires, XXVI, 87-91.
*Lavisse, E., and Rambaud, A., Histoire, Generale, 12 vols., Paris, 1896,
V, 368.
5 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 150.
e Bridges, 113.
7 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 19-22.
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and Spain no doubt did so, for she herself carried on a trade
in that commodity. In fact, Richelieu complained in 1627 (the
time of the Huguenot affair) of the attempts of the Spanish to
hinder French commerce in salt with the Flemish people.
There was evidently a commercial rivalry existing between
France and Spain with regard to that trade. 8 When the most
important salt producing center of France revolted, it was nat-
urally aided by Spain. The latter country would clearly have
welcomed an independent La Rochelle from the economic as
well as the political point of view.
The Cardinal, it would seem, was well aware of the com-
mercial plans of Spain. He knew that she wanted to monopolize
commerce in Flanders and indeed in all of her possessions. 9
Furthermore, he knew of her attempt to deprive the Dutch
of their trade in the Mediterranean and the Indies. Spain, he
claimed, desired even at that time to become dominant in com-
merce in the Levant and in Russia, and to prevent the trade
of Holland with France and England.10 The good relationship
with Holland on the part of France is partly accounted for by
this statement. Richelieu believed from the beginning of his
administration that the Spanish nation was the one power which
intended to spread its commercial monopoly over all the world,
and that therefore its plans should be blocked. Immediate
efforts were made to oppose her ambitions. Commercial
relations were broken off, and at the same time, about
1626, the French began to form large companies to reestablish
commerce, colonies, etc.
11
Steps were taken also to build canals
through France, and thus cause all goods from the Mediterra-
nean and the Levant to be sent north through France, instead
of going by way of Spain, with the purpose of making France
the common deposit of all the trade of the earth.
' ' 12 Even
the superiority of geographical location which France possessed
over Spain was considered from the economic point of view.
The Mercure Frangois quotes the statement made by the King's
s Bassompferre, Memoires, (Soci4t4 de 1'Histoire de France), 4 vols.,
Paris, 1870-1877, III, 432.
Mercure Francois, XXIII, 334-335.
lbid., XII, 4-8; 30-35.
n Mercure Francois, XII, 3-6.
12
Ibid,, XII, 359.
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Garde de Sceaux, that Spain in order to trade with Italy or
any part of the Mediterranean, had to pass by France at night
or under the culverins of the islands of Provence. Further-
more, in order to trade with Flanders, Holland, England,
Denmark, and other northern lands, it was necessary for
Spanish vessels to pass le Ros Sainct Make, at the mercy
of the French cannon, which could control the English chan-
nel with little difficulty.13 Thus France would find it easy,
because of her fortunate geographical position, to defeat Spain
in her commercial ambitions.
The favorable position of France on the Mediterranean Sea
was brought forth a little later in the same way. The good
coast and harbors of Provence could easily hinder the com-
merce of Spain and the latter 's communication by water with
Italy, so necessary in peace and war. At this point appears the
definite object of keeping Italy independent of Spain, in order
to separate not only their political but also their economic re-
lations.14 The attempt to form a political and economic zollver-
ein between the Empire and Spain through Italy was to be
broken, because it endangered the very existence of France,
politically and economically.15
On the other hand Eichelieu knew that he could not oppose
Spain upon the sea as he did not have the ships. So he was
willing to compromise. In spite of the desires of French mer-
chants to retaliate against the Spanish and Portuguese, who
committed depredations upon their vessels on their way to and
from the Indies or America, he tried to preserve peace, and
asked the merchants not to commit hostile acts when they were
in neutral waters.16 He professed belief in the principles of
what is now called international law; although prudence very
likely told him that this was for the best interest of France.
In 1634 Richelieu, in order to prevent trouble with the Span-
ish and Portuguese, agreed that they should have full rights
within certain waters leading from the Indies and America.
However, he asked that the French be permitted to sail into
the ports and harbors of Spain and Portugual, as long as they
^Mercure Francois, XII, 359-60.
Ibid., XIII, 248-253.
is
Richelieu, Lettres, II, 81; Memoires, XXVII, 222-223.
IB
Eichelieu, Memoires, XXVIII, 204-205.
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did not impose on the limits of the ports of the ocean reserved
for them. 17 Thus he was willing to concede certain rights to
his colonial rivals in return for privileges for Prance.
At the very time when Richelieu was trying to make comprom-
ises, he was also attempting to overthrow the power of
Spain in Italy, was advocating a large navy in order to sweep
her off the ocean, and was allowing the situation north of
France to be taken care of by the Dutch. The latter prevented
any attempts on the part of the Spanish to strengthen their
possessions in the Netherlands, by means of canals, etc., and
thus build up their economic interests in those lands.18 The
Mercure Francois, in 1627, mentions the attempts of the Span-
ish to obtain a closer union with their colonies and other lands,
for the purpose of defence against enemies.
19 Of course this
policy would be dangerous economically and politically for France
and should be prevented. The people of Flanders were conse-
quently influenced to oppose these efforts of Spain.
20 Richelieu
saw the economic struggle going on between Holland and Spain
for control of the Indies and the sea. "The rise of either," he
said, "would bring about the ruin of the other." 21 As a
consequence, he evidently played one against the other in the
interests of France.
This was the general diplomatic position taken by France
toward these two nations throughout Richelieu's administration.
Finally, in 1635 the Cardinal declared that war with Spain was
the only solution for the peace of Europe and the safety, the
repose, and the commercial rights of the French people.22 At
this time, in spite of the economic rivalry existing between
Holland and France, an offensive and defensive league was
made between them against the Empire of Spain.23
In 1639, Richelieu was still pegging away at the Spanish in
Italy besides trying to get the English into an alliance against
Spain.
2* The three of them were to drive Spain off the seas.
"Isambert, XVI, 409-411; Mercure Francois, XX, 711-712.
is Mercure Francois, XIII, 566-571.
iBZ&wL, XIII, 590.595.
20 Ibid., XIII, 598-600.
21 Richelieu, Mfmoircs, XXVII, 362-365.
22
Richelieu, Lettres, V, 151-153; Mercure Francois, XX, 959.
383.
550-555.
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Indeed, he gave orders at this time for the fleet to attack the
Spanish towns, and (which is more important by far) her col-
onies. 25 Now apparently, the Cardinal had imperialistic ideas
of the most advanced sort. Control of the seas meant colonies
to him as it did to many other statesmen after him.26 His
Testament shows that this was his final intention and was his
advice for those who were to follow him. He says that "there
is little left for France in western commerce. The only chance
is to obtain control of places occupied now by the King of
Spain by means of a powerful war."27 In another place he
maintains that a navy will overcome, Spain and protect France.
It has been the only instrument which has enabled Spain to retain
her colonies. 28 Furthermore, Richelieu advised a strong marine
in order to keep Spain from Italy. 29 He believed that the
only solution for the economic and political development of
France lay in the defeat of Spain on land and sea:30 on land
so that she would not threaten the boundaries of France; on
the sea, so that she could not hinder French commerce, and so
that France might obtain some of the rich colonial rewards
which she so much desired. Richelieu's part in the Portuguese
revolt was probably taken because of his desire to break up the
colonial empire of Spain. 31
In one respect Richelieu looked upon Spain from a more or
less friendly point of view. The latter purchased wheat, silks,
etc., from France in considerable quantities. The Cardinal
permitted this trade to be carried on, because it added to the
wealth of France. "Richelieu in 1639," says one writer, "han-
dled this difficult proposition very well. He allowed the traders
by an edict the right to export goods at their risk. It was a
sort of authorized contraband by which both countries profit-
ed. ' ' 32 This edict illustrates the principle back of the Cardinal 's
administration. The political and external economic power of
25 Eichelieu, Lettres, 658.
26 Sourdis, I, Introduction, III-VII ; Eichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 257-
258.
27
Eichelieu, Testament Politique, II, 71.
28/&i<Z., II, 52-53.
29JZ>td., II, 54-64.
soMercure Francois, XXIII, 125; Eichelieu, Lettres, III, 81.
si Wakeman, H. O., European History (1598-1715), :iSTew York, 1916, 116.
32 Pigeonneau, II, 423.
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Spain was a danger to the development of France; therefore, it
should be destroyed. However, enmity to Spain should not pre-
vent France from taking advantage of any opportunity to better
herself, even though it should lead to trade with a nation with
which they were at war. French merchants actually became
the overland carriers of goods between Spain, the Netherlands,
and Germany.83
Richelieu was guided by the same nationalistic ideal in his
diplomatic relations with England. The latter country, he
claimed, had failed to observe the various clauses of the com-
mercial treaty of 1623. They placed various restrictions upon
the importation of French goods, such as cloth for example.
Now the French desired their government to retaliate and con-
sequently there arose in France the demand that the English
should be treated in France as the French were treated in
England. 34 Therefore when Richelieu came into office he had
the problem confronting him of arranging commercial relations
which would be satisfactory to both countries.
One of the first steps in that direction was the marriage of
Henrietta of France to the English Prince of "Wales. The
Cardinal hoped that this alliance would result not only in the
establishment of good relations between the two countries, but
that it would serve as a counterweight to the grandeur of
Spain,
35 and also would prevent a powerful commercial and col-
onial alliance between England and Holland.36
The effect of this alliance was temporary, although both Eng-
land and Holland lent boats to France in 1625, to be used
against La Rochelle at a time when France was at war with
Spain. The explanation for the change is simple when one
considers not only the religious side of the marriage alliance
but the commercial difficulties in the way of a happy consum-
mation of its aims. France and England were beginning the
as Calendars of State Papers and Manuscripts, (Venetian Series),
London, 1912-1916. XX, 162.
s^Levasseur, I, 273.
35 Eichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 78.
se Ibid., XXII, 293.
Richelieu must have had in mind the failure of Buckingham to bring
about a marriage alliance between the two royal houses of Spain and Eng-
'land. See Montague, F. C., Political History of England, New York, 1911,
VII, 110-117.
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intense commercial rivalry on the sea which, was to be the key-
note of their diplomatic relations for the next two hundred
years. Indeed, Eichelieu in a letter said that the three roots
of trouble between France and England were first, the relig-
ious difficulties concerning the right of Henrietta in that re-
spect;
37
secondly, the commercial side as seen not only in the
retention of French vessels and their goods by the English, but
in the retaliation in a similar manner by the French; 38 in the
third place, the aid of La Rochelle by the English.39 However,
the first cause of trouble could have been settled easily if the
latter points in dispute had not prevented any lasting solu-
tion during the entire period. In fact, one might say that the
first four or five years of Richelieu's administration were taken
up with a sharp commercial controversy with England, with the
military base of operations at La Rochelle. After that, this
rivalry was extended over the seas toward various colonies,
where the actual rivalry of the two nations is seen to the fullest
extent. The Thirty Years' War complicated to a certain ex-
tent their diplomatic relations so far as Europe was concerned,
because England was a much sought-for ally, in that particular
struggle.
40
Taking up the commercial phase of the trouble, one discovers
a sharp rivalry on the sea, which resulted in depredations on
French commerce, which in turn led towards the preparation
of a war marine to protect French merchants. 41 Richelieu stated
37 Even the marriage of Henrietta had its economic side because the
French in spite of the demands of the English had failed to pay the dowry
which had been promised. In fact the Venetian ambassador summarized
the causea of the trouble between the two countries as follows: (1) the La
Rochelle affair, (2) navigation troubles, and (3) the question of the dowry.
See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 66.
as Ibid., XIX, 592. ' ' Seizure of vessels on both sides makes both
nervous. Starting as a friendly dispute between Denmark, England,
and France in 1626 over the question of navigation, it now began to
assume serious proportions." See Calendars, (Venetian), XIX, 482-483.
39 Eichelieu, Lettres, II, 243.
40 So far as affairs in Europe were concerned, the relation of France and
England in the Thirty Years' War was influenced largely by territorial
desires. The question of the Palatinate and Lorraine was at issue. Eng-
land was interested in the former and France the latter. Neither country
was enthusiastic over the demands of the other. See Revue des\ Questions
Historique, 1889, XLV, 489-501.
41 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 279-281 ; 305. Sourdis, I. Introduction, II-III.
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openly in 1627 that he was going to protect French trade on
the sea.42 Furthermore, in following out this policy of pro-
tection for French commerce, he used the same mercantilistic
policy toward England as toward Spain. He would not permit
the importation of English cloth, but wanted England to send
over her raw materials, such as iron, hides, etc.43 He desired
to build up the manufactures of France, as being one of the
requirements of a strong state. It is no wonder that England
was afraid of the results that would follow if Richelieu carried
out his policy.
4*
Colonial interests began to occupy a place in the English-
French relations as early as 1626. "For," says Richelieu, "the
establishment of the company of Morbihan in 1627 alarmed
the English and the Dtutch who fear our control of the sea as
an ultimate goal.
' ' 45 This fear on the part of the English is
substantiated by the reports of the Venetian ambassador to
England in 1627. He says, "the dispute over the Queen's
household and the shipping are merely pretexts and not diffi-
cult to adjust 46 but after that they would never permit
the French to strengthen themselves at sea, because they are
so close. More than one person told me frankly that not to
oppose this would amount to giving the French the keys to his
majesty's dominions."47 He goes on to point out the fact that
the French look upon Richelieu's attempt to build up a marine
as a means whereby he could make himself supreme, not only
over England and her India trade, but in France itself. This
and other quotations indicate that the English feared the col-
onial aspirations of the French and realized that the control
of the sea was the means by which France might not only break
42 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 389-390.
Pigeonneau, II, 423.
4* In his report concerning the relations existing between France and
England in 1626, the Venetian Ambassador to England says, "Richelieu's
care for naval affairs, either by means of a company or otherwise; the pas-
sage of the Galleons from the Mediterranean to the ocean and other man-
oeuvres of France all furnish pretexts for comments, suspicions, etc." See
Calendars, (Venetian), XIX, 592.
Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 127.
46 France had failed to pay the rent for the ships loaned by the English
for use against the Huguenots in 1626, much to the disgust of the English.
See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 122-123.
"Ibid., XX, 98-99.
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up their beginnings of an empire, but even attack England
itself.48 "The secretary Conway," writes the Venetian ambas-
sador in 1626, "whom I visited spoke to me and read a letter
addressed to the King announcing the great attention paid by
Richelieu to maritime affairs, the ships expected from Holland,
and others off La Rochelle and in the ports of Brittany and
Normandy, the arrangement made by the merchants for a com-
pany to trade off the East Indies etc. This is contrary
to the common weal and is not generally understood, etc.
' ' 49
Both England and Prance seemed to realize that they were
to be mortal enemies for control of the sea and all that goes
with it. As one writer says,
' ' Richelieu constantly believed that
Spain, England, and Holland derived their greatness and power
from the marine. Like a genius, he plunged into the future.
He knew that Spain would not control her colonies much longer,
that Holland, whether she maintained herself or not, would never
be the great danger to France. But as for England, he feared
her and the more she increased in power, the stronger he wished
to make France. ' ' 50
The capture of merchant ships by both sides served as the
basis of their opposition to each other. "This has to be stop-
ped,
' '
says Richelieu,
' '
or war will result. ' ' 51 Consequently
the great economic struggle between these two important na-
tions found a first significant expression in 1626 over this
question of navigation.
52 Richelieu even went so far as to call
the English pirates, accusing them of committing all sorts of
outrages against the French merchant ships. "No heed was
taken of any agreement made with France." 53 In fact, they
*s Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 242. The Venetian ambassador in France
writes in 1627,
' '
They are making forty pieces of artillery in the foundries
here for the fleet, according to the invention of Targoni I wrote of. . .
The terrible results they produce are shown by experiments . . . be-
fore the Cardinal, etc. He called upon me yesterday and said he was going
in a fortnight to Brittany, not only to reduce La Rochelle but he boasts that
he will enter the ports of England itself, etc."
* Ibid., XX, 31.
BO Gouraud, I, 191.
"Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 236-237.
62 Calendars, (Venetian), XIX, 222-223, 286; XX, 267.
53 Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 271-272, 277.
Henry IV, notwithstanding his dire need of the English Alliance, frequent-
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even took advantage of the faith the French placed in peace
agreements between the two nations.54 Of course he failed to
consider the English side of the case. At any rate it is clear
that at the start, the Cardinal decided that if France was to be
powerful and wealthy, the English must be overcome.55
Matters were brought to a head by the establishment of a
marine, as has been discussed before. 56 Efforts were made to
arrange a satisfactory solution of the affair by means of negotia-
tions. However, the piracies committed upon the merchant
ships of both nations brought in another element which made
a peaceful settlement difficult. In 1627 the King of England
forbade all commerce with France, and confiscated French ves-
sels and goods found in England. Louis XIII in retaliation for-
bade his subjects to trade with England and accused the latter
of breaking her agreement. 57 Evidently the La Rochelle affair
and the marriage question were not the leading points at issue
between these two powers.
Richelieu now believed that he had a good cause, and it is
interesting to note how he tried to influence public opinion against
England. For example, the Mercure Francois mentions the
accusation of the English, that the French were laden with
taxes, etc. "However," it says, "if the people of France suffer
because of the war, the English endure just as much, and curse
the Duke of Buckingham for having caused the rupture of com-
merce. The merchants have lost all their trade, and the people
are overburdened with the military expenses. All for the im-
aginary purpose of obtaining power.
' ' 58 Many traces of the
ly protested against the violation of the freedom of French ships. See
Cheyney, E. P., A History of England. New York, 1914, I, 446.
s* Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 314.
os Ibid., XXIII, 270-271 ; Sourdis, Introduction, II-III, Lettres, II, 561.
se See Chapter VII.
57 Mercure Francois, XIII, 200-206.
f*Ibid., XIII, 832-833. Richelieu had good reason to desire the
support of his people, because of the fact that the war with England
ruined the business of French merchants along the coast, who constantly
complained on this account. The English even expected the fall of the
Cardinal because the merchants of Bordeaux, Rouen, Gascony, Guienne, etc.,
depended on English trade. See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 122-123, 151,
257.
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birth of the intense rivalry of these nations may be seen at this
time. Both suffered, but were willing to endure, because of the
bright rewards of the future and the thoughts of the weakness
and sufferings of the other side. Public opinion was influenced
then as now in the direction of material gains. The resem-
blance of the past to the present appears when Richelieu in the
Mercure Francois, accuses the English of double-dealing and
lining up his allies against him.59 In a certain sense it would
seem that the edict prohibiting all commerce with England, ex-
cept by the permission of Richelieu, was the first step in the
economic struggle between the two nations which was to come
to a climax in the famous blockade phase of the Napoleonic
War.
But the match which really started the struggle in 1627 was
found in the aid given the Huguenots by the English. Not
satisfied with undergoing the displeasure of the Cardinal with
respect to the marriage alliance and the question of French
and English commerce, the English had incurred his wrath by
taking issue with him in regard to La Rochelle. They had
captured the island of Re and had, he believed, tried to draw
other people to their side, using as a pretext the religious ques-
tion.60
At that time salt was one of the principal products of the
59 Mercure Francois, XIII, 833-835.
eo Trevelyan says that English interference in the Huguenot question
stultified the European policy of both nations. "The Duke of Bucking-
ham," he says, "couldn't blind Parliament to the truth, even by under-
taking, with huge Protestant bluster, the relief of those very Huguenots
whom he had been helping Richelieu suppress." He then goes on to say
that the English were sent to seize the island of Re off La Rochelle which
was to serve as a basis for English commerce and privateering at the ex-
pense of France, secured by the neighbourhood alliance of the great Hugue-
not party. See Trevelyan, G. M., England under the Stuarts, New York,
1910, 136-138.
Another English writer says that Buckingham took command in 1627
with instructions first to offer the citizens of La Rochelle the help which
they would need if threatened with attack by their King, and then to make
good the English mastery of the sea and destroy French and Spanish com-
merce. "This conquest of Re would have given the English a good basis
for naval operations and political intrigue.
' ' See Montague, F. C., History
of England (1603-1660). Political History of England, VII, New York,
1911, 143-144.
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external commerce of the French.61 Both political and econ-
omic interests influenced her to engage in it, and develop the
exportation of that important commodity. A valuable trade in
salt was carried on in northern Italy and with the Swiss.62
This might account to a certain extent for Richelieu's interest
in that part of Europe. Furthermore, the large amount of salt
consumed in Flanders has a peculiar significance when one comes
across attempts on the part of Austria and Spain to gain ab-
solute control in that country, much to the distress of France,
as will be shown later.
La Roehelle was one of the best salt ports on the ocean, in
spite of efforts of Richelieu to build up other harbors where
foreigners could obtain this commodity.63 However, the great
geographical discoveries had brought about the rising impor-
tance of all the Atlantic ports.
64 As a result, La Rochelle,
Nantes, Dieppe, etc., became very important not only in the eyes
of Richelieu, but in the eyes of foreign nations as well. Further-
more, they were Huguenot strongholds.
The basis of the trouble was of course England's interest in
the Huguenots. The Cardinal felt that England did not have
much personal sympathy for the latter. He was materialistic
enough to base the affair on the principle of a struggle for sea
power. Indeed, to dominate the sea was the desire of France.
"None of them," he says, "not even the Huguenots, saw the
advantage of the control of La Rochelle because of its salt
mines. ' ' 65 Richelieu was probably mistaken in the latter part of
his assertion. For it is not unlikely that the economic importance
of La Rochelle, especially with regard to the salt mines, was
the controlling factor in causing England, Spain, and Holland
to be friendly toward the Huguenots. Fundamentally, the
struggle between England and France was one for sea power
even at that time.68 But the salt mines and the control of the
ei See Chapter VII.
ez D'Avenel, Absolue MonarcJrie, II, 275.
es Ibid., Ill, 194-5.
*Lavisse, E., Histoire de France, 9 vols., Paris, 1896, VI, 277.
es Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 262. Yet Eichelieu entertained a fear of
the economic relations existing between La Rochelle and the English, so that
he tried to keep track of the trade carried on between them. See Richelieu,
Lettres, II, 499.
ee Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 77, 191-192, 282.
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Garonne and Loire rivers, together with the revenues to be
obtained from the Dutch and other peoples as a consequence
of the possession of the salt mines, must have been objects
of desire to the English, especially since they carried
on an important commerce in that commodity with La
Kochelle. 67 The Venetian ambassador at London seems to have
had difficulty in swallowing the statement of the English minis-
try that they had lately conceived of the war against the French
as based upon the sole preservation of the reformed church and
the public weal.
68 There can be no doubt that England had a
certain economic interest in the welfare of her fellow Protes-
tants in La Rochelle.69 On the other hand, Richelieu at this
point frankly admits that one of the predominating motives
back of his desire to retain La Rochelle was commercial, namely,
the control of the salt mines.
As a first step in opposition to the efforts of England with
regard to La Rochelle, Richelieu proposed a union with Spain.
He did this not only for political but also for economic reasons,
and even though this plan failed it is of importance because
it illustrates his diplomatic skill in political as well as
in economic affairs. He knew that Spain and France were com-
petitors in the salt trade. Therefore he proposed a scheme where-
by a price was to be set on that commodity which was to be raised
or lowered only by common consent. In this agreement he brings
out the importance of the salt trade with the northern countries,
and then says that a mixture of Spanish and French salt would
67 Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 341. Calendars of State Papers and
Manuscripts, (Domestic Series), (1625-1642), London, 1858-1887, X, 534,
553.
s Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 374.
"After the capture of B6, they (the English) mean to attempt Oleron,
which is also very important on account of its salt pans, and both islands
are very convenient as they command the mouths both of the Garonne and
the Loire, the chief rivers of France, enabling their possessors to take
toll sufficient to pay the cost of the garrison and the fleet with something
over, indeed, some say that already certain Dutch ships which went to lade
salt evaded a duty claimed by the English, by main force and flight."
From a report of the Venetian ambassador in England in 1672. See Cal-
endars, (Venetian), XX, 341.
69 The French claimed that the English did not aid the Huguenots for
religious but for territorial and commercial reasons. See, Mercure Fran
QOIS, XIII, 809-811; XIV, 9-14.
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offer the best market, due to the fact that one was too strong and
the other was too weak. 70 He offered Spain a partnership in
a salt monopoly as an inducement towards an alliance against
England. The commerce in this commodity must have been
very important to have caused him to use it as a means of bring-
ing about such a vital union.
Even though he did not succeed in this plain, he went ahead
and took action against the English, who were constantly prey-
ing upon the French commerce. The Duke of Guise was ordered
to prepare a fleet and to oppose them. 71 The English were
ready to meet them, for the fear of a union between France
and Spain had caused that country to take a definite stand in
her relations to La Rochelle. 72 England probably saw at a glance
that this was a plan which promised to put a stop to French
commercial and political ambitions.
An edict of September 20th, 1627, breaking off relations with
England, indicates that the two nations were on the point of
an armed conflict. 73 This marks definitely not only the begin-
ning of the struggle for control of the sea but also the contest for
the colonial empire of the New World. Richelieu had taken
the first step toward this great event, when he began to build
up the marine. He took a second step when he attempted to
increase the political and economic importance of Brittany and
Normandy and make the harbor of Brest the commercial em-
porium of the world, together with other ports near it.74 Eng-
land likely realized the danger which threatened her and even
considered the capture of Brest as a means of thwarting the
design of the Cardinal, who would have liked to make this port
the center of trade and navigation. 75 She was afraid of the
growth of France, and even the commercial alliance proposed
between the Hansa cities and France possibly caused her to
Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 288-289.
71 Mercure Frangois, XIV, 38
72 Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 77.
"Isambert, XVI, 215; Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 277-278.
74 Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 191.
islbld., XX, 281.
' ' Something has also been said, ' ' says the Venetian ambassador, ' ' about
the Port of Brest, which is considered of great advantage for thwarting
the designs of the Cardinal, who would fain make it the center of trade
and navigation, but when on the spot they will make their choice. ' '
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fear the Cardinal as an opponent of England's claims to su-
premacy on the sea.
76
On account of this distrust of the ambitions of Richelieu,
Great Brittain began to look for an ally. It was natural enough
that La Eochelle with its economic importance and its relative
political and religious independence should attract her. Here
was one great opportunity to destroy the growing naval power
of France before it could threaten either England or her col-
onies. Both countries began negotiations to break the neutral-
ity of La Rochelle. The French tried to influence the Huguenots
by fear of their land forces, near at hand ; the English by setting
forth the interests of the place and by blandishments towards
the inhabitants, having issued a decree that all may trade and
bring food into the town and islands, as, according to ancient
claims, they belong to the English crown, etc.77 The French
proposed force, and the English, an economic alliance and old
political claims.
Both the English and the French seemed to be well aware of
the economic importance of these lands of the Huguenots, as
each nation was afraid of the control of the latter by the other.
But this fear on the part of the English was likely increased
when they saw in the possession of La Rochelle by the French, to-
gether with an alliance with Spain, a loss of maritime and col-
onial power. On the other hand, the French could see in English
control an invasion of their country, and a loss of valuable eco-
nomic territory, as well as the chance for future naval expansion.
It is not surprising that Richelieu said that he would not talk
peace with the English as long as their flag waved above French
soil,
78 nor that in his efforts to convert France from a conti-
nental into a naval power, he threatened England with dire mis-
fortunes, when he should have a fleet large enough to defeat.
her.79 The English knew when he became superintendent,
grand master, etc., that they would have to look out for his
76 Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 56.
"I believe that Richelieu would gladly listen to this (the proposal of
the Hansa towns) for the sake of his marine, and it will generate ill will
here by reason of their claims to supremacy at sea," says the Venetian am-
bassador to England.
77 Ibid., XX, 341.
7* Ibid., XX, 371.
7 /&?., XX, 179, 199.
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increase of naval strength and his political alliances, especially
with La Rochelle.80 It would seem that these two countries
began their colonial struggle at this time, and it is to the
credit of Eichelieu that France won the first engagement by
the capture of La Rochelle.
For a while it looked as though both nations must fight
to the finish. The sole basis on which the French would make
peace with the English in 1629 was that England should
give up all thoughts of La Rochelle and the Huguenots forever.81
Richelieu realized that if France was to attain national politi-
cal and economic unity, and was to enter upon an expansive
policy, both Spain and England would have to be guarded
against. France must have her place in the sun, and her in-
terests must not be endangered by either nation.82
In 1629, the rivalry between the two nations had extended
into the distant colonies. Port Royal in Canada and the island
of Saint-Kitts had been taken from the French by the English.
As a result, Richelieu sent a fleet "to show the English that
they were not kings of the sea any more.
" 83 In 1629, under
the leadership of Cahusac, they recaptured the island of
Saint-Kitts.8* Richelieu accused the English of entertaining
the desire even at this time to cast the French out of Canada,
a remarkable forecast of later events.
Then came a change in Richelieu's policy. In 1629 he sent
Chateauneuf to England as his representative to try to arrange
a settlement of disputes and a commercial treaty which would
enable both countries to live in a happy union.85 Under these
general directions the ambassador had specific instructions which
he was to try to carry out. For example, he was to attempt to
settle the dispute with regard to the commercial relations of
France and England with Spain, for both nations were
trying to prevent each other from trading with the latter. He
was also to take up the affair of the flags, in regard to salutes
on the high seas.
But what was the cause of this change? The Thirty Years'
so Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 155.
*ilbid., XXI, 7.
82 Biehelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 281.
s Eichelieu, Lettres, III, 446-447.
**Ibid., Ill, 447-448 ;477-478; 518-519.
ss Ibid., Ill, 447-448; 518-519; 477-478.
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"War had reached a stage wherein the defeat of the Hapsburgs
in Austria and Spain seemed a necessity. Richelieu wished
England to join with him in aiding Sweden.86 Therefore, he
had to give up his active struggle with England for control of
the sea, in order to obtain her aid in the Thirty Years' "War.
"Whether or not he would have continued the conflict after the
war if he had lived is a mere matter of conjecture. The probabil-
ities are that when peace had been declared and his long de-
layed marine had been created he would have taken up again
an economic and political opposition to England.87
Richelieu at this time showed his diplomatic genius by hav-
ing his ambassador demand a new treaty from the English,
which would bring about secure and free mutual commerce.
All agreements in past treaties were to be renewed.88 Further-
more, the problem concerning the restitution of vessels captured
by the English was to be taken up,89 and at least a compromise
was to be agreed upon. England was no longer to place her
neutrality in question by selling ammunition to the "infidels,"
which, according to Richelieu, caused even the English people
to murmur. 90
The colonial question arose at this time, but the French
ambassador wisely placed the emphasis upon the other commer-
cial problems. It is significant, however, that in his Memoirs
Richelieu reports that the King of England told Chateauneuf,
that the King of France would produce a better indication of
his desire of living in peace and good friendship with him, by
departing from his desire to become master of the sea. 91 Riche-
lieu himself points out that even the English centered the en-
tire struggle on the control of the sea. "Jealousy of French
power on the ocean caused English opposition in 1629," says
the Cardinal, "even the merchants of England were envious of
those of France." 92
se Richelieu, Lettres, III, 447-448. Pigeonneau II, 414-415.
" See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 179.
ss Richelieu, Memoires, XXV, 198-199; Levasseur, I, 264.
89 A peace agreement had been made April 24, 1629, which* established
free commerce, etc. But this agreement had been broken by England. See
Eichelieu, Memoires, XXV, 199, also Dumont, V, pt. 2, 580-581.
so Richelieu, Memoires, XXV, 199-201.
ei/bid., XXV, 201-205.
2 Ibid., XXV, 211. The Dutch ambassador in France wrote in 1628
"that the Cardinal clings to his old idea about establishing com-
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The recapture of Saint-Kitts strengthened the fears of the
English. But Chateauneuf , in a kindly way, assured them that
the French desired only to enforce the peace terms, and that
they should have no fear of the growing sea power of the
French.93 The English King replied that just as Queen Eliza-
beth had warned Henry IV to leave the sea alone, he, Charles I,
would do the same.
Richelieu, in order to settle the trouble concerning the sea,
then sent Count de Nitschdil as a general representative to call on
the King of England. But the latter was not willing to con-
cede that equality on the sea which Eichelieu demanded.
^
He
said that the French were causing trouble by persisting in
increasing their marine power. The French representatives
laughed at the idea of another person's telling a great ruler
what he should do in his state. 9* Richelieu in reply asserted
that the arms of France were always for defence and assis-
tance against enemies and never for purposes of oppression.95
In 1630 De Fontenay-Mareuil took Chateauneuf 's place in
England. Richelieu instructed him to try to obtain the resti-
tution of Canada, and the restoration of the merchandise and
vessels captured since the peace agreement of 1629, and to at-
tempt to arrange a good peace between the two crowns, and settle
all commercial difficulties. He even mentioned the so-called
"Laws of the Sea," as giving the final decision with regard to the
restitution of the ships. "Reason and justice are to decide af-
fairs," he said.96 The new ambassador was to try to settle the
commercial relations between France and England, and further-
more to determine England's attitude in the Thirty Years' War,
especially with respect to the Palatinate.97
94 Richelieu, Memoires, XXV, 205-6.
panics as in Holland, and extending navigation. The English will never
permit this, so as not to put arms in the hands of thousands of hostile
neighbors against an open Kingdom like this, and state policy does not
allow it." Calendars, (Venetian), XXI, 446.
3 Richelieu, Memoires, XXV, 201-5. A good example of the fears of
some of the English people is found in a letter of an English captain in
1630, who was afraid of the intention of France to dominate Canada and
New England to the detriment of the English. Calendars, (Colonial, 1574-
1660), London, 1860, I, 106.
95/bi<Z., XXV, 205.
90 Richelieu, Lettres, III, 518-519.
97 Hid, III, 671-672.
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Finally, on March 29, 1632, after many negotiations, the treaty
of Saint-Germain was signed. In this treaty justice was to
guide the nations in the matter of prizes of the sea, depreda-
tions, and reprisals. Commerce and navigation were to con-
form to the liberal principles of the past treaties of 1606 and
1610, which, according to the French, had been ignored by the
English. Lastly, the colonial possessions taken by England
were to be returned to France.98 It seems that the importance
of this treaty has been overlooked. The argument shows clearly
the competency of Eichelieu, in settling not only political dis-
putes but economic problems as well. Furthermore, it was a
clever solution of the difficulties between England and France.
Theoretically, Richelieu obtained what he desired and strength-
ened the commerical and colonial power of France thereby.
After this, the Cardinal was busy with the great continental
struggle and could not concentrate so much upon the foreign
economic and political situation. However, in 1635 he was forced
to send a combined French and Dutch fleet to guard the channel.
But the Dutch did not remain long with the French. They were
afraid of the English claim of being ''Lord of the sea." To
avoid taking sides in a sea dispute between the two nations,
the Dutch sailed away and left the French alone." Now the
issue was a question of control of the British channel.
"The King of England," says Richelieu, "in a notice placed
in the Bourse, affirmed the English control of the channel.
Commerce should be free but under English supervision."
But the Cardinal having all he could do to handle the Thirty
Years' War, was forced to give in to the English on this as
well as the general question of the sea in spite of an almost
national hatred engendered over the problem.100 He tried to
keep up friendly relations with the British and retain them in
an alliance with Holland and France instead of with Spain. 101
o*Mercure Francois, XVIII, 39-52; Calendars, (Venetian), XXI, 311-
315; Levasseur, I, 264; Dumont, VI, pt. I, 31-32.
99Eiehelieu, Memoires, XXVIII, 359-360.
K>O The English, in 1636, were constantly threatened by French ships.
The French sailors called the English, "English dogs." Eichelieu accord-
ing to reports had promised a sum of money to those men of war who could
interrupt the King of England's packet. English vessels coming from
La Rochelle, were forced to avoid the French fleets for fear of capture.
See Calendars, (Domestic, 1635-1636), IX, 561-562.
101 Eichelieu, Lettres, IV, 559-567.
703] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OP RICHELIEU 161
He even attempted to settle the question as to who should salute
when English and French ships met on the high seas. He
favored their relative location as determining this matter; that
is, if they should meet near the French coast, the English would
salute the French, and if they should meet near the English
coast it would be vice versa.102 Nothing was accomplished with
regard to this point.
In 1637, he again tried to get the English to break their
neutrality and come in against Austria and Spain.
"
However,
the gain,
' ' he said,
' ' in selling contraband goods as a neutral with
warring nations, made England a neutral. ' ' 103 It is plain that
Eichelieu could see the economic forces underneath the diplomacy
of the nations at that time, especially when they concerned his en-
emies. In his Memoirs in 1637, he says, "Is this neutrality of
England due to an honest love of repose, or is it due to the gain
to be derived thereby, during such a neutrality, by conveying
contraband goods to warring nations as well as carrying on
during the wars the entire commerce of France and Spain. Is
that why England kept from a direct alliance with France ? ' ' 104
At another place he complains that England constantly aided
Spain to the detriment of France. 105 England still feared the
French on the sea, and Richelieu realized this as is shown by
the fact that he instructed his ambassador there to avoid a dis-
cussion of England's imaginary empire of the sea.106 He knew
that England was torn between two policies, the materialistic
neutrality, or the aid of the Elector Palatine by participation
in the war. It was the aim of France to get her to follow the
latter policy.
107
When the Cardinal died, his plans, of course, were left in-
complete. What he would have done after the Thirty Years'
War is not mere conjecture however, for in his Testament Pol-
itique he has strongly advised the necessity of a powerful mar-
ine to oppose the claims of the English to being Lord of the
Seas." 108
102 Eichelieu, Lettres, V, 66-70.
103 ibid., v, 854-856.
104 Richelieu, Memoires, XXX, 523.
105 Ibid., XXX, 529.
loe Richelieu, Lettres, VI, 10-12.
107 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 49-50.
., II, 50-52.
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Richelieu looked at England in a large degree from the eco-
nomic point of view. He saw in both England and Holland, two
of his great rivals in the East Indies and Persia.
109 In fact
one must conclude that the former was a definite colonial and com-
mercial opponent of France at that time. Spain was on the de-
cline and he knew it. England was the enemy of the future and
he wanted to prepare against her. If he had lived long enough
to carry out his economic policy it is a question whether or not
our land would have contained one English-speaking nation as
today. At any rate the Thirty Years' War put off the com-
mercial and colonial struggle for a hundred years for better
or for worse but Richelieu seems to have been aware that it
had to come in the end.
Turning to Holland, one discovers that Richelieu's attitude
in regard to that country was different from that toward England
and Spain. As has been shown before, he admired the Dutch
industrial and commercial genius, built up in spite of numerous
obstacles. Indeed, he described it as a model for the future
growth of France.110 He was at no time actually willing to
undertake a hostile attitude toward this nation, although he
threatened her with dire punishment when she refused to lend
him boats to be used against England.111
Just as with England, the economic rivalry between France
and Holland, even though it existed, was not permitted to dom-
inate on account of the Thirty Years' War. 112 In fact it seems
that the alliance of 1627 with the Dutch, for mutual protection
and satisfactory commercial relations, was an effort on the part
of Richelieu to enlist the aid of this country not only to put
down the Huguenots, but also to aid in the prosecution of the
Thirty Years' War.113 He was constantly afraid of an alliance
between Spain and Holland,114 even though he did not like to
see the Dutch carrying most of the French commerce on their
vessels.
The treaty of 1627 was arranged with the purpose of removing
109 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 73-74.
<>See Chapter IX, 138.
in Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 192.
112 Levasseur, I, 266.
us Mercure Francois, XIV, 14.
11* Richelieu, A. J. Cardinal, due de, Maximes d'tat, et Fragments
Politique du Cardinal de Bichelieu, Ed., G. Hanotaux, Paris, 1880, 730-731.
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these difficulties, and of engaging the Dutch to act as the pro-
tectors of the French marine which was being built at that time.
Improved commercial relations were the result of this treaty.115
Yet the Dutch were not so friendly as they might have been,
as is shown by the incident in which they looked on in glee while
the English captured certain French vessels near their coast.116
The fear of the English by the Dutch, was one of the most bitter
complaints made by Richelieu during the Huguenot affair. He
says that Spain proved to be a false ally, and Holland an un-
neutral neutral, in that she persisted in sending ammunition to
the English. She was afraid of the latter country and really
favored her.117 Richelieu did not like this, as is shown by his
letters. He thought it right for France to trade with Spain, as
their commerce was important; but for the Dutch to do so was
wrong.118 International rights were thus considered from nar-
row national points of view.
Both Holland and France were looking after their own inter-
ests on the sea. The former country had before this supplanted
French navigation upon the east coast of Africa, and was
very strong in the East Indies.
119
She, like England, took plea-
sure in carrying on depredations upon French commerce, even
forming an alliance with the Barbary pirates to do so. Riche-
lieu tried to force the Dutch to accept terms by which rules of
reciprocity should guide their commercial relations. "He did
not want to undertake a tariff war," says one writer, "which
would have alienated the valuable Dutch commerce and influ-
ence. He tried to make the Dutch his associates in enterprises
in the East and in the Americas. The treaties of 1627 and 1629
stipulated that they aid the French merchant boats, and allow
their men to associate with the French in the navigation to both
of the Indies. ' ' 12 In fact, Richelieu desired to settle their
us Levasseur, 1, 266; Dumont, V, pt. 2, 523.
uoMercure Francois, XIV, 159.
i" Richelieu, Lettres, III, 66, 78.
11* Ibid., Ill, 471. Holland as a matter of fact was rather in sympathy
with the Huguenots and the English as against Bichelieu. She not only
refused to take action as an ally of France, but would only lend boats
to the French to be used against Austria and Spain. See Calendars,
(Venetian), XX, 115, 192, 310, 353.
us Levasseur, I, 273.
120 Pigeonneau, II, 424-425. This treaty illustrates the fact that Holland
also desired to stay by her agreements with England. Probably she was
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commercial relations by means of a compromise and thus open
north Europe, the Levant, Africa, Canada, the Indies, Persia,
etc., to trade.
The Cardinal knew that even though Holland was a danger-
ous economic and political rival, yet she was the natural enemy
of Spain and as such should be used as one of the elements which
was to contribute to the defeat of the Hapsburgs. In 1630
he took this stand definitely when he arranged a treaty with
Holland which completed those of the past.121 After this she
was one of the allies, and her commercial power was forgotten
for the time being by the French. But, the Cardinal did not
forget the economic side, as shown by the fact that in his Testa-
ment Politique he left plans for obtaining the commerce in the
north which the Dutch and the Flemish had controlled. 122 This
intention has an added significance when studied in connection
with the Thirty Years' War.
Richelieu 's relations with Italy were of course interwoven with
his purpose of keeping the Spanish and Austrians from uniting
through that country, which would have been the death blow
to any plans he had with regard to the development of France.
Her boundaries had to be secure, not only at that time, but also
for the future.123 He did not desire territory in Italy. In fact
he proposed the formation of a confederation in that country,124
which would keep Austria and Spain separated,123 for the Cardi-
nal frankly admitted in 1637 that the French did not desire new
lands in Italy, or on the Rhine border. 126 All he wanted was an
opportunity to develop France without fear of foreign invasion, a
prerequisite to a strong economic state. Until a lasting peace
was assured for France so far as concerned foreign affairs,
Richelieu was willing to fight.
127 Indeed the Cardinal goes so
afraid of the France of the future. Furthermore, this treaty broke up the
Franco-Spanish alliance, much to the disgust of the latter. See Calendar*,
(Venetian), XX, 353. See Dumont, etc., V, pt., 2, 462-464, 523, 605-606,
VI, pt. I, 69-70, 124-135, 127, 242-243.
121 Isambert, XVI, 356, Dumont, V, pt. 2, 605-606.
122 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 69-70.
123 Richelieu, Maximes, d'ttat, 815, etc.; Lcttres, I, 260-267, 294-296.
124 Richelieu, Lettres, III, 239.
125/fttd., VII, 695.
"6 ibid., V, 595-597. Bridges 137.
127 Richelieu, Memoires, XXVI, 42.
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far as to claim that peace as he sees it would be a true peace
for all Christianity.
128
However, his altruism was not such that
this can be entirely accepted. Itaty might have been on the
territorial waiting list.
Richelieu's relations with the East have been considered.129
Again, it is the story of commercial rivalries between England,
Spain, Holland and France. Also, the Levant had a certain con-
nection with the Thirty Years' War, in that the Cardinal at
one time was afraid of a possible alliance between Turkey and
Austria. He even went so far as to advise his ambassador to
prevent Turkey from undertaking any negotiations with the
enemy.
130 The alliance was not formed. However, the Cardinal
had to neglect his commercial interests in the Orient and permit
the Dutch to obtain a good foothold by means of a maritime
route around the cape.131
The Cardinal's interest in Sweden and the North in general
was closely bound up in the Thirty Years' War and the question
as to the control of the Baltic sea. Of course the aid given by
Richelieu to the Swedish King in his attempt to overcome the
Hapsburgs has been mentioned by most writers. But the mo-
tives which caused Richelieu to do so have been brought forth
in rather an unsatisfactory way. The Cardinal did consider
that he used this Scandinavian country as a tool to defeat the
Emperor. But why? In his Memoirs he says that Sweden en-
tered the war on account of the fear of the increasing size of
the Emperor's dominions, which threatened her boundaries;
and also, to aid the poor northern German states, and preserve
freedom of commerce in the Baltic. 132 Richelieu therefore sent"
Charnace to Sweden as his representative, who was to tell the
King that France was in sympathy with the misery of Germany,
and was afraid of the extension of the frontiers of the Empire,
whose ambitions had no limits. He desired to furnish troops and
money to aid the Swedes, which should be used to maintain the
liberty of the Princes, communities, and cities of Germany, and
to conserve the security of the two seas, the Baltic, the ocean,
128 Richelieu, Lettres, IV, 29.
129 See Chapter IX.
130 Richelieu, Lettres, VI, 323.
isi Levasseur, I, 270.
132 Richelieu, Memoires, XXVI, 397.
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and their ports. To do this, the forces of the Emperor
should be driven out of Germany and their fortresses demol-
ished. Now to assist in this undertaking, France was to furnish
money yearly, as long as necessary, and the English, Dutch and
Danes were also to aid the Swedes.133 In other words, Richelieu
feared the growing universal power of the Empire. The Danes
had failed to stem the tide. Now the control of the Baltic was in
danger. Richelieu and his allies, in order to stop this threatened
economic and political conquest of the entire north by the empire,
urged Sweden to sacrifice herself. She was to restore the free-
dom of commerce on the Baltic and the ocean, which Richelieu
desired so much. In order to do so, the German princes must be
given control of the coast, and the imperial forces had to be
pushed back from their advanced position.
It may be that his relations with the northern states were
largely economic. He saw the value of trade in the north and
in the Baltic. In 1640 mention is made of the fact that France
did not carry on much commerce with Poland, for it was mostly
in the hands of the Austrians.134 Indeed it is likely that the
control of the Baltic was one of the great factors in the Thirty
Years' War. At any rate, Richelieu desired the Baltic and its
commerce to be free. This desire together with the fall of the
Empire was bound to have great economic and political conse-
quences. Richelieu, as shown by his efforts to develop foreign
commerce, would have been only too glad to increase the French
trade in the north.135 He could have accomplished this aim if
the Baltic had become controlled only by the Baltic countries
wJth whom he was on friendly terms.
The question which now naturally arises is just what con-
nection did the Thirty Years' War have with Richelieu's poli-
cies? Judging by the Cardinal's ambitions in the north which
even extended to the east by way of Russia, one can well infer
that his extra European policies both commercial and colonial
had a close connection with his continental program. Both parts
of his administration were intermingled and he realized that
success in each was a necessary preliminary if he wanted
to develop and increase the political and economic grandeur
Francois, XVII, 469-470.
is* Eichelieu, Lettres, VII, 891-892.
IBS gee Chapter IX.
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of France; or looking at it from another point of view,
just as the Seven Years' "War was closely bound up with the
colonial struggle of France and England, the Thirty Years'
War decided whether or not the Hapsburgs were to be the con-
tinental and colonial powers of the world as against the claims
of France, England, and their allies. "The possession and ex-
ploitation of the colonies had become an international political
question at that time." 136
Richelieu continually claimed that France desired no terri-
tory as a result of the Thirty Years' War, beyond her natural
boundaries.137 What then was his purpose in entering the war
and playing the part he did if one grants him the truth of that
statement ?
In his Memoirs, he maintains that he sought a permanent peace.
He wanted to prevent the ambition of Austria causing her
to overcome the weaker German States. Each nation should
get what belonged to it.13* According to the Cardinal, his pol-
icy was to protect the rights of small nations against the growing
power of the Empire. He claims that he had no material in-
terest in doing so, but only desired a peace which would be for
the benefit of all the allies.139 In a letter to the Swiss Cantons,
he assured them that he was working only for a permanent
peace, and while fighting for it he would not infringe upon
their territory.
140 It might be that Richelieu really believed that
a victory over Spain and the Empire would benefit the world.
We do know that he constantly considered the welfare of France,
even before that of any other nation or group of nations, mak-
ing this the guiding force of his entire administration.
Now carrying this idea of "state interest" to its logical con-
clusion, it seems quite in harmony with the rest of Richelieu's
administration to say that his opposition to the Hapsburgs
naturally involved an alliance to overpower them on the Baltic
as well as on the Mediterranean. Deschamps has mentioned
an anonymous Memoir of 1626, which affected Richelieu to a
marked extent and indicates the patriotic policy behind the
las Deschamps, 80-88.
i3r Eichelieu, Memoires, XVII, 403-406.
IBS ibid., XXVII, 517-521; Lettres, VI, 243.
139 /bid., XXVII, 499-500.
no Ibid., XXX, 340.
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Cardinal's administration at that time. The end was a com-
mercial and maritime league to weaken Spain on the Mediterra-
nean, and the first step was to establish a navy and increased
commerce in that field.141 Richelieu in his creation of a
marine accomplished this first step. His attempts to draw
England, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden into the war against
the Hapsburgs marks the second step taken by Richelieu toward
the completion of that plan.142
In 1632, Richelieu received from a Hollander by the name
of Wilhelm Usselinx, a written plan which proposed an associa-
tion (commercial and colonial) with Sweden and the German
princes. The purpose of it was to drive Spain from the control
of seas. The writer gives as his reason for this proposition, that
the Hapsburgs of Austria have been the cause of all the trouble
for more than a hundred years, and the King of Spain was the
chief supporter of that ambitious house. Since the ruler of Spain
was powerful only through the money from the American col-
onies, France should form a company which would destroy
Spain commercially and colonially.143 Richelieu's efforts to
obtain allies against the Hapsburgs indicate that he probably
heeded this advice.
But it is evident that Richelieu must have realized the eco-
nomic importance of an alliance against these powers, for the
Mercure Francois, in 1628, published the various efforts of Spain
and Austria to form a commercial and political alliance against
France, England, and Holland. In 1628, one can read an
account of the attempts of the Hapsburgs and Poland to control
the Baltic by means of a mutual alliance, together with the
aid of the Hanseatic cities, especially Lubeck, Danzig, and Ham-
burg, which cities were all offered great privileges, in return
for which they should leave the commercial alliance with Hol-
land and England. The Hapsburgs even tried to get Sweden
by offering Prussia to that country in order to separate her
from Denmark (which they desired to overrun). They said
openly that their purpose was to control the trade and commerce
I" Deschamps, 93-94.
142 ' < His treaties with England, Holland and Germany and his defiance
of Spain were all economic policies," says M. d'Avenel, "He extended the
boundary of France in order for her to be secure. ' ' See Richelieu, Lettres,
I, LXXX.
us Deschamps, 96-99.
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of the Baltic and to ruin the Dutch thereby. To do this they
planned a strong fleet on the Baltic. 144 It is not strange that
Richelieu was so anxious to bring Sweden and the North German
states into an alliance with France. He must have realized
that France and her allies were threatened by a combination
founded by the Hapsburgs, which might cause their political
and economic ruin if allowed to continue.
It is no wonder that Richelieu tried to settle the commercial
troubles with England and Holland by means of a compromise,
in order to meet this great rival. One sees why he neglected
the finances as well as commerce more or less. " Spain," says
the Mercure Francois, "frankly admitted that in alliance with
the Empire, she intended to gain control of the principal com-
merce of Europe, by means of control of the Baltic, together
with the aid of Lubeck, Danzig, etc.
' ' 145 In 1624 a council of
commerce and an admiralty had been established in Spain and
in the Netherlands and the navy was increased. Agents were
then sent to the German cities offering a commercial treaty
with Spain together with the promise of removing all traces of
past devastation in those regions. But this plan failed, as the
cities refused to unite against England and Denmark, etc. Also,
the Empire was not able to seize the control of the straits from
Denmark, as Holland, Denmark, and Sweden all opposed that
move. It is interesting to note that the result of all these
negotiations only served to unite the German cities more closely
to Sweden, Denmark, and Holland.
Richelieu seems to have appreciated the danger of a sort
of zollverein comprising the Imperial lands, Spain, and the Ger-
man states, against Sweden, England, Holland and France.
This economic union would have resulted in a commercial war
which would have been extended to all parts of the world, and
so he took steps to prevent its success, by promoting the entrance
of Sweden.
Unfortunately for Sweden, and happily for Richelieu, Gus-
tavus Adolphus was killed in the battle of Lutzen in 1632. For
in 1633 appeared in the Mercure Francois a very significant ac-
count of the proposed political and economic alliance between
Sweden and the northern German states, in order to complete
the war against the Hapsburgs, and to begin a commercial and
144 Mercure Francois, XIV, 354, etc.
Z., XIV, 355-373.
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colonial policy which extended even into the Americas and the
East Indies. Gustavus Adolphus planned this in 1626, and
Oxenstierna tried to carry it out in 1633.146 The Swedish leaders
were too ambitious, and, as a result, Richelieu became rather cool
towards Sweden when he learned about this plan, and the mili-
tary successes of her great King and leader made it probable that
she might be able to succeed.147 The Cardinal was not guided
purely by political ambitions, when he threw France into the war
in 1635 and assumed the leadership in the war by this act. It is
possible that something besides political considerations caused a
protest on the part of France as to the intentions of Austria to
control Liege in 1637, with which France maintained important
commercial relations.148 Speaking in general terms, Richelieu
definitely desired France to develop not only on the continent but
in colonial possessions as well. Austria and Spain both stood
in the way of the first step to be taken toward the achievement
of that policy. As a result of the Thirty Years' War, Germany
became open to the European powers, and the influence of the
Empire a thing of the past. France was thus afforded a chance
to expand toward her natural frontiers. Spain fell further in
national power. The Portuguese revolution in which Richelieu
was especially interested left her Empire in a very weak and
helpless condition. What a chance for political and economic
expansion of France ! How unfortunate it was for that country,
that her minister was unable to live long enough to complete
the economic, as well as the political, side of his administration,
which he had so well begun !
Thus it was the result of the Thirty Years
' War which decided
the first question as to who should control the commerce and
the colonial projects of the world. Richelieu helped to frustrate
the claims of Spain and the Empire along these lines. Who
i*Mercure Francois, XIX, 468-485. In 1630, Gustavus Adolphus ar-
ranged a treaty of commerce between Danzig and Sweden. See Dumont,
etc., V, pt. 2, 598-599.
! Wakeman, 94. In 1626, Gustavus Adolphus persuaded by Usselinx,
an Amsterdam merchant, decided to form the Swedish West India Company
and establish settlements in so-called "New Sveden." Oxenstierna con-
tinued the policy and in 1638 established a settlement in the state of
Delaware. See Tyler, L. G., England in America (American Nation
Series), N. Y. 1904, 295-296.
"8 Mercure Francois, XXII, 55
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among the allies would be the leader in the economic and pol-
itical affairs of the time, was a question of the future. As
was said before, Richelieu knew that England was the great
power that France would have to contend with for control of
the sea, after the ambitions of Spain in that direction had
been settled. His external policy was his method of preparing
for this coming emergency.
In the last place, it does not seem that due credit has been
given Richelieu in his conduct of the Thirty Years' War. The
very fact that he was able to throw other countries against the
enemy by furnishing them with money, certainly indicates his
genius. For while he was doing this, he tried to settle internal
affairs and develop his external policy, so that after the war
France would be able to assume the leading part in European
affairs, because of her own great economic and political strength
and grandeur. "All this was a matter of prudence," he says,
"for by keeping your enemies occupied with your allies, you
have time not only to furnish them money, but to save some
for yourself. However, when your allies really need you, then
it is an act of wisdom and courage to come to their aid. ' ' 149
It certainly would seem that Richelieu followed out to the
highest degree his principle of placing the interest of the state
first, in his conduct of the Thirty Years' War. After all, what
he desired was the political and economic supremacy of France
in Europe. In order to achieve this purpose he forgot commer-
cial rivalries, made allies, and then pushed them into the war,
and finally at the opportune time entered it himself. When he
died, international relations were shaping themselves in such a
way that he could have turned his undivided attention to the
economic development of his nation, and to the questions which
would have arisen out of his attempts to develop such phases of
his government as colonization. Of course England was a prob-
lem for the future. But what would the future have brought if
the Cardinal had lived? At any rate the English and French
colonial struggle seems to have been the natural outcome of
Richelieu's administration. Imperialism had begun.
Eichelieu, Memoires, XI, 307; Testament Politique, I, 45.
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
The early death of Richelieu was certainly an unfortunate
event for the development of France, for his career ended at
a time when he was planning to carry to final completion the
magnificent political and economic program which he had begun.
It was doubly unfortunate because of the fact that his successor,
while he was able to carry out the external political phase of
Richelieu's administration, nevertheless failed to aid in any
way the general economic and internal political ideas promulga-
ted by the Cardinal. As a result, whatever Richelieu accom-
plished in an economic way was neglected until Colbert came
along, and by that time France had lost to a certain extent her
great opportunity. One writer suggests that if a man strong in
both political and economic affairs had succeeded Richelieu, no
doubt the final disappearance of feudalism in the 18th century
would not have been delayed. The French Revolution would
probably have come; but the horrors of the French Revolution
would have been spared. Aristocracy and hereditary monarchy
would have been swept away none the less, and the republicanism
of modern France would have arisen, as it has arisen in their
place, but the substitution would have taken place without con-
vulsions and without bitterness. ' ' The question after his death is
whether the monarchy will stay with the Third Estate or will
turn on them and be conservative. In the first case, there will be
the peaceful establishment of the modern era, and in the second,
a reign of terror and war. ' ' x The second choice was made, and
it is indeed unfortunate that the death of this great man be-
came one of the forces leading to the great catastrophe of French
history.
Colbert, who succeeded Mazarin, was able to build upon the
foundation laid by Richelieu. "One must admire," says Gour-
aud, "the security of principles, when after twenty years of
i
Bridges, 40-41
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civil trouble and debasement of nearly all commerce the founda-
tion laid by the latter great man was found nearly intact, and
it was upon this that his economic successor built the great com-
mercial grandeur of France.
' ' 2 One can easily confirm the truth
of this statement by consulting the achievements of Colbert.
Indeed to Colbert alone has been given the glory of having made
France for a brief period the greatest colonial power of modern
times. "In this," says one writer, "he showed himself to be
the docile son of Richelieu. He borrowed from him the method
of forming companies with privileges and monopolies. The
contracts of 1664 were formulated in the same manner as those
of the time of the revolution. Indeed the patents of the com-
pany of the 'one hundred associates' and the company of the
'"West Indies,' seemed to have been written by the same hand." 8
Colbert completed the colonial conceptions of Richelieu. The
latter had placed conquest and settlement of the new lands in
the first place. He considered the honor and welfare of the
Kingdom, and its influence in Europe. Colbert, minister of
finances, took upon himself the task of increasing the richness
of the country, accomplished by means of colonization, which was
an economic effort. He put in the first place the commercial in-
terests, which had remained in the second place according to
the Cardinal's conception.
4 One might go on and show just in
what way Colbert built upon the economic foundations laid by
Richelieu with regard to finances, the marine, industry, etc.,
but it suffices to say that the accomplishments of Richelieu
served as a worthy basis for the brilliant protective policy of Col-
bert. It is indeed unfortunate that the continental policy of
Louis XIV should have prevented the carrying out of the peace-
ful economic ideas set forth in the Testament Politique, which
Richelieu left to posterity.
The keynote of Richelieu's administration from the economic
point of view is mercantilism. This study has tried to point
out the fact that the great Cardinal was fundamentally a man
of that school of thought. Whether he obtained his ideas from
Sully, Henry IV, or the first French economist Montchretien,
is not certain, but it is evident that the motive behind
2 Gouraud, I, 198.
s Deschamps, 144-146.
* Ibid., 146.
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his administration was mercantilistic as illustrated by his policy
of political and economic centralization. Practically all of his
actions can be traced back to that belief. For example, in his
efforts to create the state, he looked at all classes from the
viewpoint of the welfare of the nation. In this respect his
conflict with the Huguenots over the salt beds around La Rochelle
is a splendid example of his efforts to centralize even the
economic side of the government. His financial program sA-
though weak was guided by ideal state building. This was smo
true of his foreign and domestic commercial policies as well as his
colonization schemes and his attempts to create a marine. The
welfare of the nation was behind all of them. As to his contin-
ental policy, Richelieu desired to overthrow the Hapsburgs, not
only for political but for economic reasons as well. That is, to the
Cardinal, the downfall of the Hapsburgs was the first step in the
colonial and commercial as well as the political aggrandizement
of France. His relationship with all nations was centered
around this idea and consequently the struggle with England
over control of the Huguenots, and the salt region, is only in-
teresting in that it shows that the Cardinal was aware of the
potential economic forces working within his own land, and his
future rival, England. It is granted that Richelieu might have
been actuated by other motives in his administration, but one
must concede that the policy of a great mercantilistic state
around which all his economic policies center is one of the fun-
damentals of his administration. For after all, a strong state
politically, a good economic foundation, and an era of peace in
which work could be accomplished, was the ideal of Richelieu,
and no correct conception of his career can be obtained, unless
this program is taken into account.
That he fully intended to develop his country in the time of
future peace is clearly brought out in his Testament Politique,
which was written toward the last of his career when he knew
that death was going to prevent the carrying out of his plans.
"Just as his Memoirs were the accomplishments of the past, so
his Testament Politique," he says, "would be the guide for the
future. ' ' 5 Then in concluding the first part of his great work,
5 Richelieu, Memoires, XI, 269-271. (Includes introduction to the Testa-
ment Politique, and part one.) Testament Politique, Introduction, I, 1-5.
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he sums up the keynote of his entire administration when he
says; "Up to the present the deeds of your Majesty have been
related. I certainly believe that they will end happily if they
are followed by a repose, which will give the means by which
the state may be heaped up with all kinds of advantages, gains,
etc." 6 "Your Majestjr being naturally of a tender constitution,
not very healthy, of restless impatient humor, especially when
you are with the army, of which you take the leadership, I should
think myself guilty of a crime, if I did not make it my humble
request for you to avoid war for the future, as much as possible ;
which I do upon this basis, that the levity and inconsistency
of the French, can only be vanquished by the presence of their
master, and that your Majesty cannot, without exposing your-
self to ruin, fix upon so lasting a design, nor consequently ex-
pect a good success from it. You have shown your valor and
military power sufficiently to think of nothing like that for the
future, but to enjoy that peace and tranquillity which you have
acquired for the Kingdom by your labor, being in a position
to defend youself against all those who, contrary to public
faith, would offend you anew.
' ' 7 Peace was the final goal to-
ward which the Cardinal had worked. And even though he
admitted the heavy cost in treasures and suffering, yet he be-
lieved that the ideal was worth the efforts and the privations.
Like many great men, Richelieu made countless enemies in
his attempts to carry out his policies. "But," says Bonnefon,
"in contact with the logical and firm policies of the Cardinal,
the French people began to take notice of the true interests of
the country and the public, and if it had at first been distrustful
of the minister because of the brutality of his plans perceived
now the farsightedness and the justice of the policies which he
conceived and was carrying out.
" 8 In this regard the beautiful
letter of his contemporary Voiture is significant. The latter
praises the farsightedness of the Cardinal's costly military policy,
as being a necessary prerequisite for the future wealth and growth
of the country. "One must admit," he says, "that instead of
ruining France, he has saved her millions by simply taking La
Rochelle, which has been in a state of constant revolt and thus
6 Richelieu, Memoires, XI, 394-350; Testament Politique, I, 60.
T Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 196-197.
s Sotiete Franeaise due XVIII * Stfcle, 32.
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a constant expense.
" 9 He then goes on to justify the part taken
by Richelieu in the Thirty Years' War. "If the war ends, as
it appears to indicate, in a victory, Kichelieu will then find the
means of winning the admiration of all. Being as wise as he
is, he has realized after so many experiences, what is best;
and will turn his attention toward creating in that state the most
flourishing of all, after having made it the most formable. He
will make evident an ambition which is the most beautiful of
anything which can fall into the views of mankind, namely, of
creating in France the best and most loved of Kingdoms and not
the most feared. He knows that the most true and noble con-
quests are those of the heart and the affection; and just as a
plant is barren which gives shade and no fruit, so will he enjoy
the fruits with which peace is crowned. There is not so much
glory in extending the limits of the land as in diminishing the
taitte. Richelieu realizes this fact. He also knows that there is
less glory in overcoming a hundred thousand men, than in put-
ting twenty millions at their ease and security. Also, this great
spirit who has only been occupied with the means of furnishing
money for the war and of raising men, taking villages and win-
ning wars, will occupy himself henceforth, only in establishing
repose, riches, and abundance. Instead of being a leader in war,
he will lead in the advancement of the arts. He will make new
edicts to regulate luxury and establish commerce. Large vessels
accustomed to carry arms will bear merchandise, and hold the
seas free from pirates, etc. Then the people will admire him and
the middle classes will sing his praises. . .
" This is a rather en-
thusiastic eulogy of the Cardinal, but it is interesting as indicat-
ing the growth in sentiment in his favor among the intellectual
French people. They began to see the ultimate purpose of Riche-
lieu's administration; that war was a necessary evil, accepted
only for the sake of better conditions under future peace.
A study of Richelieu's life leads to the conclusion that he was
an economic statesman and that he was one of the unconscious
economic and political founders of the French mercantilistic
state. Yet he was not an extreme advocate of the doctrine of
mercantilism, for one finds that he differed radically from other
influential men of his age. The extreme mercantilistic view held
for its fundamental belief that money is wealth. It follows that
Voiture, Oeuvres, 2 vols., Ed., M. M. TJbicini, Paris, 1855, I, 271-279.
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a nation should have a favorable balance of trade in order to
keep gold and silver within its boundaries, and should never let
them go out of the land, because it is the possession of specie
that makes the state strong. When the Cardinal took up the
work of his administration, he believed more or less in this
doctrine, which was commonly followed and obeyed at that time.
But as he began to study the economic side of the question; as
he was confronted with commercial conditions in which the fal-
lacies involved in the idea were brought to light in various ways,
he gradually came to the conclusion that this theory was wrong,
and admitted it. In referring to this change of economic doctrine,
M. Masson says that the other French officials still believed in
the theory, but Richelieu changed completely to the other side.
This change is a very important event in the economic history of
that time, because it tends to locate in the age of Richelieu the
transitional stage of development from the mercantilistic doctrine
to the belief in free trade. Just what was the influence of the
Cardinal's ideas upon those who came after him, presents a dif-
ferent historical and economic problem. That Richelieu was
not strictly a follower of either the old or new school is evident
from a study of his life, although the main outlines of his govern-
mental policy are based largely upon the mercantilistic concep-
tion of the strong state. He may be regarded as an unconscious
medium whereby the old mercantilistic views finally became
merged into the ideas which finally led to the doctrine of free
trade. For example, one of his letters illustrates very well the
modern view he possessed in regard to duties on imports. "If
one must endure," he says, "the heavy import duties which
foreign lands put upon our goods which enter their lands, and
upon those which come to us, let us charge such duties on their
goods and raise them in proportion as the foreigners raise their
duties on us." " Thus he believed in the system of retaliation,
which is more or less modern. As a result, it may be asserted
that Richelieu deserves more consideration upon the economic
side than has hitherto been given him. The Cardinal may indeed
10 Histoire du Commerce Frangaise dans le Levant, 149.
11 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 332. Richelieu desired to make France a strong
commercial nation and "in the spirit of reciprocity he gave to foreign mer-
chandise the same rights as they gave to French goods." See Lavisse et
Rambaud, Histoire Generate V, 368.
178 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [720
be regarded as a forerunner of the exponents of the modern
school of political economy.
"The deeds of great men live after them." A man is truly
great if he has accomplished something which has a living force
in times after his own. All accounts of Richelieu's life have
brought out clearly the importance of his political work, but
have failed to give similar attention to the economic phase of
his career. This treatise has endeavored to take up the internal
and external commercial policies of the Cardinal, and has thus
limited itself to an interpretation of his economic accomplish-
ments. It has tried to establish that Richelieu, as measured by
his activities in this particular field of his career, comes up to
the requirement as to what constitutes a great man. Two gen-
eral contributions to economic thought and practice entitle him
to this position. In the first place, he made an addition to the
theoretical side of economics by taking a stand in favor of in-
creased freedom of trade and opposing the extreme mercantil-
istic doctrine. This unconscious contribution made by the
Cardinal may have influenced the development of the modern
doctrine of free trade. In the second place, his ideas as to
"state building," by means of a marine, colonization, and com-
merce in general, have formed the basis, as has been said before,
of most activities in this particular field ever since.
In the last place, Richelieu's political achievements, largely
accomplished with the intention of obtaining a peace which would
afford an opportunity for France to expand in an economic
way, are essentially modern. Traces of his ideas can be
found after nearly three centuries in the economic pol-
icies of modern France, and of other nations. His greatness
cannot be limited to the political sphere, but clearly extends with
approximately equal credit into the field of practical economics.
Us chantent quel fut ton merite
Quand au gre de vos matelots
Tu vainquis les vents et les flots.12
1 2 This poem was written by Jean de Chapelain (1595-1624), and ap-
peared under the title : Ode a Monseigneur le Cardinal Due de Richelieu.
(Paris, Jean Camusat, 1633). See De Brienne H. A., Memoires, Paris,
1916, I, 241-243.
Chapelain ranks among the intellectual men of that age and was a mem-
ber of the French Academy. The above poem is considered his best.
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Et domptas 1'orgueil d 'Amphitrite.
Quand votre commerce affoibli,
Par toi, puissamment retabli.
Dans nos havres deserts ramena 1'abondance
Et que surcent vaisseaux maitrisant les dangers
Ton nom seul aux Frangais redonna 1'asseurance
Et fit naitre la craints au coeur des etrangers . . .
Us chantent tes conseils utiles
Par qui malgre Tart des mediants
La paix refleurit dans nos champs
Et la justice dans nos villes
Us disent que les immortels
De leur culte et de leur autels
Ne doivent qu'a tes soins la pompe renaissante,
Et que ta prevoyance et ton autorite
Sont les deux forts appuis dont
1'Europe tremblante
Soutient et raffermit sa foible liberte.
APPENDIX A.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following works are the primary and secondary sources
consulted in the preparation of this study. In each group they
are placed in the order of their importance.
GROUP I
Bibliographies
1. Molinier, Augusta fimile, and others, Les Sources de
I'Histoire de France depuis les Origines Jusqu'en 1815,
12 vols., See Vols., XI, XII. Paris, 1913.
2. Monod, Gabriel Jacques, Bibliographic de I'Histoire de
France, Paris, 1888.
3. Franklin, Alfred, Les Sources de I'Histoire de France, Paris
1877.
4. Belong, Jacques, Bibliotheque Historique, 5 vols., Paris, 1768-
1778.
5. Langlois, Charles Victor, et Stein, H., Les Archives de
I'Histoire de France, 3 vols., Paris, 1891 [1893].
Of the five bibliographies, the first one has been found
most valuable in the preparation of this study. It covers
the field with respect to geographies, general histories,
memoirs, and letters. Monod 's work is a single volume
in which is found a fairly good limited catalogue of sources
and works relating to the history of France from its
origin down to 1789. It is arranged chronologically and
by classification. The next two bibliographies are older
works and thus not so important as the ones just mentioned.
Good brief bibliographies concerning this subject may
be obtained by consulting (a) Lavisse, E., Histoire de
France, Vol., VI, 2 partie, Ch. XI., (b) Lavisse et Ram-,
baud, Histoire Generale, Vol., V, Ch. VII., (c) Cambridge
Modern History, Vol., IV, Ch. IV.
180
723] APPENDIX A 181
GROUP II
Original Sources
1. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Testament
Politique, 2 partie, Londres, La Haye, La Februre, 1770.
See Appendix B.
2. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, The Political
Will and Testament of that Great Minister of State,
Cardinal Duke de Richelieu, London, 1695.
This interesting old English translation is found in the
Harvard College Library, made by some unknown men of
the age of Louis XIV.
3. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Memoires du
Cardinal de Richelieu (M. Petitot, editor), Vols. X-XXX,
Foucault, Libraire Rue des Noyers, No. 37, Paris, 1821-
1829.
These memoirs of Richelieu include the years 1610-1638.
They are the source of valuable information with respect
to his economic ideas. Indeed, in one sense of the word,
they are not memoirs, but are a collection of notes sent to
him by his agents, advice from his councillors and, finally,
his own ideas either jotted down by himself or by his
secretaries, and have been used with this in mind. The
authenticity of the memoirs is generally accepted, although
before the Academie des Sciences Moral et Politiques, on
January 7, 1921, M. Louis Batiffol maintained that the
Memoirs of Cardinal Richelieu were not authentic, being
the work of two compilers, who used Richelieu's papers
shortly after his death. Therefore this work must be used
with that idea in mind. [See L.Batiffol, "Les Faux Mem-
oires du Cardinal de Richelieu" (Revue des Deux Mondes,
April 15, 1921)].
4. Richelieu, A. J. Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Lettres, Instruc-
tions. Diplomatiques, et Papiers d'fitat, Ed., Georges,
Comte d'Avenel (Documents inedits sur 1'histoire de
France), 8 vols., Paris, 1853-1877.
A valuable collection, including practically all of
Richelieu's correspondence. Unfortunately the letters left
out seem to be the ones pertaining to commerce.
The editor remedies matters to a certain extent by listing
these letters and summing up their main themes. Volume
182 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [724
one of this series contains a splendid introduction by the
author.
5. Eichelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Maximes d'Etat
et Fragments Politique du Cardinal de Richelieu, Ed.,
Gabriel Hanotaux, (Collection des documents inedits sur
Thistoire de France, vol., LI), Paris, 1880. See Appendix
B.
6. Mercure Francois, le, 25 vols., (1605-1644), Paris, J. Richer
[etc] .
This work is not a journal but is an annual history of
which the first volume embraces an account of the events
which took place in Europe from 1605-1611. The collec-
tion of twenty-five volumes is one of the best sources for
the study of the history of that period. Being controlled
by the government, it sets forth the views of the admin-
istration. There is a strong probability that Richelieu
acted as editor in some degree and contributed a number of
articles to it.
7. Isambert, Frangois Andre and others, Recueil General des
Anciennes Lois Francoises depuis I'an 420, jusqu'a la
Revolution de 1789, 29 vols., See vol. XVI, Paris, 1829.
8. Sourdis, Henry de, Archbishop of Bordeaux, Correspondence,
Ed., Eugene Sue. (Collection des Documents inedits. . .
LVII) 3 vols., Paris, 1839.
This is the best source for information concerning Riche-
lieu 's marine activities. M. Sue has written an excellent
introduction, dealing with the state of the marine under
the Cardinal.
9. Montchretien, Antoyne de, L'economic Politique Patronale
Traicte de I'Oeconomie Politique . . . Ed., Th. Funck-
Brentano, Paris, 1889.
This economic work is especially important, because of
the fact that this is the first French work of that nature,
and also because it sets forth the basis of many of Riche-
lieu's economic ideas, whether he was acquainted with it
or not. Written in 1615, it is our first real evidence as
to the rise of economic ideas in France.
10. Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, (Domestic ser-
ies), (1625-1642), 19 vols., London, 1858-1887. Colonial,
(1574-1660), vol., I. London, 1860.
725] APPENDIX A 183
11. Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, (Venetian ser-
ies), Vols. XVIII-XXI, London, 1912-1916.
An important source for a study of the relations be-
tween England and France during the administration of
Richelieu, both from the English and the Venetian, or
neutral, point of view.
12. Voiture, Vincent de, Oeuvres, 2 vols. Ed., M. M. Ubicini,
Paris, 1855.
This work contains a very interesting eulogy of the
Cardinal by a contemporary, with much information in
regard to economic matters.
13. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Journal de
Monsieur Cardinal Richelieu, (1630-1631), Amsterdam,
1864.
Not very valuable so far as this study is concerned.
14. Mole, Mathieu, Memoires. (Societe de 1'Histoire de France),
4 vols., See vols. I-II. Paris, 1855-1857.
Mathieu Mole was a member and later president of the
Parlement of Paris. These memoirs are therefore im-
portant in that they give one an insight into the ideas of
Richelieu's opponents. They are also valuable in an eco-
nomic study of the period.
15. Beaurepaire, Charles Marie de, Cahiers des fitats de Nor-
mandie (1610-1666), (Societe de 1'Histoire de France), 3
vols., See vols. II-III, Rouen, 1876-1879.
A good source for the economic study of the period.
16. Talon, Omer, Memoires, Petitot, 2
e
serie, Vols. LX-LXIII,
See vol. LX, Paris, 1819-1829.
Omer Talon was an avocat in Parlement who in 1641
became avocat general. He was a constant opponent of
Richelieu, and therefore his writings are valuable as re-
gards disputes which arose between the Parlements and
the Cardinal. His work is not so much a memoir as a
compilation of speeches, extracts from the registers of
Parlement, etc. There is much material on the economic
side.
17. Brienne, Henri Auguste, Comte de, Memoires de Comte de
Brienne. (Societe de 1'Histoire de France), Vol. I, Paris,
1916.
18. Bassompierre, Francois, Marechal de, Memoires, (So-
184 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [726
ciete de 1'Histoire de Prance), 4 vols. See vols. III-IV,
Paris, 1870-1877.
19. Goulas, Nicholas, Memoires, (Societe de 1'Histoire de
France), 2 vols. See vol. I, Paris, 1879.
20. Tillieries, Leveneur, Comte de, Memoires, Paris, 1863.
Tillieries was ambassador to England in 1619 and his
memoirs furnish a good source for a study of Anglo-
French relations.
21. Dumont, Jean, Corps Universelle Diplomatique du Droit
des Gens, (800-1731), 8 vols. Supplement 5 vols. See
vol. V, pt. 2, vol. VI, pt. 1. Amst, et La Haye, 1726-1739.
This work contains treaties of alliance, peace, commerce,
etc., from 800 to 1731. It is a valuable source.
The following sources, while not of much value to this study,
yet are important in obtaining an all around conception of the
accomplishments of the great Cardinal.
22. La Force, Jacques Nompar, Memoires de La Force, 4 vols.,
Paris, 1843.
A faithful "marechal" of Louis XIII.
23. Kohan, Henri, Prince de Leon, Memoires, Petitot, 2e serie,
Vols. XVIII-XIX, 1819-1829.
Herein one finds the Huguenot side of the conflict with
Richelieu.
24. Orleans, Gaston, due de, Memoires, Petitot, 2e serie,
Vol. XXXI, 1819-1829.
25. Fontenay-Mareul, Frangois, Marquis de, Memoires, Petitot,
le serie, Vols. LI-LII, 1819-1829.
26. Souvigny, Jean, Gangnieres, Comte de, Memoires, 3 vols.,
See vols., I-II, Paris, 1906-1909.
An excellent account of the political accomplishments
of Richelieu and Mazarin.
GROUP III
Secondary Works
A. LIVES OF RICHELIEU
1. Perkins, James Breck, Richelieu and the Growth of French
Power, (Heroes of the Nation Series), New York, 1900.
A good general account of his life.
2. Lodge, Richard, Richelieu, London, 1896.
727] APPENDIX A 185
This book is of especial interest because the author did
not consider the Testament Politique of Richelieu as authen-
tic and thus did not use it in the preparation of his work.
See his appendix C.
3. Zeller, Berthold, Richelieu, London, 1884.
4. Fagniez, Gustave Charles, Le Pere Joseph et Richelieu, 2
vols., Paris, 1894.
5. Price, Eleanor C., Cardinal de Richelieu, New York, 1912.
Remarkable for its neglect of the economic side of Riche-
lieu 's administration.
B. GENERAL HISTORIES WHICH COVER THE PERIOD
1. Martin, Henry, Histoire de France, 6 vols., Paris, 1861.
2. Dareste, Antoine, Histmre de France, 9 vols., Paris, 1884-
1885.
3. Bazin, Anais de, Histvire de France sous Louis XIII et sous
le Ministere de Mazarin, ed. 2, 4 vols., Paris, 1846.
4. Ranke, Leopold, von, Franzosiche Geschichte, Vols. II, III.
Samtliche Werke, IX, X, Leipzig, 1876-1877.
5. Lavisse, Ernest, Histoire de France, 9 vols. See vol. VI,
Paris, 1896.
The best French account of this period.
6. Anquetil, Louis Pierre, Histoire de France, 14 vols. See
vols. X, XI, Paris, 1805.
7. Kitchin, George William, History of France, 3 vols., Oxford,
1892-1896.
8. Michelet, Jules, Histoire de France, 16 vols. See vol. II,
Paris, 1869.
9. Macdonald, John Ronald, A History of France, 3 vols. See
vol. II, New York, 1915.
C. HISTORIES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WHICH DEAL WITH THE PERIOD
1. Blanqui, [Jerome Adolphe], History of Political Economy,
New York, 1880.
2. Ingram, John Kells, History of Political Economy, London,
1904.
3. Schmoller, Gustave, The Mercantile System, New York, 1902.
4. Seeley, John Robert, The Expansion of England, London,
1891.
The main criticism of these works would seem to be that
186 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [728
they reveal a universal neglect of the economic side of
the administrative career of Kichelieu.
D. HISTORIES OF FRENCH COMMERCE
1. Bonnassieux, Louis Jean Pierre, Les Grandes Compagnies de
Commerce, Paris, 1892.
An excellent account of the French colonial and com-
mercial projects during the age of Eichelieu.
2. Deschamps, Leon, Histoire de la Question Coloniale en
France, Paris, 1891.
A unique work covering the colonial efforts made by
France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
3. Gouraud, Charles, Histoire de la Politique Commerciale de la
France et son Influence sur le Progres de la Richesse Pub-
lique, Paris, 1854.
This work is distinguished not only for the abundance
of facts, but for the novelty and profundity of its re-
views and ideas.
4. Levasseur, Emile, Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2
vols., Paris, 1911-1912.
An excellent work. M. Levasseur has the ability to
pick out the essentials from the non-essentials.
5. Pigeonneau, H[enri], Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2
vols. Paris, 1889.
One of the best works covering this phase of French
history. The author sees clearly the economic importance
of the seventeenth century.
6. Guenin, Eugene, Histoire de la Colonisation* Franc.aise dans la
Nouvelle France, Paris, 1896.
7. Masson, Paul, Histoire du Commerce Francois dans le Levant
en XVII* Siecle, Paris, 1896.
8. Masson, Paul, Histoire des Etablissemewts et du Commerce
Frangaise dans I'Africque Barbaresque (1560-1793), Paris,
1903.
10. Norman, Charles Boswell, Colonial France, London, 1886.
This work is not very reliable as the author makes a
number of mistakes with regard to important French
dates in French colonial history.
11. Weber, Henry, La Campagne Fran$aise des Indes, (1604-
1870), Paris, 1904.
729] APPENDIX A 187
E. FINANCIAL HISTORIES OF FRANCE
1. Bailly, Antoine, Histoire Financiers de la France, 2 vols.,
Paris, 1830.
2. Bresson, Jacques, Histoire Finmiciere de la, France, 2 vols.,
Paris, 1843.
Both works contain a fair estimate of the financial ad-
ministration during the period of Richelieu.
3. Forbonnais, Francois, F. de, Recherche* et Considerations sur
les Finances de France, 2 vols., Basel, 1758.
F. GENERAL WORKS ON THE PERIOD
1. Wakeman, Henry Offley, European History (1598-1715),
New York, 1916.
A standard brief general work in English for this period.
2. Caillet, Jules, L fAdministration en France sous le Ministere
du Cardinal de Richelieu, Paris, 1857.
A very conscientious and complete work, but a little
confused and apt to neglect the economic phase of the
subject.
3. Avenel, Georges, Comte de, Richelieu et la Monarchic Abso-
lue, 4 vols., Paris, 1859.
The best work concerning the Cardinal from an economic
point of view.
4. Bridges, John Henry, France under Richelieu and Colbert,
Edinburgh, 1866.
A combined economic and philosophical survey of
France under Richelieu and Colbert. An extremely val-
uable book.
5. Cambridge Modern History, 13 vols., and atlas. Cambridge,
1902-1912. See vol. IV, Ch. IV, "Richelieu."
6. Lavisse, Ernest, et Rambaud, Alfred, Histoire Generale, 12
vols., Vol. V, Paris, 1893-1901.
7. Lavallee, Theophile Sebastien, Histoire des Fran$ais, 6 vols.,
Paris, 1861.
8. (a) Lavisse, Ernest, et Rambaud, Alfred, Histoire de la
Civilisation Franqaise, 2 vols., Paris, 1897-1898.
(b) Rambaud, Alfred, Histoire de la Civilisation Franqaise,
2 vols., Paris, 1898.
9. Bonnefon, Paul, Societe Franqaise due XVII* Siecle, Paris,
1903.
188 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [730
10. Gasquet, Amedee Louis, Precis des Institutions Politiques et
Sociales de I'Ancienne France, 2 vols., Paris, 1885.
11. Avenel, Georges, Comte de, La Noblesse Frangaise sous Riche-
lieu, Paris 1901.
12. Avenel, Georges, Comte de, Pretres, Soldats, et Juges sous
Richelieu, Paris, 1907.
13. Normand, Charles, La Bourgeoisie Fran$aise au XVII
Siecle, 1604-1661, Paris, 1908.
14. Mims, Stewart Leas, Colbert's West India Policy. New
Haven, 1912. See Chapter I.
15. Parkman, Francis, The Jesuits of North America, Boston,
1905.
16. Hanotaux, Gabriel, Origine de I'Institution, des Intendants
des Provinces, Paris, 1884.
17. Michaud, Joseph Francois and Louis Gabriel, Biographic
Universelle, 45 vols., Paris, 1842-1865. See Vol. XXXV.
18. Montague, Francis Charles, History of England (1603-1660),
in Political History of England, VII, New York, 1911.
19. Trevelyan, George Macaulay, England under the Stuarts,
New York, 1910.
20. Cheyney, Edward Potts, A History of England, New York,
1914.
21. Bracq, Jean Charlemagne, France under the Republic, New
York, 1910.
22. Griffet, Henri, Histoire du Regne de Louis XIII, 3 vols.,
Paris, 1758.
APPENDIX B
THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE TESTAMENT
POLITIQUE
Because of the fact that this study is based largely upon
the writings of Cardinal Richelieu and especially upon his
Testament Politique, it seems best to discuss the problem of the
authenticity of the latter work, which has been a perennial
question ever since it was first published. That it belongs
among the most interesting memorials of French history in the
17th century, is shown by the great warmth with which schol-
ars have fought over it. "But," says Boehm, "such was the
fate of this work that its authenticity, and therewith its value
or worth must be placed in doubt because of a succession of
circumstances, not yet cleared up. Thus it has been under
suspicion until now. An important individual has opposed the
treatise and since then various teachers have exerted their ability
to defend or approve it. Indeed* few works of the world's lit-
erature have been subject to such a searching criticism. ' ' x
The Testament Politique was written sometime between the
years 1638 and 1642. D'Avenel says that Richelieu continued
his memoirs as far as 1638, and seeing that he could not finish
them, wrote the former work. 2 It is divided into two parts, the
first of which gives a short account of the reign of Louis XIII
up to that time, according to Richelieu's interpretation. The
second part is concerned mostly with matters of administration,
such as colonial development, the marine, finances, etc. Indeed
its contents demonstrate that in writing his Testament Politique,
Richelieu desired to leave it as a guide for the King after his
own death, when the coming peace would afford him a chance
to build up his state. Also, it was to serve as a vindication
of the Cardinal's administration, which had been grossly at-
tacked by many enemies.
1 Boehm, Introduction, 1.
zEichelieu, Lettres, VIII, 383.
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The personal nature of the work accounts for the fact that
it was not published, or known at first by the public at large.
Indeed, only a few people were aware of its existence. Yet
the fact that mention was made of it in a funeral oration upon
the Cardinal, which has been found in the British Museum,
certainly would indicate that some were acquainted with the
treatise and its important contribution. 3 Furthermore, the writer
of the oration bemoaned the fact that the King had not pub-
lished his copy of the Testament Politique. This showed that
the King had a copy which he was keeping secret, and explains
the late public appearance of the work. However, since neither
the King nor Richelieu left direct evidence that a copy was pre-
sented to the former and was to be kept secret, one cannot be
certain as to the precise reason for the late appearance of the
work. "The probabilities are," says one writer, "that it was
considered so important that it was reserved for the King alone
and thus its publication was delayed.
' ' *
There are a number of copies of the Testament Politique.
Among these are four important manuscripts, the first of which
is found in the French department of foreign affairs. It was
probably brought over in 1705 with the papers of Eichelieu
as a whole, which were sent there by permission of Louis XIV.5
The second manuscript was found in the Sorbonne, which insti-
tution obtained it from a former secretary of the Cardinal. The
third was found in the possession of M. Frudaine, councillor of
state and of the royal council. The fourth belonged originally
to M. de Saint-Palaye. The last two were manuscripts found
in the hands of private individuals and are thought to be copies
of the manuscript discovered in the department of foreign affairs.
Thus the first two can be regarded as original, since one was
found among the papers of the Cardinal, and the other given
by his secretary who recognized its authenticity.
In spite of the existence of these copies of the interesting
work, the historian Aubery, who took upon himself the task of
writing the life of the Cardinal, failed to find it among the
papers of Richelieu, which were in the possession of his niece
the Duchess of Aiguillon. He went ahead and published in
sBoehm, 15.
* Ibid., 16-17.
5
Eichelieu, Memoires, XI, 267-268.
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1678 a work entitled le Traite de la Regale. But when the
Testament appeared about ten years later, the latter work
proved that his conception of Richelieu's ideas with regard
to the royal prerogative was wrong. Indeed he found his rep-
utation as an authority on the life of the Cardinal to be injured,
and as a result' it was a question of either his downfall or that
of the Testament Politiqiie, and of course he favored the fall
of the latter.
Thus the fight started. "Aubery in his history of the Cardi-
nal Mazarin," says Boehm, "took a determined stand against
the authenticity of the work, but his criticism was purely per-
sonal and not scientific. ' ' 6 However, his failure to find the
manuscript gives evidence of the effort made to keep the work
secret as a personal possession of the King. No apparent effort
was made between 1642 and 1687, to make the public aware
of it. Nevertheless, once it got into print, its intrinsic impor-
tance made it an object of eager debate, and the question of its
authenticity became a live one. 7
Next comes the great debate of 1749 between the historians
Voltaire and Foncemagne with regard to the last writing of the
Cardinal. Voltaire hated Richelieu from the very first and
saw a chance to pay his respects to the departed churchman.
At this point one must take into account the attitude of
certain groups toward Richelieu as largely influencing the
secrecy of the Testament and accounting for the violent oppo-
sition to it. Sympathy could not be expected for the Cardinal
or for his work from such opponents as the nobles and the
Parlement of Paris. Indeed, it is surprising that they permitted
the work to appear at all. It certainly did not suit their polit-
ical ambitions, and therein lies the political explanation for
the suppression of and the opposition to the great book.
On the other hand, Richelieu left some strong friends espec-
ially among the intellectual class. Gabriel Hanotaux, for ex-
ample, may be cited as the greatest living exponent of the true
greatness of the Bishop of Luzon. It is due to such men that
a reliable account of the life of Richelieu can be obtained at
present.
Voltaire made an unauthentic, prejudiced attack which was
e Boehm, 18.
19.
192 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [734
answered by Foncemagne in a clear, fair, and concise manner.
"In fact," says Boehm, "he knew how to return every thrust
with absolute certainty and effect.
' ' 8
However, as the dispute
was a personal one, it is not worth considering except in so far
as the motives behind it aid in an explanation of the results
obtained. The opposition to Richelieu, in a political and personal
sense, found a welcome outlet in numerous attacks on his last
work. For example, Voltaire's second assault upon the Testa-
ment was brought about more from personal enmity against
certain Amsterdam publishers than from a desire to oppose the
Testament Politique. He was determined to "show up" these
publishers as being frauds, and picked upon the last contribu-
tion of the Cardinal as a means by which this was to be done.
The result was a torrent of sarcastic abusive personal remarks
which really meant nothing against the book itself.
Opposition developed to the attacks of Voltaire, and the Tes-
tament Politique had many defenders. Foncemagne in a letter,
made a reply which put the former on the defensive. But
nothing positive came out of this conflict. The authenticity of
the work was not proved as yet, and the question as to whether
Richelieu had written the notes and not the text or vice versa
was unsettled. In fact, the crux of the argument now centered
around a study of the original manuscripts, which contained the
text and some notes written on their borders. Of course, the
Cardinal is accused of obtaining his ideas in finances from Sully,
but this proves nothing, as Boehm points out, for any writer at
that time used the intellectual ideas of the age as common
property. This custom is also illustrated in Richelieu's Mem-
oirs, but they must be considered likewise a part of his own
ideas.9
Both Foncemagne and Ranke recognized the spirit of Riche-
lieu in this work, but when they found anything in the book
which reminded them of other authors they put down a question
mark as to that particular section. The best example is perhaps
the chapter devoted to the finances, which was considered to
have been written by Sully or someone else who had read Sully 's
works. However, Foncemagne admitted finally that the chap-
s Boehm, 23-24.
9 Ibid., 28. Also, that the Cardinal might have obtained his ideas
from Montchretien, but what does this prove!
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ters concerning the finances and the marine, if not written by
the Cardinal, were set down by his secretaries under his super-
vision. Boehm does not doubt that they were the ideas of
Richelieu and of no one else.10
The final stage of the controversy was reached when Hano-
taux brought out his Fragments et Maximes de Richelieu, which
were written by Richelieu without doubt, since his handwriting
has been recognized.
Now these fragments are a part of his Testament Politique.
That is, all the passages having a certain mark are found in
the latter work. Furthermore, along the margin of certain
passages is found the word Testament, which would tend to
prove that particular sections were to be inserted in his last
great work.
"
However, Hanotaux's discovery does not absolutely prove
the authenticity of the Politique," says Boehm.
12 It merely
supports the funeral oration mentioned above in the proof that
the Cardinal actually intended to write a work of that kind.
One must further conclude that the real Testament Politique
arose uniformly and grew as an organic unit, that it was writ-
ten during the latter part of his life, and that it was completed
and was not a mere "torso." The Fragments to Boehm are
just a part of the work. The marginal notes on the text are
changes to be made in the revision of the work. He has no
doubt that the fragments, the text, and the marginal notes com-
prise what Richelieu planned should be a part of a final copy
which he would not be able to finish.13 Does this explanation not
help to explain the late publication of the work and the silence
concerning it ? In other words, the Testament Politique we now
have is a combination of the text, the marginal notes, and the
fragments. That the process of copying might bring about
slight mistakes is to be expected, but this fact does not prove
the falsity of the work.
Finally, when one considers again the purposes which Riche-
lieu had in writing this book : (1) to influence the King to wait
10 Boehm, 29-30.
11 Eiehelieu, Maximes d'titat, 707-728.
12 Boehm, 30-31.
tU, 30-31.
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until the coming peace to take up the great reorganization of the
state, (2) to leave a defense of his life-work against future
attacks that might be made against him; one cannot doubt its
importance and truth: "out of these purposes grew the great
interest which Richelieu put into his work and the value he
attributed to it. " 14 That he tried to adopt and follow out a
system based on what is in his Testament Politique is evident
to students of his administration. Indeed, the tenseness and
unity of it all, the firmness with which the portions were skill-
fully^ inserted in the building up of the whole work, and above
all the high personal purpose of it all, makes Richelieu responsi-
ble for every line of it. When one studies his life and finds out
how he constantly considered the future of France; when one
compares this work with his Memoirs and letters, and sees the
conformity in style, judgment, and opinions, it seems incon-
ceivable that this is the work of any other man than the Cardi-
nal. Was there another individual in France capable of writing
a book as great as the Testament Politique ? Bonnefon says,
"It is a work which shows the man more than the writer,
' ' 15
and this makes it of supreme value; for in reading it, one can
conceive of no other personality than that of Richelieu behind
it all. Pigeonneau sums the whole matter up when he says that
it is his work in thought as in style. 16 The authenticity of the
Testament Politique is today generally admitted.
17
i* Boehm, 32.
is Bonnefon, 415-416.
is Pigeonneau, II, 376-377.
"Molinier, XI, 35.
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Vol. IV
No. 1. Madame De Stael's literary reputation in England. By R. C.
Whitford. 75 cents.
Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Index verborum quae in Senecae fabulis necnon in Octavia
praetexta reperiuntur. By W. A. Oldfather, A. S. Pease, and
H. V. Canter. Part I, $2.00. Parts II and III, $1.50 each.
Vol. V
Noa. 1 and 2. The influence of Christianity on the vocabulary of Old
lish poetry. By A. Keiser. $1.50.
No. 3. Spenser's defense of Lord Grey. By H. S. V. Jones. $1.00.
No. 4. Ysopet-Avionnet: The Latin and French texts. By K. McKenzie
and W. A. Oldfather. (In press.)
Vol. VI
No. 1. La Colleccion Cervantina de la Sociedad Hispanica de America.
Ediciones de Don Quijote. By Homero Seris. $1.50.
Vol. VII
No. 1. Sir Robert Howard's comedy, "The committee." With introduc-
tion and note. By C. N. Thurber. $1.50.
No. 2. Tho
-opulchre of Christ in art and liturgy. By N. C. Brooks. $1.50.
. Tho language of Konungs Skuggsja. By G. T. Flom. (In press.)
UNIVERSITY OK ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Vol. IX, 19-20
Nos. 1 and 2. War pov\; executive in the United States. By C.
A. Berdahl. $2.25.
No. ". Eiiglih GoverniM <nS. By F. C. T)u<(z. (Out of
print.)
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